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This study investigates the impact of Turkish ‘settlers’ on conceptions of collective identity in 
northern Cyprus during the period 1995-2013. It traces the discursive effects of immigration and 
the citizenship status of populations from Turkey on competing identity narratives in the context 
of Cyprus’s EU accession by focusing on three distinct empirical domains: political parties, civil 
society and the print media. 
 
Inspired by the conceptual framework of the poststructuralist discourse theory and constructivist 
readings on nationalism and immigration, the investigation seeks to explain the discursive 
mechanisms of identity construction and transformation in relation to immigration from Turkey 
which represents a key element in the narration of identity in northern Cyprus. More specifically, 
the thesis explores how the presence of populations from Turkey has been framed within the 
dominant narratives on identity along two antagonistic versions: Turkishness and Cypriotness. 
Using qualitative methodology based on discourse analysis, the empirical sections trace the 
continuity and change in these narratives and their framing of the ‘settler issue’ in the course of 
Cyprus’s EU accession and the ongoing anticipation on part of the Turkish-Cypriot community for 
eventual membership. The purpose of the investigation is to reveal the logic of securitization 
within both discourses that compete to attach a meaning onto identity in northern Cyprus. 
 
The findings demonstrate that the discursive space of the Turkish-Cypriot community is 
dominated by these competing, securitised versions of subjectivity and belonging. Traditionally 
interpreted within the hegemony of Turkishness, the antagonistic reading of immigration and the 
citizenship status of ‘settlers’ by the subversive Cypriotness discourse also reveals the potential 
to significantly increase the appeal of alternative visions and projects through securitization. 
Indeed, the northern Cyprus case testifies that appeal to identity involves much more than a 
source of self-identification, involving a contestation over autonomy, statehood and purpose.  
 
In this sense, the thesis aspires to make a contribution in both empirical and conceptual terms. 
The investigation of identity politics in relation to Turkish ‘settlers’ provides fascinating empirical 
findings on Turkish-Cypriot politics and society but also the Turkish-Cypriot perceptions of Turkey 
which have attracted limited scholarly attention thus far. Placing the investigation within the 
wider discourse-analytical framework also offers significant insights to complement existing 
understandings of the political relevance of identity in particularly intriguing migration settings 
found in unrecognised states but also in other contexts involving similar dynamics such as the 
presence of a ‘kin’ state. The current thesis thus offers a particular aspect of the infamous ‘Cyprus 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
 
 
1571  Beginning of the Ottoman Rule in Cyprus.  
1914   Full annexation of Cyprus by the British.  
1925   The island becomes crown colony. 
1955-1959  Clashes between the Greek-Cypriot led EOKA and British/ Turkish-Cypriots.   
1960   Cyprus gains independence as the ‘Republic of Cyprus’. Treaty of Guarantee 
   gives Britain, Greece and Turkey the right to intervene.  
1963-1967  Inter-communal clashes/ gradual Turkish-Cypriot retreatment into ethnic 
   enclaves.  
1967   Turkish Cypriots set up the ‘Turkish-Cypriot Provisional Administration’.   
1974   Military junta in Greece orchestrates a coup against the Cypriot President 
   Makarios. Within days, Turkey retaliates with a military operation which is later 
   consolidated into ‘invasion’ by enforcing the partition of the island between the 
north and the south. Around 165,000 Greek-Cypriots flee or are driven to south, 
and around 45,000 Turkish-Cypriots move to the north. 
1975 (Feb) Turkish-Cypriots establish the ‘Turkish Federative State of Cyprus’ with Rauf  
   Denktash as the President; the statelet is immediately denounced by the United 
   Nations as ‘illegal’.   
1975 (May) The ‘settler recruitment programme’ (1975-1983) initiated by the Turkish 
-Cypriot authorities and Ankara facilitates the large-scale transfer of Turkish 
nationals into the north. 
1977-1979  Makarios-Denktash ‘4 Points Agreements’ for a federal, bi-communal, non 
-aligned state as the basis of negotiations on the Cyprus issue.   
1980-1983 UN-Sponsored inter-communal talks, which, ultimately, collapse.  
1983  Turkish-Cypriots proclaim the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ recognised 
   only by Turkey 
1984- 1991 Various UN efforts for resolution of the ‘Cyprus problem’ fail.   
1990  Republic of Cyprus applies for European Union membership.   
1995  The General Affairs Council confirms Cyprus’s suitability for membership 
1996  Turkish-Cypriot journalist Kutlu Adalı, murdered near his home in Nicosia. 
1998  Beginning of negotiations for European Union accession of Cyprus.  
1998  Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots pledge closer integration in reaction to Cyprus’s EU 
   accession process. 
1999  Turkey becomes candidate for European Union membership, with the resolution 
   of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ as part of her accession conditionality.    
2000-2001 Banking crisis in the north erupts into civil unrest. 
2002 (Nov) First presentation of the United Nations sponsored ‘Annan Plan’ for the 
resolution of the ‘Cyprus Problem’.   
2002 (Dec) Rise of ‘Justice and Development Party’ government in Turkey.   
x 
 
2002-2003 Rise and prevalence of Turkish-Cypriot public opposition to Denktash leadership 
   and the right-wing administration led by the ‘National Unity Party’ and the  
   ‘Democratic Party’  
2003 (Apr) Cyprus border partially opens for the first time since 1974. 
2003 (Dec) Moderate, pro-EU CTP wins the Turkish-Cypriot legislative elections.   
2004 (Apr) ‘Annan Plan’ is accepted by the Turkish-Cypriots and rejected by the Greek 
   -Cypriots.  
2004 (May) Cyprus enters the European Union as a divided island.   
2005  Moderate Mehmet Ali Talat replaces Rauf Denktash as the second Turkish 
   -Cypriot President.   
2008  New inter-communal talks on the Cyprus issue commence.   
2009  ‘National Unity Party’ returns to the Turkish-Cypriot government.   
2010  Hard-liner Derviş Eroğlu becomes the third Turkish-Cypriot President. 
2010-2012 A series of ‘Communal Survival Rallies’ are organised to protest new austerity 
measures and demographic changes. 
2013  The leftist ‘Republican Turkish Party’ returns to office after winning the 

























NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY 
 
This thesis does not deal with the legality of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of northern 
Cyprus and the legitimacy of its governing institutions. Northern Cyprus (with a small ‘n’) is the 
term generally preferred in this study to designate the distinction of the Turkish-Cypriot political 
space. For purposes of analytical clarity, public institutions are nonetheless referred here by their 
original name, as used by the Turkish-Cypriots themselves (‘president’, ‘government’, ‘minister’, 
etc.) The term ‘settler’, though not part of the Turkish-Cypriot political lexicon, is modified in its 
usage here with a view to reveal the complexity (and the contingency) of the context in which it 
is utilised. Other categories, such as ‘immigrants’ and ‘citizens’ are also used in tandem, to further 
distinguish between different groups with varying legal statuses and rights in a real albeit 
















CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The Case Study 
1.2 Focus and Timeframe 
1.3 The Conceptual Framework 
1.4 Scope, Limitations and Contribution 
1.5 Methodology 
1.6 Thesis Overview 
 
1.1. The Case Study 
 
The ‘Cyprus Problem’ has long drawn world attention, perhaps increasingly more so in 
the context of the island’s accession into the European Union in May 2004. On 11 November 
2002, the then United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed a comprehensive 
plan towards settling the diplomatic dispute to allow the EU accession of a reunified Cyprus. 
Following extensive negotiations, the fifth version of the so-called ‘Annan Plan’ was submitted to 
simultaneous referenda on 24 April 2004, the results of which are well-known: 65 percent of 
Turkish-Cypriot voters accepted the Plan while 76 percent of Greek-Cypriot voters casted ‘no’.2 
The aborted plan notwithstanding, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), representing the whole of the 
divided island, joined the EU a week later on 1 May 2004. Talks were relaunched at the end of a 
two-year deadlock, when the Cypriot President Papadopoulos and the newly-elected Turkish-
Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat agreed, on 8 July 2006, to discuss ‘issues that affect day-to-day 
life’ and, concurrently, substantive issues.3 The ‘Gambari Process’, as it came to be known, almost 
                                                          
2 For a comprehensive analysis of the Greek Cypriot ‘no’ vote in 2004 referendum, see Lordos (2004).  
3 In July 2006, the Under-Secretary General of the United Nations for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari was 
successful in bringing the leaders of the Turkish and Greek side together to break the post-Annan Plan deadlock. 
The outcome of the initiative was a statement agreed by two leaders reaffirming the basic principles of a solution 




immediately developed into a stalemate however, and the five-point accord was not 
implemented. Dimitris Christofias’ election as the Republic’s President in 24 February 2008 ended 
the impasse and in March, he and Talat agreed to resume the settlement process, with working 
groups and technical committees.4 Talat was ousted at the ‘presidential’ elections on 18 April 
2010 by Derviş Eroğlu, a right-winger, who continued negotiations with Christofias under the UN 
Special Envoy Alexander Downer. Though without much progress, peace negotiations came to a 
complete halt in 2014 when the Greek-Cypriots walked out in protest of a Turkish ship entering 
Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in search for natural gas. At the time of writing, Cyprus, 
once again stands at a cross-road with renewed efforts by the Turkish-Cypriot leader Mustafa 
Akıncı who was elected in 2015 and Nicos Anastasiades who succeeded Christofias in 2013 to 
push forward the new round of negotiations with an aim to reach a deal by the end of 2016 
(Cyprus Mail, 2016a).5 
 
Numerous studies have been published over the years to illuminate the nature of the 
conflict in Cyprus and the current impasse with a good number of them aiming to overcome the 
existing political stalemate and averting the recurrence of similar ones in the future, all building 
up to a remarkable body of work on the ‘Cyprus Problem’.6 This thesis, while taking stock of the 
                                                          
Council Resolutions”. The agreement also reintroduced the so-called ‘Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)’ and 
announced new rounds of negotiations on “issues of day-to-day cooperation” (PIO, 2006).  
4 For a detailed account of the negotiations between Talat and Christofias, see Kaymak and Faustmann (2010). 
5 With six official areas to negotiate (governance and power-sharing, property, territory, security and guarantees, 
the economy and EU matters, Anastasiades and Akıncı had, at the time of writing, held over 30 meetings. 
6  For an excellent review of the literature on the history of the conflict and its EU dimension, see Demetriou 
(2004); for a more recent discussion on the security dimension of the Cyprus Conflict, see Ker-Lindsay, (2008); 
edited volume by Bozkurt and Trimikliniotis (2012) offers a number of fresh and critical perspectives on the island’s 
politics; Kyris’ (2015) work is an exciting new addition to the body of work on the ‘Cyprus Problem’ with an 
exclusive focus on the ‘Europeanization’ of the Turkish-Cypriot community’.  
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existing knowledge, nonetheless departs from the current literature on the ‘Cyprus Problem’ by 
seeking to shed light into an important aspect of the island’s politics which has attracted limited 
scholarly attention thus far: the migratory flows from Turkey into northern Cyprus since the de 
facto partition of the island in 1974 and the impact this has had on Turkish-Cypriot conceptions 
of identity.  
 
Estimated to be around 105,000 in a population of around 295,0007, the presence of 
Turkish immigrants and ‘settlers’8 in northern Cyprus constitutes one of the most contentious 
issues in the Cyprus negotiations and on the political agendas across the ‘Green Line’.9 The 
Republic of Cyprus has consistently argued that the presence of the Turkish population 
constitutes a violation of international law with particular reference to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949.10 Any Turkish national who travels to Cyprus using the air or sea ports in the 
‘occupied areas’ is thus automatically considered an ‘illegal settler’. In addition, the continuous 
‘transfer of population’, for the Republic of Cyprus, amounts to a ‘process of colonization pursued 
by Ankara’ (RoC, 2006). RoC position is further echoed in a number of international opinions on 
the issue; according to a 2003 Recommendation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
                                                          
7 Figures based on the latest (2011) census conducted by the ‘State Planning Organisation’ (DPO), a comprehensive 
breakdown of the results are available online at http://devplan.org/Nufus-2011/nufus%20son.pdf. It should be 
noted here, however, that the population of the TRNC and the number of Turkish settlers/immigrants within it are 
much contested with other estimates citing much higher figures ranging from 120,000 (DPO, 2016) ‘200,000 
upwards in a population of 300,000’ (International Crisis Group, 2010, p.2) and 500,000 (Cole, 2011).   
8 For the analytical distinction between the two categories, see section 2.4 in Chapter 2. 
9 The term ‘Green Line’ refers to the cease fire line, controlled by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force 
(UNFICYP) that de facto divides Cyprus, cutting through the capital of Nicosia. 
10 The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 states that ‘the occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its 





Europe (CoE): ‘the presence of the settlers constitutes a process of hidden colonization and an 
additional and important obstacle to a peaceful negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem’ (CoE, 
2003). Public attitudes in the Republic also appear to be in favour of taking a tough stance11 and 
attitudes towards Turkish migrants and ‘settlers’ are often hostile.12  
 
Turkish-Cypriot positions on the issue, however, are less clear. The nationalist discourse 
— fervently advocated by the former Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and to a large extent 
by the right-wing parties that have historically dominated the Turkish-Cypriot administration (see 
sections 4.3 and 4.4 in Chapter 4) — does not differentiate a Turkish-Cypriot from a Turkish 
national. Denktash’ often-cited formulation, ‘A Turk goes, another Turk comes’, appears to sum 
up the line of thought which guided official views and policies on immigration and citizenship for 
the greater part of the administration’s history. In the last two decades, however, public opinion 
— galvanised by the Turkish-Cypriot left (see section 4.5 in Chapter 4), large segments of the civil 
society (section 5.4 in Chapter 5) and oppositional newspapers (see section 6.3 and 6.4 in Chapter 
6) — is presumed to have taken a more critical stance toward immigration and the naturalisation 
of Turkish migrants in articulating their identity-related anxieties within a Cypriotness discourse.  
                                                          
11 According to a 2009 poll, Greek Cypriots are willing to accept a mix of citizenship and residence permits only for 
two categories of Turkish immigrants: those born in Cyprus of mixed Turkish/Cypriot parents and those married to 
a Turkish Cypriot. For all other categories of Turkish immigrants, large Greek Cypriot majorities favour either 
immediate or gradual repatriation. Lordos, A. et al. (2010) 
12 Christiansen (2005); for Lordos et al. (2008), Greek Cypriot intolerance for the presence of Turkish nationals’ 





Previous studies have thus far attempted to explain this shift in identity discourse with 
inadequate reference to immigration from Turkey, although the notion of the immigrant ‘other’ 
is inherent in the so-called Cypriotness discourse.13 Indeed, a ‘hierarchy of Cypriotness’ is often 
constructed whereby Turkish immigrants are categorised as the ‘others’ which threaten, or are 
perceived to threaten presumed Turkish Cypriot ‘authenticity’ (loss of cultural identity) and 
‘autonomy’ (fear of political subordination). The key objective of the study is to place the 
presence of populations from Turkey at the heart of its investigation of the development and 
transformation of collective identity in northern Cyprus.      
 
1.2. Focus and timeframe 
 
  Understanding the impact of Turkish migration into northern Cyprus on conceptions of 
identity involves studying identity change. Accordingly, the investigation traces the 
transformations in identity narratives in the course of Cyprus’s EU accession period (this is 
elaborated further below). Conceptualising identity as a discursive construct which is made 
possible through the exclusion of ‘otherness’, the analysis here selects one central dimension of 
the ‘self-other’ dialectic that accounts for identity construction in the Turkish-Cypriot community, 
Turkish ‘settlers’ — and follows its evolution under two dominant narratives, namely Turkishness 
and the rival Cypriotness discourse. While the focus is predominantly on the articulation of the 
                                                          
13 Several studies, most notably those by Ramm (2005), Lacher and Kaymak (2005), Vural and Rustemli (2007), 
Hatay (2005, 2007), Sahin (2008), Loizides (2011) and Akcali (2011) highlight the identity transformation in 
northern Cyprus with reference to the Cypriotness discourse but do not engage sufficiently with the impact of 
immigration on the notion of identity or the framing of ‘settlers’ in competing identity discourses.   
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twin issues of immigration and the citizenship rights of Turkish ‘settlers’, the investigation 
attempts to identify transformations both in the discursive position of the ‘other’ but also in the 
‘self’. It therefore follows identity narratives articulated toward the domestic discursive space 
(see below). Empirically, this implies studying variations diachronically within empirical domains 
and synchronically across the domains in which concepts under investigation are constructed. 
Competing articulations of immigration narratives are therefore traced around three empirical 
domains that have traditionally offered important sites of identity (re)construction in northern 
Cyprus: political parties, civil society and the print media.   
 
  The process of Cyprus’s EU membership is seen here as showcasing the hegemonic 
struggles taking place in this context. As it will be demonstrated throughout the study, the 
prospects of European Integration brought about significant changes to the discursive space of 
the Turkish-Cypriot community in a very visible way by enabling the Cypriotness discourse to 
compete with the dominant meanings established by Turkish nationalism whilst at the same time 
revealing the securitizing attempts of both discourses in the context of heightened contestation. 
The period leading to the accession of the island also displays a distinct openness about the 
legitimacy of nationalism because of the specific historical juncture it created (this is further 
elaborated in section 2.5).  
 
  A logical approach to setting the timeframe within which identity change will be analysed 
here is therefore to look at identity narratives at the outset of Cyprus’s EU accession process and 
after. Though Cyprus’s membership bid was formally launched in July 1990, a discretionary 
7 
 
criterion has been preferred here to select 1995 as the beginning of the analysed period. Despite 
the significant symbolism of the July 1990 bid, it was not until March 1995 that Cyprus’s suitability 
for membership was confirmed. In this sense, it can be suggested that the prospects of EU 
membership became more salient only after 1995 and would mark the beginning of a period of 
intense contestation in the Turkish-Cypriot community. The chronological point marking its end 
is set by the Turkish-Cypriot legislative elections of 2013 featuring identity and immigration as 
key electoral battlegrounds. 
  
  Within this timeframe (1995-2013), identity narratives articulating the discursive 
positions on immigration from Turkey and the citizenship rights of Turkish nationals/settlers are 
studied around the moments of increased salience marked by significant events and discursive 
occurrences. Of particular importance here are election periods, major developments in relation 
to the ‘Cyprus Problem’, significant events concerning immigration (such as amnesties for 
unauthorised workers), and other events of bilateral concern including various economic and 
political protocols/treaties signed with Turkey. Therefore, the discursive space which is object of 
this investigation is chronologically oriented toward these points (Table 1). 
 
  The conceptual insights from the poststructuralist discourse theory and its principal 
methodological tool of discourse analysis that are utilised to carry out the analytical task in the 






Figure 1. Analytical timeframe and salience of immigration-related identity
Event  1995-2000 2000-2004 2004-2009 2009-2013 
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1.3. The Conceptual Framework 
 
  In tracing the impact of Turkish immigration on conceptions of identity, the study 
develops an eclectic14 conceptual framework, combining discourse theory with constructivist 
strands from two academic (sub-)disciplines: nationalism and immigration studies. Inspired by 
critical theory and the postmodernist school, poststructuralist and constructivist approaches not 
only suggest new ways of conceptualising about the ‘nation’, power relations and political control 
but also provide the analytical tools to uncover mechanisms of hegemony and domination over 
such social meanings as nationhood, belonging, purpose and otherness. Thus, some of the 
seminal ideas of earlier modernists such as Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’ (1991) are 
operationalised within a conceptual framework of seeing identity and its elements as subjective 
and contextual. Poststructuralist and constructivist approaches also emphasise the central role 
of language in constituting social reality, objective knowledge and/or power relations15, which 
suggests that any relevant understanding of social phenomena, such as identity change, should 
start from studying the language used to speak of them. A key focus of these approaches toward 
identity, therefore, is discourse and the meanings it articulates in order to establish the contours 
of the ‘imagined community’. Looking at collective/national identity from the cross-section of 
these academic fields permits a more rounded understanding. It allows for the incorporation of 
various theoretical approaches (securitization theory and critical approaches to studying 
                                                          
14 This relates to Mouzelis’ idea of ‘conceptual pragmatism’ in social theory which “has as its major task to clarify 
conceptual tools and to construct new ones by following criteria of utility rather than truth” (1995: 9). 
15 See below for a brief discussion of the ontological differences between some strands of the Critical Discourse 
Analysis and the poststructuralist discourse theory. 
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nationalism), various levels of analysis (distinguished by various domestic remits or empirical 
domains) and various qualitative methods, discourse analysis in particular, to uncover the 
dynamics of identity construction and highlight the mechanisms through which they change and 
with what implications. Thus, it promises to guide the key research question of this study:  
 





  Originating in branches of philosophy, literary theory and linguistics, discourse analysis 
has been utilised within a wide range of disciplines including sociology, anthropology, 
communication, and politics. One of its most relevant contribution to the study of politics has 
been demonstrating the discursive construction of “objects of knowledge, situations and social 
roles as well as identities” (Wodak et al., 2009: 8). Informed by aforementioned 
conceptualisations of power, the discourse analysis method and that of Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) within it, is aimed at studying the contexts in which language operates or the ‘text 
in context’ (Van Dijk, 1977: 2008), to reveal the rhetorical strategies, and the goals a language is 
meant to impose, in the constitution of particular social conditions and identities. This is an 
important distinction of the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) developed in the works of 
Fairclough, Van Dijk and Wodak, in relation to other discourse-analytical approaches, in the sense 
11 
 
that the main focus is not on the linguistic system and its grammatical and semantic functions 
but rather the linguistic relations between discursive practices and social structures.  
 
 In a similar vein, Ruth Wodak’s ‘socio-diagnostic’ critique further suggests going beyond 
the ‘text’ and indeed, for the analysis making use of “background or contextual knowledge” in 
order to embed the discursive event in a wider frame of social and political relations, processes 
and circumstances (Wodak, 2001: 65). The methodological approach that is utilised hereafter 
adheres to this premise of the discourse-historical approach of Wodak and others, by integrating 
a large quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the 
social and political fields which form the ‘context’. From this perspective, an important 
methodological advantage of discourse analysis is that it facilitates approaching the ‘object 
investigated from multiple theoretical and methodological perspectives’, implying using various 
methods of data collection and the analysis of different sets of data.   
  
  This is particularly helpful for the purposes of the current investigation because the 
discursive construction of collective/national identity in relation to immigration involves 
articulation at different levels: government (adopting relevant legislation on citizenship, work 
permits, amnesties, etc.), political parties (press statements, speeches, publications), print media 
(opinion making on day-to-day issues) and civil society (indicating public debate on various 
aspects of the subject), etc. Discourse analysis as a method allows for the incorporation of these 
levels and a rich data set into the investigation to identify and contrast competing identity 
narratives and divergent articulations of immigration within them. The current analysis therefore 
12 
 
uses a customised selection method that has been designed to incorporate data comprising both 
oral and written texts (primary and secondary) from across the three empirical domains. The 
following paragraphs summarise the data set utilised to investigate identity narratives and their 




 The introduction of the conceptual framework (Chapter 2) includes a thorough review of 
a wide range of secondary sources on identity, nationalism and immigration including books and 
journal articles. Chapter 3 which highlights the genesis of Turkishness in Cyprus uses a wide range 
of secondary sources primarily on the modern history of Cyprus but also some primary texts 
produced in news reports and other archival material relevant to the investigation. In the 
remainder of the study, the bulk of the empirical analysis uses texts from primary sources 
produced by government representatives such as the Prime Minister, the President, members of 
the Parliament, relevant ministers, but also print media, leading journalists, relevant civil society 
actors as well as the mainstream parties. In form, the corpus of texts covers, among others, 
official statements by governmental actors, press-conferences, press releases of parties and 
other actors, speeches, official interviews in the media, news reports, relevant columns, 
editorials and op-eds in the print media and interview transcripts.  
  
  The selection process to produce a viable research corpus, moreover, is based on the 
topical area and subjective judgement. The topical area involved manually identifying texts 
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containing interpretations predominantly concerned with identity, and searching contextual 
occurrences of particular words such as ‘immigration’, ‘immigrants’, ‘Turkish-born nationals’, 
‘citizenship’, ‘naturalisations’, etc. A further ‘temporal’ criterion has also been followed to reduce 
the data set in line with the timeframe of the investigation which has meant that data collection, 
for the empirical chapters in particular (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) was restricted predominantly to the 
texts produced between 1995 and 2013.16 The search was further focused around key 
chronological moments (i.e. discursive events) determined by the salience of the studied 
narratives (see Figure 1). 
  
  In addition, the empirical chapters draw extensively on semi-structured interviews 
conducted with a variety of Turkish-Cypriot elites in Nicosia during the investigation (appendix.) 
Whilst majority of them being face-to-face, a small minority of interviews were conducted via 
email whereby interviewees were provided with a list of questions to respond. The entire 
sequence of question sets (appendix 5) was introduced in all the interviews in the same order. 
The analysis of the interviews concentrated on the discursive constructions of identity narratives 
and the articulation of Turkish immigration within them. The results were organised according to 
the thematic and chronological discussion in the study. In this sense, the transcripts were 
interpreted in a stylised way to highlight the specific contexts. The name and exact 
position/status of the interviewees remain confidential (appendix 4).   
  
                                                          
16 To provide a fuller understanding of discourses being investigated, those events that stood outside of the 
selected timeframe were nonetheless acknowledged and referenced in the introductory sections providing 
contextual background for each case study.  
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  Last but not least, it is important to emphasise again that the discursive analysis 
undertaken here concentrates less at the micro-linguistic level but more so on the content level 
i.e. on the specific interpretations of key elements and concepts as well as the recurring patterns 
of argumentation (and their ‘securitization’ in particular, see section 2.3.a in Chapter 2) and 
modification of identity and immigration-related narratives and the ways in which these were 
combined within rival interpretations. This is related to the understanding of ‘text’ here as a 
specific and unique realisation of a discourse. In other words, the study is concerned with text in 
so far as it relates to the socio-political and the historical context. As stated earlier, one principal 
aim is to uncover securitizing logics that different yet competing identity interpretations rely on. 
Depending on the context, i.e. the empirical domain and the event related to immigration – one 
or another aspect of the identity discourse evoked with the securitizing logic17 is thus brought 
into prominence in text. In all three case studies, or empirical domains therefore, discourse 
analysis is aimed at following the genesis and transformation of narratives in a historical 
trajectory and in line with the social interests of the actors and their power relations through the 
interaction between text and ‘context’. 
  
  This distinction does point, to some extent, to an ontological issue that often sets Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) and the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) from the traditional 
Discourse Theoretical (DT) approaches that are at best suspicious of any ontological distinction 
                                                          
17 Logic here refers to a more or less intentional plan of discursive practices adopted to achieve a particular social, 
political, psychological or linguistic aim. As far as the articulation of immigration is concerned, it relates to the 
framing of the latter as an ‘existential threat’ to evoke a particular understanding of identity in an attempt to fix its 
meaning, thus rendering it ‘hegemonic’. This is elaborated further in the following chapter. 
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between the ‘text’ and the ‘context’ (especially if the latter is conceived as a ‘constraint’, see for 
example Balzacq, 2011). In DT approaches, more specifically, the distinction between linguistic 
(text) and non-linguistic (context) is internal to discourse. CDA approaches, on the other hand, 
retain a distinction between the semiotic and material dimensions of social relations and 
processes (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). While it is beyond the scope of this investigation to clarify 
at length the conceptual presuppositions that both approaches share18 suffice it to say that it 
aligns itself with both approaches. Theoretically, the analysis follows Laclau and Mouffe in 
breaking away from a strict discursive/non-discursive dichotomy and the strong realist 
tendencies that are at the heart of some CDA approaches. Methodologically, on the other hand, 
it aligns itself with the Critical Discourse Analysis and the historical-discursive approach of Ruth 
Wodak (2009) in particular, in collating a wide range of data and conducting the micro level 
analysis of texts as a means to reveal their interaction with the context and macro-level 
structures whilst, of course, acknowledging the latter’s discursive contingency, at least in theory 
(see section 2.2.b in Chapter 2). 
  
 Within this framework, access to data has been unproblematic. Since the investigation 
used texts that are produced for public consumption, they were accessible through electronic 
sources and were available online through newspaper websites, leading media archives and 
other institutional platforms (governmental websites, websites of the political parties, civil 
society organisations, etc.) When it was not (mostly material from the 1990s), it was consulted 
upon request at the central reference library (Atatürk Kültür Merkezi) in Nicosia. The majority of 
                                                          
18 A brief discussion is nonetheless provided in (2.2.b), 
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these texts are produced in Turkish (which this author is fluent) with a small portion of it being 
English. They were analysed in the original languages they were produced and translated by the 
author. 
 
1.5. Scope, Limitations and Contribution 
 
The specific focus of the thesis on the politics and discourses of identity in northern 
Cyprus seeks to provide an original, much-needed contribution to existing academic knowledge 
on the modern history and politics of Cyprus. Whilst the inter-communal conflict and the ‘Cyprus 
Problem’ has drawn significant academic attention over the years, there is scant information on 
the socio-political development of the Turkish-Cypriot community and more so on Turkish 
‘settlers’ which is an important aspect of that conflict. When they have been studied at all, it has 
often been through an anthropological and socio-psychological approach, insufficiently 
embedded in the political context, or in a language not accessible to the English-speaking world 
(for exceptions, see Chapter 3). This thesis aims to go some way toward filling this gap by 
providing extensive empirical findings with regard to Turkish ‘settlers’, Turkish-Cypriots and 
Turkey during a particularly captivating and important period (1995-2013). Synthesised literature 
review, official document and news report analysis but, mainly, extensive fieldwork and 
interviews with central actors of this process in each empirical domain (the print media, civil 
society and the political parties), seeks to provide new, exclusive and fascinating insights into the 
framing of immigration and the citizenship rights of Turkish ‘settlers’ in the context of intense 
contestation over identity during that period. 
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At the same time, the thesis provides useful conceptual insights for the discussion on 
identity and immigration that are of comparative value to other case-studies similar to northern 
Cyprus i.e. in relation to the presence of settlers in unrecognised states or in fact cases in which 
the context of identity politics resembles that of the identity politics in northern Cyprus involving 
a kin-state (Romania-Moldova, Crimea-Russia, Abkhazia-Russia, etc.) The study offers an original 
conceptual framework, combining discourse theory with constructivist strands from two 
academic (sub-)disciplines: nationalism and immigration studies. Looking at collective/national 
identity from the cross-section of these academic fields permits a much broader and fuller 
understanding. It allows for the incorporation of various theoretical approaches (securitization 
theory and critical approaches to studying nationalism), various levels of analysis (distinguished 
by various domestic remits or empirical domains) and various qualitative methods (through 
discourse analysis of official publicly produced texts, news reports and elite interviews). Placing 
this investigation within the wider discourse-analytical framework can complement existing 
understanding of many aspects of the political relevance of identity in particularly intriguing 
migration settings or contexts involving similar conflict dynamics and/or the presence of a kin-
state. The current thesis thus offers a particular aspect of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ but one that 
points to many ‘bigger’ stories in Europe and beyond. 
 
Finally, there is a group of issues that lie beyond the scope of this investigation. The 
‘Cyprus Problem’ is addressed here insofar as it relates to the identity politics of the Turkish-
Cypriot community, as a discursive frame that structures conceptions of identity and the framing 
of immigration within it. In this sense, though the relevant sections highlight the trajectory of the 
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inter-communal fighting and the diplomatic efforts in relation to ending the dispute, the study 
does not provide an exclusive and/or exhaustive account of the conflict. In a similar vein, the 
study also does not position itself in the strand of literature that investigates the EU as a ‘conflict 
resolution actor’ or an overarching identity narrative for that matter. Rather, the EU and the 
anticipated Turkish-Cypriot integration into it, is seen here as yet another discursive element that 
is relevant to the framing of competing identity narratives within the empirical domains and by 
the domestic actors that are investigated. Lastly, the precise operationalisation of identity within 
this investigation also precludes an in-depth examination of the latter at the individual (micro) or 
state (macro) level. Such a process would entail at the very least an ethnographic inquiry 
informed by psycho-sociological and cognitive insights at the micro level, and/or a different 
research design to be valid for the level of the state, both of which lie beyond the scope of this 
investigation. Though very much relevant to such inquiries, the analysis offered in this thesis 
operates at the domestic (middle-range) level of national parties, civil society and the print 
media.   
 
1.6. Thesis Overview19 
 
 The thesis is divided into 7 chapters. Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 takes 
up the key concepts which the analysis works with – identity, nationalism, immigration, 
discourse, articulation and securitization. These key concepts operationalised in the investigation 
are delineated in relation to existing academic literature before the chapter lays out in detail the 
                                                          
19 A more detailed analytical plan of the dissertation is provided in section 2.5 of Chapter 2. 
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conceptual framework, combining discourse theory with constructivist strands from the 
academic literatures on nationalism and immigration. A set of hypotheses are also introduced to 
further test the analytical scaffolding in the subsequent empirical chapters.20 
 
Chapter 3 begins by charting the emergence of Turkish-Cypriot identity in a historical 
context.  In this sense, it acts as the link between the conceptual and the empirical parts of the 
thesis by a) further building the conceptual argument presented in Chapter 2 and b) presenting 
the dominant discursive contexts that have shaped the main concepts and dynamics under 
investigation. These include: i) the ‘Cyprus Problem’ ii) de facto statehood and non-recognition; 
iii) bilateral relations with Turkey and iv) EU accession process.   
 
Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter of the thesis and investigates how and to what 
extent the mainstream political parties in northern Cyprus have articulated immigration and the 
citizenship rights of Turkish ‘settlers’ within competing narratives on Turkish-Cypriot identity over 
the specified timeframe (1995-2013). In other words, it places the ‘settler issue’ at the heart of 
the identity politics in northern Cyprus and tries to account for continuity and change in the 
extent to which immigration from mainland Turkey and other closely related issues such as the 
citizenship status of Turkish ‘settlers’, bilateral relations with Turkey, the ‘Cyprus Problem’ but 
                                                          
20The epistemological issues relating to positivist perspectives and their clear differences with constructivist 
approaches notwithstanding, the study utilises a set hypotheses (section 2.5 in Chapter 2) to help maintain focus 
and strengthen the overarching structure of the thesis without presupposing a strong, causal relationship. These 
hypotheses are based on the theoretical hunches (outlined in Chapter 2) but also preliminary evidence relating to 
the historical trajectory which rival identity claims have followed (Chapter 3). More specifically, they deal with 
particular events and processes that connect them in a specific case-study. The investigation nonetheless 
acknowledges and delineates the complex interaction of ‘causal’ influences and ‘discrepancies’ and corroborates 
its findings through triangulating its methods and data sets. 
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also the anticipated EU integration are represented and instrumentalised within party-political 
rhetoric in relation to identity in northern Cyprus since 1995. Civil society positions on these issue 
and their articulations in the Turkish-Cypriot newspapers are analysed in detail in Chapters 5 and 
6 subsequently. The working hypotheses developed in line with the conceptual framework and 
introduced in Chapter 2 are tested in all three case-studies by tracing the overall trajectory of 
identity politics and by examining the crucial discursive shift that occurred in relation to the 
articulation of the ‘settler issue’ discourse during the 1990s and again in late 2000s.  
 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by recapping the empirical findings, highlighting the 
original research contributions of the thesis, and considers the bearings of its conclusions on a 
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This chapter introduces the discourse-analytical framework to examine the constitution 
of collective identities in northern Cyprus in relation to immigration from Turkey. The first section 
of the chapter (2.2) is concerned primarily with delineating the concept of identity that is 
operationalised in the remainder of the study. It starts by outlining the modernist insights 
garnered from the literature on nationalism and national identity with a particular emphasis on 
the social agents and institutions as the primary drivers of this process. This is followed by a 
discussion of the more contemporary approaches to the study of collective identity inspired by 
Discourse Theory (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) and Critical Discourse Analysis (Wodak, 2001,2009; 
Fairclough, 2001). The section concludes by clarifying the constructivist position which is adopted 
towards the study of collective identity throughout the study premised on a contextual 
understanding of collective identity as discourse. The following section (2.3) then looks at identity 
with regards to immigration, conceptualising how specific articulations of immigration construct 
and invoke collective identities. More specifically, it accounts for the symbolic relationship 
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between identity and immigration by exploring comparative cases which deploy the 
‘securitization approach’ and suggests conceiving immigration as a ‘floating signifier’, open to 
competing articulations by antagonistic discourses on identity. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 outline the 
theoretical framework in which the conceptual tools delineated in the previous sections (2.2 and 
2.3) are operationalised within the northern Cyprus case. Section 2.4 in particular highlights the 
hybrid nature of Turkish migration in the northern Cyprus context by drawing attention to the 
strategic/ideological considerations in the deployment of contested ‘settler’ and ‘immigrant’ 
categories. Section 2.5 then revisits the main research question outlined in Chapter 1 
(‘Introduction’) and introduces several working hypotheses based on the analytical framework. 
The last section of the chapter summarises the conceptual discussion which informs the empirical 
studies presented in Chapters 3 to 5.  
 
2.2. Collective Identity: A Review of the Literature  
 
Cultural theorist and sociologist Stuart Hall (2000: 2) once described identity as ‘an idea 
which […] cannot be thought in the old way, but without which certain key questions cannot be 
thought at all’. These questions Hall refers to — on the form and shape of identity — have been 
a central focus of scholars working within disciplines as diverse as political philosophy, sociology, 
anthropology, social psychology, cultural studies, politics and international relations. The result 
of this sustained academic engagement with identity is, naturally, a colourful array of stimulating 
conceptualisations and insightful empirical findings. It is not possible to provide a detailed review 
of such a vast literature on identity in a brief space as this. This section is therefore limited in its 
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scope to only briefly highlight the key arguments suggested by seminal works on the subject of 
national identity and those developed within the nationalism literature in particular. It should be 
stressed that the picture sketched here is selective and stylised so as to outline a theory of 
collective identity that will be used for the purposes of this study. 
2.2.a. The social-constructivist paradigm 
Nationalism and ethnicity literature proves a good starting-point to begin a theoretical 
survey on collective identity.21 Indeed, as others have acknowledged (Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 
851), the theoretical paradigm on modernity within the nationalism literature associated with 
Ernest Gellner (1997), Eric Hobsbawm (2003, 2012), Miroslav Hroch (1985), Benedict Anderson 
(1991), and others presents the most-developed case study on the social construction of a 
particularly intriguing type of collective identity; namely, national identity. These scholars, in one 
way or another, have all rejected the primordialist/essentialist view of nations as historical 
continuities, arguing instead that the idea of the nation and the notion of national identity 
became salient only in the modern period as a result of economic and social changes. From this 
perspective, nations and national identities attached to them are seen as modern constructs, 
forged by elites to achieve various socio-political and economic objectives. Gellner (1997: 7), for 
example, famously suggested that nationalism was not an ‘awakening of nations to self-
consciousness’ but that it invented nations where they did not exist. He also convincingly argued 
that the nationalist project in most instances sought to facilitate modernity and industrialisation. 
                                                          
21 As it will be elaborated further below, collective identity is considered here in relation to social systems. The 
focus of the research, therefore, is “not individual people, but rather groups, organisations, classes, cultures […] 
people [emphasis added] who reveal the social system through descriptions” (Frey and Hausser cited in Wodak et 
al. (2009), p.15) 
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In a similar vein, Eric Hobsbawm (2012: 1) suggested that nationalist leaders went so far as to 
invent ‘national traditions’ in order to reproduce nationalist sentiment which implied continuity 
with the past in order to invoke legitimacy for the present. For Hobsbawm, common national 
symbols, such as flags, anthems, ceremonies, monuments and statues were all invented for the 
national cause (in some cases quite recently) but are presented as elements of the nation’s 
distant past (Hobsbawm, 2012: 1-2). Furthermore, in cases where the modern nation was formed 
recently, Hobsbawm asserted that, ‘even historic continuity had to be invented, for example, by 
creating an ancient past beyond effective historic continuity, either by semi-fiction […] or by 
forgery’ (Hobsbawm, 2012: 7). Hroch (1985) also argued that nationalism arose from the 
activities of cultural elites seeking histories that constituted the identities of nations. Benedict 
Anderson (1991) developed these arguments in his Imagined Communities with more systematic 
attention to the role of ‘print capitalism’ which has not only engaged in history-making but has 
constituted the nation as a community albeit an imagined one. As he put it succinctly: “It is 
imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion’ (Anderson, 1991: 1).  
 
A notable exception to the constructivist/instrumentalist formulations on nations and 
national identities has been the work of Anthony D. Smith (2011). While Smith’s work has 
progressively evolved to incorporate some of the constructivist findings, he has nonetheless 
maintained a middle-ground, ‘ethno-symbolist’ approach which defines national identity as a 
product of both natural continuity and conscious manipulation. Natural continuity emanates 
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from pre-existing ethnic identity and community, or what Smith (2011) has called the ‘dominant 
ethnie’; and conscious manipulation is achieved via ‘traditions’, ‘symbols’, ‘myths’ and 
‘memories’ such as myths of ‘common origin’, memories of ‘golden ages’, etc. Thus, for Smith 
(2011: 234): ‘national communities [in Europe] were created around one or more dominant 
ethnies or ethnic categories, which formed the basis of the polity; the intelligentsia frequently 
made use of biblical and/or classical myths and prototypes […] and nationalisms in Eastern and 
Southern Europe frequently looked to the West, especially France and Germany, for their 
blueprints’. It is important to stress that Smith does not refute the constructedness of nations, 
national identities or for that matter the so-called ethnie. Rather, he claims that ethnie, once 
formed, tends to be exceptionably durable under normal fluctuations, and to persist in the long 
term. It is nonetheless suggested that Smith in particular and the ethnosymbolist school in 
general take the existence of “the people” and “collective memories” for granted; as Özkırımlı 
(2003: 348) has put it: “[…] they never ask the questions ‘which people’ and ‘whose memories”.   
 
Indeed, the key premise of many contemporary, constructivist22  readings of identity and 
nationalism is that concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’ in particular and that of identity in 
general confuse more than they illuminate. Building upon the earlier modernist/constructivist 
approaches, a number of scholars have widely argued that it is nationalism that creates and 
defines nations and our attention should return to more fruitful concepts of power, discourse 
                                                          
22 Following Crotty, constructivism is defined here as the ontological position which posits that “all knowledge, and 
therefore, all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of 
interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social 
context” (2003: 42). 
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and ideology (Balibar, 1991; Calhoun, 1993, 1997; Brubaker, 2000; Özkırımlı, 2003; Kaldor, 2004; 
Malesevic, 2011). Indeed, as Balibar put it (1991: 140): ‘[…] no nation possesses an ethnic base 
naturally, but as social formations are nationalized, the populations included within them, 
divided up among them or dominated by them are ethnicized — that is, represented in the past 
or in the future as they formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, 
culture and interests which transcends individuals and social conditions’. Calhoun (1997: 30) has 
further argued that the construction of national identity is ‘a self-conscious and manipulative 
project carried out by elites who seek to secure their power by mobilizing followers on the basis 
of nationalist ideology’. As Malesevic (2011) has asserted, rather than arguing that national 
identity requires those who share it to have ‘something in common’, we need to explore how 
such claims are made and when and why they publicly resonate:  
 
”National identities” are neither things nor living beings that can impose requirements, 
make connections or feel threatened. Rather than simply assuming the existence of 
national identities or using this concept as an explanation of social behaviour, it is crucial 
to carefully unpack the different and often contradictory processes hidden behind this 
giant and loose umbrella term (2011: 281). 
 
In a more critical vein, others have suggested that the over-exhausted concept of identity 
should now be dropped from the analytic terminology altogether (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). 
Rogers Brubaker has been at the forefront of the radical call for abandoning the use of identity 
as an analytical concept. For Brubaker (with Cooper, 2000: 1), the term ‘identity’ is simply over-
stretched: ‘” Identity” […] tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little 
(when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity)”. The first 
part of Brubaker’s criticism points out to different uses of identity (heterogeneous meaning 
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across social sciences) as well as its essentialist/primordial baggage whereas the second part is a 
more particular charge against what he calls soft/weak conceptions of identity and ‘clichéd 
constructivism’ (2000: 11). Constructivist conceptions of identity almost always refer to identity 
as ‘multiple’, ‘fluctuating’, ‘constructed’, ‘negotiated’, and so on. These qualifiers, have become 
so common-place, Brubaker argues, that a) they risk becoming a mere form of lip-service ‘to 
signal a stance’ and b) they leave the concept too weak as to be ‘incapable of performing serious 
analytical work’ (2000: 11). The pinnacle of Brubaker and Cooper’s argument is that the 
contemporary salience of identity as a ‘category of practice’ (a term he borrows from Bourdieu, 
1990) does not require its use as a ‘category of analysis’. This is all the more important, Brubaker 
argues, if we are to avoid reifying essentialist/primordial beliefs about identity by uncritically 
adopting categories of practice as categories of analysis.  
 
Brubaker and Cooper’s criticism, as they somewhat admit, is perhaps too harsh on 
constructivist theorising and conceptualisation. Afterall, it was the constructivist approaches, 
developed across the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, political science, history and 
literature, which has discredited the primordialist approach (for a detailed review, see Haslam et 
al., 2000) by showing that identities are constructed, fluid and endogenous to a set of social, 
economic and political contexts. As Chandra (2001: 1) underlined, it is now virtually impossible 
to find a social scientist openly defending a primordialist position. Nonetheless, Brubaker’s 
critical exertion is certainly worthy for pointing to the reification trap and calling for more vigour 
in separating analytic from common-sense/popular concepts which is fundamental to any social 
inquiry (for a critique of Brubaker’s position, however, see Csergo, 2008).  
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This study is broadly sympathetic to Brubaker’s caveat except that it suggests altering it 
in one important sense. Instead of risking ‘throwing out the baby with the bathwater’ i.e. 
‘ditching’ the concept of identity together with the analytic opportunity of its contextual 
taxonomy, the study re-conceptualises identity in a more operationalised and embedded way. 
More specifically, it pegs the notion of collective identity, in the case of northern Cyprus, onto a 
theory of discourse which is produced through competing articulations of ‘Turkish settlers’ and 
dispersed by the political parties, civil society organisations and the mass media. To suggest that 
collective identity be understood as a discourse does not assume a priori definition of that 
category or the attributes attached to it. Instead these definitions are allowed to emerge from 
specific empirical analyses.  It will therefore be suggested that the concept of discourse is central 
to the sustained critique of identity — and that of national identity in particular — for allowing 
the multiple, highly complex and power related processes associated with identity construction 
to be revealed rather than concealed. 
 
2.2.b. Discursive Approaches 
 
Borrowing from various critical perspectives offered by Louis Althusser (Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses, 1971), Michel Foucault (his genealogy and concepts of discourse, 
knowledge and power developed in Discipline and Punish, 1971 and thereafter), Jacques Derrida 
(the notion of différance, 1978) and Pierre Bourdieu (his concept of habitus, 1980) several 
discourse-analytical works have made a significant contribution to our understanding of identity 
construction/transformation and the ideologies that support these processes. Within this 
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intellectual tradition, Wodak et al. (2009: 153) have argued that the idea of a ‘national 
community’ becomes reality through reification and rhetoric orchestrated by the political elite, 
intellectuals and the media and circulated through education, mass communication, and other 
policy regimes. In their influential and aptly-titled work, The Discursive Construction of National 
Identity, these authors employ ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ (CDA) developed by the Lancaster 
School of Sociology and in the writings of Norman Fairclough (Fairclough, 2001, 2005a, 2005b; 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 2010) as their framework for the analysis of Austrian national 
identity. Their dualist, middle-ground discourse theory distinguishes between discursive and 
‘non-discursive’ dimensions of social practice and assumes a dialectical relationship between 
them: ‘on the one hand, the situational, institutional and social contexts shape and affect 
discourses; on the other hand, discourses influence social and political reality’ (2009: 8). The 
conception of discourse, adopted by CDA approaches as ‘an element of social practice’ — often 
based on the critical-realist social ontology of Fairclough (2005a, 2005b) with greater emphasis 
on structural dependencies — is usually taken as a point of departure from more post-
structuralist approaches such as the Discourse Theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe 
developed in their seminal work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (2001).  
 
Indeed, it is central to Laclau and Mouffe’s approach that all social practice is discursive. 
Their post-Marxist theory of discourse is firmly based on the argument that social world is 
constituted through the discursive practices that furnish the social as well as the material with a 
determinate sense of being. Laclau and Mouffe have further argued that it is precisely the 
discursive character of social relations and identities, their unfixity which allows them to be 
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contested and modified. Their theory is highly-complex but can (very briefly) be sketched as 
follows. For Laclau and Mouffe, the specificity of a discourse lies in its novel articulation of 
signifying elements from pre-existing discourses, what they have called ‘floating signifiers’. 
Floating signifiers are concepts or political demands that do not have any pre-assigned meanings 
except traces of past articulations that are not deterministic; their actual meaning, in this sense, 
depends on their precise definition in a specific historical context. Terms such as ‘unity’, 
‘liberation’, ‘revolution’, ‘order’ and so forth are examples that Laclau uses (1996: 44). For Laclau 
and Mouffe, political discourses and identities are constituted entirely through articulation, 
which they define as ‘any practice establishing a relation among elements [i.e. ‘floating signifiers’] 
such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 
2001: 105). An articulation consists of the transformative combination of two or more floating 
signifiers.  
 
The political aspect of discourse is further elaborated by reconceiving Gramsci’s notion of 
hegemony for which power and exclusion are essential features. Dominant discourses prevail or 
hegemonise by marginalising radically different discourses, by naturalising their hierarchies and 
exclusions (presenting them in the form of ‘common sense’) and by concealing the traces of their 
own contingency. Yet, despite this, no hegemony can remain stable. This is because a) a 
hegemonic discourse cannot assign a permanent meaning onto a ‘floating signifier’; and b) 
because hegemony involves a certain exclusion, there is always an ‘outside’ in the field of 




This also presupposes the notion of dislocation referring to the process whereby a 
hegemonic/dominant discourse is dislocated and its contingency revealed. Such processes 
disorientate the already existing identities (or discourses) and induce an identity crisis which, in 
turn, opens up a discursive space for the constitution of new identities. It is also what will be 
referred in the remainder of this study as a critical juncture (i.e. times when social identities are 
in a crisis and structures need to be recreated) that subjects are compelled to identify with 
discourses that seem capable of giving meaning to the symbolic order. At these critical junctures, 
alternative representations or what Laclau calls myths emerge to articulate dislocated elements 
and social demands. When a myth or a political project has proved to be successful, it is 
transformed into a social imaginary (Howarth et al., 2000: 16). 
 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is often criticised for overestimating change and the 
authors are charged with overlooking the structural constraints as they focus on contingency. As 
noted above, this also appears to be the departing point for Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
approaches which distinguish more sharply between a contingent (discursive) domain and a 
structural domain. It is important to note, however, that this distinction between discursive and 
non-discursive is generally carried out in order to emphasise the ‘relatively durable’ nature of 
particular social practices that are themselves originally constituted (Fairclough, 2005: 924). 
What Laclau and Mouffe insist on, on the other hand, is that all traditions and social practices 
are, in principle, open to new articulations; as Smith asserts, they certainly do not abandon the 
analysis of ‘asymmetrical social structures […] tracing traditions, institutionalizations and 




[…] their theory [of hegemony] can in fact be used to detect the social structures that, in 
spite of their incomplete nature, do indeed create specific limits for political practice. 
From their perspective, we can use contextually-sensitive genealogical studies to suggest 
that in a specific moment, some forms of identity formation will — thanks to their “family 
resemblances” with already institutionalized identities — probably offer more compelling 
interpretative frameworks than others. (2012: 106) 
 
In other words, what Laclau and Mouffe suggest, in fact, is that articulations become more 
influential insofar as they are institutionalised. Laclau and Mouffe’s distinction between 
‘structural position’ and ‘subject position’ with regards to identity formation can further redress 
the structure-related concerns of CDA without resorting to a priori categorisation of social 
phenomena as discursive and non-discursive. Certainly, Laclau and Mouffe do not turn a blind 
eye to structural positions; rather they insist that structural positionings do not determine subject 
positions. For Laclau and Mouffe, it is the discourse-articulated subject positions that provide 
individuals with (often institutionalised) interpretative frameworks to interpret their structural 
positionings. Laclau (1990: 16) argues, for example, that an individual’s class structural position 
becomes coherent for her through some specific and compelling political discourse. It then 
becomes possible to argue that our structural positionings are discursively constructed. These 
subject positions tend to imply certain practices and are located in multiple normative systems, 
although in a non-deterministic sense; in other words, they can become contingent depending 
on subversive intervention. Laclau and Mouffe further situate the networks of subject positions 
with respect to hegemonic power relations (Smith, A.M., 2012: 148). Hegemonic discourses 
construct normative horizons that ‘delineate what is possible, what can be said and done, what 
positions may legitimately be taken, what actions may be engaged in, and so forth’ (Norval in 
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Smith, A.M., 2012: 64). In sum, it is the power relations that structure and shape what is an 
‘available’ or ‘compelling’ subject position for individuals. 
 
It is then a matter of interpretation whether CDA approaches really depart from Laclau 
and Mouffe’s intellectual trajectory. In fact, conceptual insights attributed to CDA often overlap 
with the poststructuralist discourse theory. In addition, Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 44-60) have 
shown how insights from other discourse-analytical approaches, such as the CDA, can be 
methodologically articulated with Laclau and Mouffe’s post-structuralist discourse theory. 
Indeed, the methodological strength of the Critical Discourse Analysis over the more 
methodologically abstract post-structuralist approach is well-known (see for example, Jørgensen 
and Phillips, 2002; Dahlberg and Phelan, 2011).  
 
In any case, this brief sketching of the ontological overlap but also the analytical 
differences between the two discursive-analytical approaches is not to assert one over the other 
but to clarify the position of this study which aligns itself with both approaches. Theoretically, 
the analysis follows Laclau and Mouffe in distancing itself from a sharp discursive/non-discursive 
dichotomy that is at the heart of some CDA approaches. Methodologically, on the other hand, it 
aligns itself with the Critical Discourse Analysis and the historical-discursive approach of Ruth 
Wodak (2009) in particular. While this second proposition is dealt in detail under the section on 
‘Methodology’ (1.4 in Chapter 1), the theoretical position which is inspired by Laclau and 




Firstly, the risk of running into the trap of ‘clichéd constructivism’ notwithstanding, it has 
to be stated that collective identities are ‘multiple’, ‘fluctuating’ and fragmented’. They are not 
‘fixed’ precisely because they are constructed through competing discourses. Discourse here has 
to be understood in the broader sense that is not merely as ‘linguistic phenomena’ but also 
institutions and practices through which a discursive formation is structured (Laclau and Mouffe, 
2001: 109). Consequently, because identities are constructed within and not outside discourse, 
they have to be seen as produced in specific historical and institutional sites, within specific 
discursive practices and strategies. (Hall, 2000: 17) This, in return, means thinking of discourse 
rather than identity and thinking of it in terms of political projects, actors, institutional forms and 
contingent events. Discourse, then, refers here to concrete systems of meaningful, social 
practices that form the identities of subjects and objects (Howarth et al., 2000: 6). Their 
formation, moreover, is a political act related to power, which involves the construction of 
antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Howarth et 
al., 2000: 6). 
 
This second proposition draws on the notion of ‘other’ in suggesting that discursive 
construction of collective identities is intimately linked with the construction of difference and 
exclusion. Derrida argued that an identity’s constitution is always based on excluding something 
and establishing a violent hierarchy between the two resultant poles. (Derrida cited in Laclau, 
1990: 32) For Hall (2000: 7), too, because identities emerge within the play of specific modalities 
of power, they are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion. From this 
perspective, moreover, identities depend for their ‘reality’ on processes of exclusion that create 
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marginalised ‘others’. As Hall (2000: 17) has described: ‘[...] it is only through the relation to the 
Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its 
constitutive outside that the “positive” meaning of any term - and thus its “identity” can be 
constructed’. Or as Billig puts it (1995: 78): ‘there can be no ‘us’ without “them”’.  
 
The concept of the ‘other’ has been popular in nationalism literature for some time with 
a wide range of studies focusing on the role of ‘other’ in the formation, consolidation but also 
transformation of national identities (Smith, 1998: 13). As Edward Said (1995: 332) has put it: 
‘Each age and society recreates its “Others”’. Triandafyllidou (1998: 609) has further argued that 
the presence of ‘significant others’ influence the development of national identity by means of 
their ‘threatening presence’ for example, during nation-formation or during periods of instability 
which may put the identity of the nation into question. A number of typologies are also available 
within the literature. Duara (1996), for example, identifies ‘internal historical others’, ‘potential 
others’ and ‘hidden others’. Triandafyllidou (1998, 2001), on the other hand, has distinguished 
between ‘external’ and ‘internal others’ and supplements these with subtypes. More recently, 
Triandafyllidou (2002: 34) has revised her earlier typology by introducing a further category of 
‘inspiring others’ or ‘[…] the out-group […] perceived as an object of admiration and esteem, an 
exemplary case to be imitated, a group with a set of features to be incorporated into the national 
identity, a higher ground to be reached by the nation’. Triandafyllidou (2002: 35) further suggests 
that the representation of the ‘other’ may change in different periods: ‘[…] they may be initially 
an inspiring Significant Other and later be perceived as a threat to the ingroup’. Triandafyllidou’s 
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work departs from much of the earlier writings and aligns itself with the argument that identities 
do not necessarily have to be perceived as ‘negative’ or ‘threatening’.  
 
Indeed, it is important to treat these typologies with care since they may misguide 
analysis towards attributing essential characteristics to categories and reifying them as concrete 
groups. It is through these ideal-types that immigrants and ethnic minorities may be treated as 
internally homogeneous and externally bounded groups of ‘internal-negative-others’. These 
typologies may further preclude discursive-analysis by stopping short at identifying the ‘other’, 
and describing what their attributes are. Perhaps the more serious analytical problem, somewhat 
inherent with these typologies, is that they limit the scope of inquiry by assuming either that i) 
there can be only one ‘other’ at any one time; ii) and/or that the same ‘other’ cannot be both 
positive and negative simultaneously. The latter assumption is particularly problematic as it may 
obscure the diverse, ambivalent and often contradictory nature of framing by not recognising 
that competing identity discourses in some cases may claim positive or negative attributes over 
the same ‘other’. For example, ‘immigrants’ may be articulated as ‘negative others’ by a right-
wing political party, to be excluded from the national community and even the ‘national territory’ 
but a liberal business association may call for better integration (or indeed assimilation) of 
economic migrants into the ‘national community’ alongside an ‘immigration as economic benefit’ 
discourse. Similarly, the same right-wing political party may distinguish between different 
immigrant groups by identifying positive ‘co-ethnic’ migrants and demonising other immigrant 
groups as ‘negative others’. Each of these discourses is a social and political construct that assigns 
a meaning for the ‘other’ while providing (subject) positions with which social agents (‘the right-
37 
 
wing party’, or the ‘liberal business association’) can identify. The ‘other’ in each case may be 
framed as ‘economic migrants (positive)’, ‘unauthorised/illegal workers (negative)’, ‘co-ethnic 
brothers (positive)’ and so on. This work will therefore assume that there may be more than one 
‘other’ group at any given time and that the same ‘other’ may simultaneously be articulated as 
negative or positive within different identity discourses.  
 
This complexity can be captured by Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of a floating signifier 
briefly outlined earlier. A floating-signifier is a concept that is open to re-definition or subversive 
intervention since it does not carry a fixed meaning. From this perspective, it becomes possible 
to rethink of ‘(Immigrant) other(s)’ as well as immigration alongside other political concepts as a 
signifier, an element which belongs to the ongoing struggle between competing identity 
discourses, available for multiple, alternative articulations. The ways in which immigration and 
the ‘immigrant other(s)’ become privileged signs, or a key signifier in the organisation of 
collective identity discourses is the theme of the following section.  
 
2.3. Connecting Identity and Immigration 
 
Immigration is a highly topical issue in public and political debates across Europe and in 
North America.  While there is variation in the way it is represented in different domestic contexts 
within Europe and in comparison with the North American cases, a number of similarities and 
convergences in policy, rhetoric and popular attitudes have increasingly attracted the attention 
of academics and other observers working on immigration and immigration-related phenomena 
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(see below for citations). One such feature the prevalent immigration discourses in Europe and 
in the US and Canada have in common is the omnipresent perception of threat.  
 
In political discourses, immigration is commonly (though not often explicitly) 
conceptualised as an ‘economic threat’ to the State and the national economy as well as a 
‘cultural threat’ to the national identity of the host society. In addition, the notion of ‘terrorist 
threat’ that was articulated in the aftermath of the attacks in the US in 2001, and in Europe more 
recently with the attacks in Brussels and France by ISIS, has further consolidated these traditional 
threat perceptions with a new understanding of immigration as a ‘national security’ concern that 
ties immigration together with the notions of defence, control, sovereignty and national 
priorities. This, in turn, has translated into restrictive immigration policies (stricter entry 
requirements, advanced surveillance both within and outside the national territory, restrictions 
on welfare entitlements, re-introduction of ‘assimilationist’ policies, etc.) at the policy level as 
well as an increasingly militarised presence (military-style border agencies, detention centres, 
patrols, etc.) at the borders.  
 
In public discourses, too, popular frames and attitudes towards immigration have tended 
to correspond with the security concerns of governments, local politicians and — to borrow from 
Michel Foucault (1991) — other professionals of governmentality. Indeed, the bourgeoning 
literature in social psychology suggests that public opinion across Europe and in the US and 
Canada toward immigration is largely influenced by anxieties and fears about physical security, 
‘well-being’ and national identity. In addition to physical in-security, threat perceptions to 
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presumed authenticity of the national culture and national identity have been shown to promote 
ingroup solidarity (Triandafyllidou, 2000) but also ethnocentrism and xenophobia (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979; McLaren, 2001; Scheepers et al., 2002; Lahav, 2004; Hjerm and Nagayoshi, 2011).  
 
The notion of border is a particularly relevant signifier which articulates immigration 
within a securitised context (see below) and in relation to collective (national) identity. Political 
actors and governmental figures often use this notion to invoke the symbolic representation of 
state authority. Once again, the prevailing symbolic power of borders is well-established: as social 
constructs, they signify a power relationship between the controllers and those who are 
controlled (Sack, 1986); they are also tied to identity by representing the bond between the 
nation and the territory in nationalist-mythology (Angus, 1997; Newman and Paasi, 1998). A 
border is also conceptualised as an institution which allows a state to exercise sovereignty over 
its territorial/political space (Newman and Paasi, 1998; Anderson, 1996; Kaiser, 2002; Paasi, 
2009);  Thus, as Geddes (2003: 8) has also argued, it is politically important for the governments 
to make claims to be able to ‘control’ their borders and the flow of immigration because these 
issues are intimately-related to their ability to regulate access to the national territory and 
therefore an important aspect of their sovereign authority. Arguably, the same applies not only 
for the governments but to political parties across the political spectrum competing with each 
other for authority. Indeed, what Derrida (2005: 12) once observed in France now seems relevant 
for multiple cases across Europe and in North America: ‘Both to the Right and to the Left, [French] 
politicians speak of the control of immigration […] this forms part of the compulsory rhetoric of 
electoral programmes’. By the same token, the notion of border links immigration and national 
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identity to one another by articulating the ‘immigrant’ as a cultural ‘other’ who disturbs the 
identity and the presumed authenticity of the host society by crossing the border. Immigrants 
are then associated with ‘culture(s) of criminality’, ‘incivilities’, and ‘alien forms of violence’ or 
even deemed non-compatible with the ways of life, culture and the identity of the society 
(Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Carr, 2006; Fekete,2009).  
 
According to Bigo (2002), the work of the ‘political professionals’ (i.e. politicians, 
governmental agencies and departments, authorities such as the police, other internal/external 
security professionals as well as some NGOs and policy think-tanks) is at the heart of the 
securitization of immigration – the general perception of immigration as a risk/threat, to national 
security as well as the identity and the well-being of the host society. From this perspective, the 
relationship between security and immigration is political for ‘both migration and security are 
contested concepts and they are used to mobilize political responses not to explain anything’ 
(2002: 71). Bigo has argued that the securitarian discourses on immigration are based on the 
conception of the State as a ‘body’ for the polity and the symbolic control over it. The 
contemporary revival of sovereignty in political debate on immigration is thus suggested to be 
understood as the deployment of a narrative, ‘with the specific purpose of playing with positions 
of symbolic authority’ (2002: 68).  
 
In a similar vein, Huysmans (2000) has described immigration as a nodal point in the 
internal security field. It is a key issue which facilitates the connection between the security 
practices and the normative and political questioning of immigration. Immigration and the 
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categories of ‘immigrant’, ‘foreigner’ and ‘asylum-seeker’ are ‘politically powerful signifiers with 
a capacity to connect the internal security logic to the big political questions such as cultural 
identity’ (2000: 761). At the same time, immigration for Huysmans is a meta-issue, or a discursive 
formation that can be referred to as the cause of many social, economic and political problems. 
Indeed, it is within this discursive formation that issues such as urban decay, unemployment and 
crime are reduced to the problem of immigration. Multiple actors involved in the securitization 
process (national governments, civil society organisations, transnational police networks, etc.) 
also suggest that social and political agencies use the theme of immigration to articulate a range 
of political issues in their struggle over power, resources and knowledge (2000: 762).  
 
For Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002), too, through its presentation in public and political 
debate as a threat to state security as well as the cohesion of the host society, immigration has 
become securitised involving new actors and leading to stricter policies and to new surveillance 
methods. Also inspired by the work of Edelman (1985) on ‘symbolic power’, Ceyhan and Tsoukala 
have further argued that the securitization of immigration is articulated through symbolic politics 
involving the deployment of a corpus of semantic creations, discursive strategies and rhetoric. 
The obvious implication of the process of securitization for immigration, for Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 
is that securitarian discourses ‘demonise’ immigration based on the fear of a loss of sovereignty 
(authority), collective identity and the well-being of the society.   
 
The securitizing practice which takes place over immigration, described so far, is dispersed 
and developed through the proactive strategies and articulations of the state officials, security 
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professionals, political parties and other civil society actors for the purposes of attaining power, 
resources and knowledge. Yet, another aspect of the securitization practice that is worth 
mentioning here arguably stems from the ‘pragmatic’ essence of security that takes place within 
a particular configuration of circumstances, including the context, external objective 
developments and finally the psycho-cultural disposition of the ‘audience’ as well as the power 
this has over the ‘securitizing act’ (see below).  The last point is taken on by Vukov (2003) in calling 
attention for the psychological climate of insecurity sustained by the ‘affective processes’ — what 
she describes as a set of resonances, sensations and intensities (akin to ‘moral panics’) that 
circulate socially and accumulate to form a kind of backdrop or climate.  Vukov suggests tracing 
the proliferation of the ‘sense of threat’ through the media and the news media in particular. 
More importantly, she has argued that the affect generated around immigration in the 
(Canadian) mass media plays a critical and mobilising role in articulating the popular frames that 
effectively shape the formation of immigration policy, either through ‘mediated panics’ or 
‘celebratory portraits of desirable immigrants’ (2003: 336). 
 
 In a similar vein, Buonfino (2004) points out that the hegemony of the securitization 
discourse over other, antagonistic discourse types on immigration (‘liberal’, ‘cosmopolitan’ and 
‘human rights discourses’, etc.) is only one possible outcome that can be explained by the 
‘interplay between public opinion, mass media and national governments’ (2004: 48). For 
Buonfino, fears and concerns within the public sphere that are ‘fuelled, reproduced and 
amplified’ by the mass media influence the choices that governments take. As a result, so the 
argument runs, governing parties and policy-makers make a rational choice in adopting one 
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discourse type (e.g. securitization of migration) over another (e.g. liberalisation of migration) in 
order to comfort and match their electorates’ expectations (2000: 37). In other words, the 
securitised discourse of immigration which aims at containing and controlling the phenomenon 
is prevalent since it responds well to the public fears of economic competition and of threat of 
being ‘swamped’ by foreigners.  
 
While Vukov and Buonfino both rightly point out to the role mass media plays in the 
construction and articulation of immigration discourses (this is elaborated further in Chapter 6) 
as well as further highlighting the populist considerations of political parties over such issues as 
immigration, their emphasis on a perceptive climate and public opinion appears to be based on 
the notion of an ‘audience’ that exists prior to and outside discourse together with the possibility 
of invoking its support. The idea of an audience-centred securitization is also put forward by 
Balzacq (2005, 2011) in his formulation of the so-called ‘pragmatic’ theory of securitization. To 
win an audience, Balzacq has claimed, depends on an objective context rendering the audience 
more perceptive to its vulnerability. In other words, if times are critical enough, the securitarian 
discourse put out there ‘on the marketplace of ideas’, would get the support of the masses (2005: 
182). As argued below, however, the notion of a context that is ‘outside’ discourse is problematic 
since the utilisation of a securitarian discourse or the ‘speech-act’ of security itself constitutes 
the (now already securitised) context. Moreover, it is important to note that what is of interest 
with regards to public opinion for the purposes of this study is not what the members of the 
public believe ‘as the representation of the public proper’ or whether they agree with the 
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securitarian discourse but for what the public perceptions tell us about that discourse and the 
political sphere in which it is constituted.   
 
2.3.a. The Securitization Approach 
 
As already indicated above, one of the most important and controversial contributions to 
critical scholarship on immigration has been the theory of securitization, elaborated in the works 
of Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, also known as the Copenhagen School (CS) securitization theory. 
The novelty of CS securitization theory, in line with other constructivist perspectives, lies in its 
interpretation of security as a social construct. In this view, security does not point towards an 
objective reality or the existence of a real threat; instead, ‘the utterance itself is the act’ (Buzan 
et al., 1998: 26). As Wæver puts it, securitization approach points to the ‘inherently political 
nature of any designation of security issues’ (1999: 334). For Wæver and Buzan, the definition 
and criteria of securitization is ‘the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a 
saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects’ (1998: 25). In other words, securitization 
is a successful speech-act through which an understanding is constructed within a political 
community to treat something (immigration) as an existential threat to a key referent-object 
(national identity) and to legitimise a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the 
threat (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 491). Within the securitization framework, moreover, security 
is no longer viewed as referring naturally and solely to the physical/military security of the State, 
the protection of its boundaries, its integrity and its values against dangers out there in the hostile 
international environment. Instead, the process of designating security issues through successful 
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speech-acts, that is the process of securitization, is analysed to better understand how different 
referent-objects, national identity for instance, are removed from the realm of ‘normal’ politics 
and with what consequences. 
 
In their attempt to broaden the concept of security by introducing the notion of ‘societal 
security’, Buzan and Wæver have suggested that societies, defined in terms of identity, could be 
seen as the referent-object for some cases of securitization in which ‘what could be lost is not 
sovereignty but identity’ (1997: 242). As the authors have argued, the two concepts can share 
the same label of existential threat since: ‘for a state, sovereignty defines when a threat is 
existential, because if a state is no longer sovereign, it is no longer a state; and similarly identity 
is the defining point regarding existential threats for a society […]’ (1997: 242). Indeed, identity 
could be a possible object of securitization since it can hold a ‘symbolic power’ which makes it 
efficient to invoke and it can take a form which makes securitarian discourse possible i.e. making 
a claim to survival as well as articulating what non-survival would mean (1997: 243) In other 
words, within a securitarian discourse, national identity can be linked to immigration by framing 
the latter as an existential threat to the presumed ‘authority’, ‘authenticity’ and ‘ways of living’ 
of the host society (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002). 
  
It is important to note here that the Copenhagen School of securitization theory has been 
subject to various criticisms not least for being somewhat skewed towards a realist, state-centric 
understanding of security where the state (together with its agencies) is seen as the central-
securitizing actor (Doty, 1998; Trombetta 2008).  For Trombetta (2008), the Copenhagen School’s 
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understanding of security brings with it a certain way of dealing with a security problem: ‘it entails 
a specific logic or rationality, independent of the context or the intentions of the speakers’ (2008: 
588). More specifically, Buzan and Wæver’s agenda is thus seen as the operationalising of this 
rationality to other contexts and domains with the implication that such concepts as societal 
security appearing as just another form of ‘state security’ (Trombetta, 2008). This is especially 
apparent in the earlier writings of Wæver, insisting on a particular security logic behind 
securitization: ‘When a problem is ‘securitized’, the act tends to lead to specific ways of 
addressing it: threat, defence, and often state-centred solutions’ (1995: 65). As it will be argued 
here however, it is inadequate to see security as one-dimensional, confined to a classical, statist 
logic. The state-centred logic of security, as Wæver and Buzan suggest, may be the prevalent 
logic which dominates the security field. It is also true that governmental figures (and other 
power holders) are often the key participants in the social construction of security issues (see for 
instance Bigo, 2002 but also Huysmans, 2000). However, it is important to stress that through 
securitization, other logics which characterise different contexts, can be brought into existence 
and more importantly, new actors can gain relevance. In other words, the state is not the only 
entity that can label an issue a security problem and state actors are by no means always the only 
or the most significant actors. In fact, securitization of an issue can be initiated and/or carried 
forward by a variety of sources including the opposition, civil society or in fact, the mass media. 
Understood in this broader sense, concepts of societal security and securitization can then help 
discern alternative discourses on collective (national) identity and immigration which compete 
against official articulations as well as highlighting the conditions in which they become 
securitised, by whom, against what and with what consequences. 
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This perspective on securitization has the potential to open a broader landscape for 
analysis. It enables the analysis of discursive dynamics and strategies in the construction of 
immigration as a security concern by other, non-state actors which can then be linked to a 
securitised discourse on identity either in terms of state or societal security. By deploying the 
securitization lens, the analysis can also deconstruct (or ‘desecuritize’) the threat perceptions 
articulated within securitised discourses by demonstrating the contingent character of their 
politicisation. This, of course, does not mean that the construction of immigration as a security 
issue or an ‘existential threat’ is the only possible articulation of immigration. Rather, the view 
taken here is that securitization of immigration is only one possible discourse type amongst 
others but a particular type which is often linked to a securitarian discourse on collective 
(national) identity. In other words, immigration is conceptualised here as a powerful ‘floating 
signifier’, open to competing articulations by antagonistic discourse types but with particular 
currency for securitised discourses on collective (national) identity.  
 
This argument also raises a number of important questions about how the interplay 
between immigration and collective (national) identity feeds into the discussions on an equally 
important concept of citizenship which features prominently in immigration and (national) 
identity debates. While it is outside the scope of this study to discuss the normative dimension 
of citizenship in relation to immigration and ‘settler’ integration (see below, in section 2.4 of this 
chapter) in the northern Cyprus case, suffice it to say that contested framing of citizenship 
(policies, laws, rhetoric and institutions) is a discursive social practice that constitutes an 
important aspect of identity politics. Accordingly, the arguments developed in the remainder of 
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this study is concerned with citizenship as another ‘floating signifier’ or a “communicative 
achievement” (Bora et al., 2001: 3) which belongs to the ongoing struggle between antagonistic 
identity discourses. This conceptual perspective adopted here entails a particular emphasis on 
citizenship as a feature of the wider discussion on collective identity, and its articulation by those 
political actors in constructing ‘imagined communities’.  
 
2.4. Collective identity and the ‘settler debate’ in northern Cyprus 
 
Immigration literature and the securitization approach that has been further developed 
within it provides an intriguing account of how immigration and such categories of ‘immigrants’, 
‘foreigners’ and ‘asylum-seekers’ become politically powerful signifiers in constituting collective 
(national) identities. The issue of populations that have relocated into northern Cyprus from 
Turkey, however, presents a controversy that makes adopting an immigration framework 
somewhat less straightforward.  The particular difficulty stems from the fact that northern Cyprus 
is regarded in international law as the ‘territories under Turkish occupation’ and just like in other 
instances of foreign occupation, ‘the colonization of occupied territories’ is a violation of 
international law (ICRC, 1949). There are also a number of ideological/normative considerations 
that makes equating settlers with immigrants problematic. In particular, the mechanisms 
involved in the migration of populations into a contested territory are usually cited as the primary 
factors which necessitate the analytical distinction between ‘immigrants effectively permitted 
into an undisputed territory and settlers introduced with the explicit aim of gradually 
transforming ownership of a contested territory’ (Loizides, 2011: 392). From this perspective, 
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settlers are seen as part of the colonization process aimed at getting rid of the indigenous 
population in what is seen as ‘virgin or empty land’ (Elkins and Pedersen, 2005) and conceived 
(often with implicit reference to the case of Israeli settlements in the West Bank) as ‘a key 
obstacle to peace’ and as ‘ultra-nationalists’, engaging at times with ideologically led violent 
terrorism (Hirschhorn, 2015).  
 
  Other accounts however, point out to the inherent tension between international law and 
the human rights of the settlers and their descendants. Political philosopher Joseph Carens 
(2000), for example, has advanced the idea within his contextual and historical approach to 
justice (what he aptly calls an ‘even-handed’ approach) that while the passage of time does not 
absolve the immoral and unjust consequences of foreign occupation, the ‘settler issue’ that is the 
presence of settlers in a contested territory, nonetheless has a humanitarian dimension and that 
‘it seems problematic to penalize present generations for what their ancestors have done’. 
Loizides (2011) also takes a similar view in acknowledging the distinctions but also the potential 
overlaps between the settler and immigrant categories. Crucially, he points out to the essentially 
contested nature of such framing of these populations as ‘settlers’ or ‘immigrants’ and the 
potential consequences of adopting any such frame in consolidating in-group narratives by 
excluding ‘uncomfortable facts’ but also ‘others’. Hirschhorn also underlines the complex 
mélange of ideological and political outlooks in the case of Israeli settlers in that ‘this isn’t a group 
that thinks alike, looks alike or speaks alike anymore and after four decades you have also inter-




 This study is sympathetic to these important normative concerns in adopting a simple 
settler vs. immigrant dichotomy, and so wishes to acknowledge the hybrid nature of the 
contested migration in the northern Cyprus context. It also recognises that such categories not 
only conceal a complex picture but are also fluid themselves within rival accounts of the Cyprus 
conflict between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot side and indeed within the latter in relation to 
competing identity claims.23 To that extent, it carefully unpacks these categories within their 
distinct contexts to explore the hegemonic identity projects of different social groups in northern 
Cyprus. To this end, it fully utilises the insights garnered from the immigration literature outlined 
above to show how the ‘immigrant’ category that is generally favoured in northern Cyprus is 
articulated within a range of collective identity claims without any normative predisposition 
towards a particular account or category. This strategic positioning of the study offers important 
knowledge about the contested nature of settler-immigration politics in unrecognised states as 
well as its crucial interplay in the constitution of rival identity claims in these contexts that have 




                                                          
23 Indeed, it is an analytically futile attempt to maintain a neat distinction between settlers and immigrants in the 
context of a frozen conflict as any such attempt carry the potential of disavowing the past injustice and 
simultaneously distorting the diverse and subjected (i.e. ‘securitised’, see 2.3 in Chapter 2) nature of migration into 
a territory even though the sovereignty of the territory in question is disputed. As such, they should be appraised 
together. To this end, the study retains both categories i.e. ‘immigrant’ and ‘settler’ with the latter generally 
designated for the Turkish nationals holding TRNC citizenship. Though imperfect, this categorisation should not 
detract from the fact that the primarily focus of the investigation will be the ongoing competition between 
different ideas about the nature of the migration and the presence of populations from Turkey that are articulated 
within each of the identity narratives examined further in the subsequent empirical chapters (4, 5 and 6).   
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2.5. Operationalising the hypotheses 
 
Within the conceptual framework that is adopted towards the study of identity in 
northern Cyprus, the former is understood as a discourse. The basic premise of this approach, as 
indicated above (section 2.2 in this chapter) is that identities are not tangible or material ‘things’ 
in reality and cannot impose conditions or feel threatened as such. Rather than simply assuming 
the existence of collective identities ipso facto, this analysis thus aims to carefully unpack the 
different and often contradictory processes that take place in their constitution. The concept of 
discourse is introduced as a critical analytical tool precisely to better understand these processes. 
It suggests that any appeal to identity is a contingent political effect involving the discursive 
construction of the political community. Discourse here has to be understood in the broader 
sense that is not merely as ‘linguistic phenomena’ but also institutions, rituals and practices 
through which a discursive formation is structured (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 109). The 
constitution of an identity discourse, moreover, entails the articulation of ‘floating signifiers’: 
concepts or political demands that are open to multiple definitions in a historic context.  
 
Given the role of Greek and Turkish nationalisms in leading up to intercommunal strife 
and ultimately the de facto partition of the island in 197424, the persistence of the Cyprus conflict 
between the two main communities has important implications for the identity politics of the 
island (Papadakis, 2003; Psaltis, 2012). In this regard, representations of the past continue to 
inform identity narratives at the communal level which often construct a certain victimhood and 
                                                          
24 This is discussed at length in section 3.2 of Chapter 3. 
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a ‘national struggle for survival’ that sustains prejudice and mistrust toward the other 
community. 25  At the same time, given the history of Greek-Cypriot aspirations for union with 
Greece (enosis) and the existence of an unrecognised state in the form of the TRNC with a rather 
asymmetrical relationship to Turkey — both on premises of ethnic kinship and also on strategic 
grounds for supporting the Turkish-Cypriot ‘national cause’ (as the ‘protector’) — there exists a 
certain ‘motherland nationalism’ which gives emphasis to a primary sense of loyalty to ‘national 
centers’ (Turkey and Greece) and identification as Greek or Turkish. There are also various 
subversive discourses, often related to left-wing political orientations, that aim to resist these 
superordinate forms of identification with the so-called motherlands and the official narratives 
of victimhood, promoting instead a Cypriot identity emphasising the local Cypriot traditions and 
cultural similarity between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. Such Cypriot-centric discourses 
were boosted with the launching of Cyprus’s EU accession process in the early 1990s when the 
latter was initially tied to a federal solution (European Council, 1993) and led to a certain albeit 
temporary dislocation of hegemonic, exclusionary discourses which were clearly incompatible 
with such efforts or with the notion of political community such a solution implies (see also 
Loizides, 2007). 
 
Another important dimension of the Cyprus issue implicated in identity politics is the 
presence of a large number of individuals of Turkish origin who have moved to Cyprus from 
Turkey since 1974. While the Greek-Cypriot arguments on the issue are well-known (see section 
1.2 in Chapter 1), research on the Turkish-Cypriot positions and perceptions on Turkish 
                                                          
25 For the corresponding Turkish-Cypriot narrative, see section 3.2 in Chapter 3. 
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immigrants/settlers — who first arrived as part of a ‘settler recruitment programme’ (see section 
3.3 in Chapter 3) — is rather scarce but still reveals important intergroup tensions as well as 
intense ideological contestation around the national identity of Turkish-Cypriots (Hatay, 2005; 
Navaro-Yashin, 2006; Psaltis and Chakal, 2016). As Psaltis and Chakal (2016) note, while the 
Turkish influx created an opportunity for interaction between mainland Turks and Turkish-
Cypriots (for the latter, their ethnic kin in Turkey were a mere abstraction before 1974), Turkey’s 
continued and heavy interference in the Turkish-Cypriot affairs meant the settlers/immigrants 
are perceived as a threat to the cohesion the Turkish-Cypriot community and with many fearing 
that ever increasing numbers of immigrants/settlers from Turkey dilute the ‘Cypriot’ character of 
their identity as well as their community’s autonomy (see also Hatay, 2005). 
 
In northern Cyprus, there are thus various forms of identification and multiple identity 
signifiers which makes it a challenging task to capture identity politics and the ideological 
contestation taking place in a culturally and ethnically diverse context. The discursive approaches 
briefly outlined above and the conceptual framework that is elaborated further below 
nonetheless aims to overcome some of the ramifications of this complexity by focusing on 
identity as discourse beyond binary distinctions, that is Greek-Cypriot/Turkish-Cypriot or Turkish-
Cypriot/Turkish ‘settler’ etc.     
 
In this sense, while acknowledging that other important identity signifiers do exist in the 
northern Cyprus case (most notably the indubitable relationship with the Republic of Cyprus and 
the Greek-Cypriot ‘Other’), immigration from mainland Turkey and the presence of Turkish 
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settlers in northern Cyprus, or ‘the less known schism of Cyprus’ (Christiansen, 2005: 156) is 
chosen here as the key signifier which organises rival accounts of the Turkish-Cypriot identity. 
This is based on the assumption that the ‘settler’ issue also influences the inter-communal 
relations between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, relations of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community with Turkey as well as the other related identities including ‘Europeanness’. Other 
main identity signifiers outlined in Fig. 2 are therefore delineated in tandem with the ‘settler 
debate’ in the empirical chapters (4,5 and 6) and specific attention is paid within each empirical 
domain to attitudes toward the Greek-Cypriot community as well as the centrality of the Cyprus 
issue and the EU integration process within the rival identity discourses, wherein concepts such 
as ‘isolations’, ‘solution, ‘statehood’, ‘EU integration’ and ‘justice’ are also explored throughout. 














  It is argued that competing claims of Turkish-Cypriot identity are made chiefly in relation 
to the migration and settlement of populations from Turkey and are orchestrated and dispersed 
by various political actors, the civil society and the print media. From this constructivist 
perspective, the relationship between Turkish-Cypriot identity and the Turkish 
immigrants/settlers is enacted in the proactive strategies and articulations of the Turkish-Cypriot 
political parties, the civil society and the media. This is captured further in the twin notions of 
‘securitization’ and ‘societal security’ elaborated in the works of the Copenhagen School of 
securitization theory (see above, section 2.3 in Chapter 2). In this view, security is no longer 
viewed as referring naturally to the traditional state security problematique. Instead, the process 
of designating security issues through successful speech-acts, that is the process of securitization, 
is analysed to better understand how different ‘referent-objects’, immigration or collective 
identity for instance, are securitised. A discourse-analytical account of collective identity is 
provided for all three domains of empirical investigation (Fig.2). These domains have been 
selected on the theoretical assumption but also preliminary evidence that they represent 
important sites for the construction of rival identity claims in northern Cyprus. In addition, a 
particularly relevant argument which is tested is that the securitization of an issue can be initiated 
and/or carried forward by a variety of sources including the opposition, the civil society (including 











In the following chapters, the conceptual framework outlined above is deployed to 
analyse the emergence and diachronic development of multiple identity discourses in northern 
Cyprus in the period following the endorsement of Cyprus’s accession to join the European 
Union. As it will be argued below in more detail, Cyprus’s accession to the EU presented a critical 
juncture which led to a disorientation of the hegemonic Turkishness discourse and presented a 
strategic opportunity for the proliferation and legitimation of alternative identity discourses (see 
below). It is further argued that the inability of the ‘EU Project’ to integrate northern Cyprus into 
the European mainstream has resulted in a dislocatory experience which led to a crucial 
discursive shift in oppositional, pro-EU discourse to transform and reorganise around the issue 
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of Turkish settlers and opposition against the ‘assimilationist’ immigration and citizenship policies 
purportedly engineered by the AKP government in Turkey.   
 
 More specifically, the study identifies and examines the articulations of identity, 
immigration and citizenship rights of Turkish migrants/settlers along two antagonistic discourses: 
a historical version emphasising irredentist ‘motherland nationalism’ characterised by the right 
and the newer, subversive version of Cypriotness discourse, galvanised by the left. The nationalist 
discourse — fervently advocated by the Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and to a large 
extent by the right-wing parties that have historically dominated the Turkish-Cypriot 
administration — does not differentiate a Turkish national from a Turkish-Cypriot. Turkish 
immigrants/settlers are seen as co-ethnics or ethnic-kins from the historical homeland and 
Denktash’ often-cited formulation, ‘A Turk goes, another Turk comes’ appears to sum up this line 
of thought which guided official views on national identity, immigration and citizenship for the 
greater part of the administration’s history. This can be formulated in the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Given the local history and in the context of the Cyprus conflict, Turkish-
Cypriot identity was cultivated and subsumed within a hegemonic notion of Turkishness 
that did not distinguish between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish settlers.  
 
On the other hand, the gradual strengthening of the nativist Cypriotness discourse, which 
gained momentum with the launching of Cyprus’s accession process in 1995 and reached its apex 
during the ‘Annan Peace Process’ (2001-2004) to unify the island within the European Union, 
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appears connected to the somewhat implicit articulation of anxiety in the context of immigration 
from Turkey and the related fears of changing demographic equilibrium, loss of cultural identity 
and the erosion of political autonomy as a result of the influx from Turkey which leads to the 
second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: In the context of Cyprus’s accession to the EU and the anticipated Turkish-
Cypriot integration into the European mainstream, Turkish settlers came to be perceived 
as a threat to Turkish-Cypriot identity. 
 
 With the failure of the ‘Annan Plan’ to reunify the island ahead of its EU entry in May 2004 
however, the Turkish-Cypriot community was left on the margins of the EU and the pro-EU 
Cypriotness discourse, which brought together large segments of the Turkish-Cypriot society, 
became disorientated. This is also evident in the return of the nationalist forces (UBP and the DP) 
into power in 2009 and then again in 2010 with the election of hardliner Derviş Eroğlu as the new 
Turkish-Cypriot leader.  
 
 More importantly, this period has also seen a significantly more vocal anti-Turkish 
rhetoric on the part of the Cypriotness camp that has overshadowed its distinct pro-EU stance. 
Such a discursive shift can be explained by the inability of the ‘EU project’ itself to consolidate 
the social imaginary that could structure the post-accession order. In other words, the failed 
attempt to integrate the Turkish-Cypriot community into the European mainstream obstructed 
the continuity of the common ‘social imaginary’ that was represented by the pro-EU camp and 
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thwarted the emergence of a stable hegemonic formation in Turkish-Cypriot politics during this 
period. It is argued that the dislocatory experience of the aborted EU-membership has led to a 
new reconfiguration of the pre-existing elements articulated within the oppositional Cypriotness 
discourse in which settler antagonisms took centre stage. This argument is hypothesised below: 
 
Hypothesis 3: With the failure of the ‘Annan Plan’, the pro-EU Cypriotness discourse is 
disorientated and settler antagonisms take centre-stage. 
 
The transformation of the pro-EU Cypriotness discourse into a more radical ‘anti-tutelage’ 
struggle organised around opposition towards immigration/settlement from mainland Turkey 
that has occurred during the past two decades is analysed with a view to putting into focus the 
emergence and changing contours of competing identity discourses in northern Cyprus (Fig.4). 










































Chapter 3 begins by charting the emergence of Turkish-Cypriot identity in a historical 
context. Section 3.1 sets the scene and outlines historic identity and citizenship conceptions 
covering the period beginning with the start of the British rule (including the 1960-1974 period 
of Independence) until the de facto partition of the island in 1974. Subsequent sections in the 
chapter, in turn, look at the diachronic impact of immigration/settlement from mainland Turkey 
on competing identity discourses since 1974. This part of the thesis is chiefly a historical account 
that provides the backdrop for the discussions presented in the following empirical chapters (4 
to 6). In this sense, it acts as the link between the conceptual and the empirical parts of the thesis 
by a) further building the conceptual argument presented in Chapter 2 and b) presenting the 
dominant discursive contexts that has shaped the discussions on identity and immigration under 
investigation. These include: i) the ‘Cyprus Problem’ ii) de facto statehood and non-recognition; 
iii) bilateral relations with Turkey and iv) EU accession process.   
 
 Chapter 4 analyses how and to what extent the mainstream political parties in northern 
Cyprus have articulated immigration and the issue of Turkish migrants/settlers within competing 
narratives on Turkish-Cypriot identity over the specified timeframe (1995-2013). In other words, 
it places the ‘settler issue’ at the heart of the identity politics in northern Cyprus and tries to 
account for continuity and change in the extent to which immigration from mainland Turkey and 
other closely related issues such as the citizenship status of Turkish settlers, bilateral relations 
with Turkey, the Cyprus Problem and the EU are represented and instrumentalised within 
established party-political discourses on identity in northern Cyprus since 1994. A further aim of 
the chapter is to test the working hypotheses posited above (1, 2 and 3) by tracing the overall 
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trajectory of identity-settler discourses within Turkish-Cypriot party-politics and by examining 
the crucial discursive shift that occurred within the oppositional Cypriotness discourse during the 
1990s and again in late 2000s. 
 
Chapter 5 focuses on the civil society positions on the discussions examined in the earlier 
chapters. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 deal with the nationalist veteran groups and trade unions 
respectively. Selected participants in this section are considered influential political agents 
regularly engaged in public and media debates on identity and immigration. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 
then look at the ‘other side’ of the debate by exploring the identity and citizenship conceptions 
articulated by the settler/diaspora organisations (5.5) and other radical groups promoting 
counter-cultural agendas (5.6.) in order to shed much-needed light onto this important aspect of 
the debate that has received limited attention thus far. In this sense, Chapter 5 introduces a 
multiplicity of actors involved in the constitution of identity and immigration discourses in 
northern Cyprus. The decision to include civil society articulations in examining political 
discourses also reflects the broader understanding of the ‘political’ adopted here which entails 
not only official or mainstream discourses but semi-official and informal ones. Indeed, discursive 
acts can be initiated and/or carried forward by a variety of sources, including the civil society, 
sometimes in direct conflict with official state or mainstream positions. This is particularly 
relevant for the arguments put forward in Hypotheses 2 and 3 which posited the dissolution of 
the hegemonic Turkishness discourse and the emergence of alternative political identities. It is 
also in this chapter that the extent to which discursive/rhetorical acts of some of these civil 
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society actors can be described as ‘securitizing moves’ and constitute securitised discourses on 
identity and immigration-settlement is examined.  
 
Chapter 6 examines the role of the Turkish-Cypriot newspapers in constituting and 
articulating competing identity claims. It is primarily concerned with tracing the diachronic 
impact of competing identity discourses on the linguistic construction and framing of identity and 
immigration-settlement in the media narratives. The chapter focuses on three historical framing 
events (Fig. 2) and delineates the process whereby linguistic, ideological and political strategies 
adopted by the newspapers and their columnists played a critical and mobilising role in 
articulating the popular frames that simultaneously shaped the discourses on identity and 
immigration-settlement. All three hypotheses posited above are further elaborated in this 
chapter.  
 
Chapter 7 is a concluding chapter that ties together and scrutinises the findings of the 
empirical chapters. It also takes a step back to reflect on the possible limitations of the study and 




This chapter introduced a discourse-analytical framework for investigating the impact of 
immigration-settlement from mainland Turkey on conceptions of collective identity in northern 
Cyprus. The first part of the chapter (sections 2.2 and 2.3) provided a brief review of the literature 
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on collective identity and immigration respectively. It looked at the scholarly debate on the 
constitution of collective identity particularly focusing on the earlier modernist readings on 
national identity and followed the intellectual trajectory of the constructivist paradigm into the 
contemporary period, arguing for a contextual understanding of collective identity as discourse 
inspired by the poststructuralist Discourse Theory and the insights offered by the Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) school. Important conceptual definitions that underpin the theoretical 
framework of this thesis such as ‘discourse’, ‘floating signifiers’, ‘articulation’ and ‘dislocation’ 
were also provided throughout the discussion. Section 2.3 then looked at the recent immigration 
literature that has conceived immigration as a discursive formation. In this respect, section 2.3 
also accounted for the symbolic relationship between identity and immigration by exploring 
comparative cases which deploy the constructivist ‘securitization approach’ to suggest 
immigration to be conceptualised as a powerful ‘floating signifier’, open to competing 
articulations by antagonistic discourses on identity.  
 
Having outlined the constructivist paradigm and the discursive approaches developed 
within it towards the study of collective identity and the theoretical frame of analysis towards 
immigration, the next part of the chapter (sections 2.4 and 2.5) then turned on to explore their 
applicability to the case of northern Cyprus. Section 2.4 pointed out to some of the normative 
considerations in adopting an immigration framework for the purposes of this investigation. In 
this respect, it highlighted the hybrid nature of the migration in the northern Cyprus context and 
drew attention to the strategic/ideological considerations in the deployment of competing 
‘settler’ and ‘immigrant’ categories. Based on this utilisation of the identity and immigration 
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framework, the next section (2.5) then introduced several working hypotheses that are tested in 
the empirical chapters of this thesis (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). The purpose of the following chapter 
is to provide a historical account of the emergence of dominant identity narratives which informs 




































3.2. Historical Legacies: Early conceptions of Turkishness in colonial Cyprus 
3.3. Turkish-Cypriot conceptions of identity after partition: ‘Turk comes, another Turk goes?’ 





3.1. Introduction  
 
 Conceptions of collective identity in the Turkish-Cypriot community are inextricably linked 
to the recent turbulent history of Cyprus marked by geopolitics, nationalism and a complex legal 
context. Under Ottoman rule (1571-1878), collective identity was largely based on religious 
affiliation which distinguished the Muslim population from the Orthodox Christians. With the 
beginning of the colonial period under Britain (1878) religion remained the primary site of 
identification for the Muslim community and identity politics mainly evolved around religious 
appeals for unity against enosis or refusal to be incorporated in a Christian/Greek state. The 
nationalist victory in Turkey and the founding of the Turkish Republic (1923) together with 
growing Greek nationalism on the island then gradually shifted identity from Islamic forms of 
belonging towards a Turkish national consciousness. 
 
In the 1950s, Turkish nationalism became a reckonable movement and fought under the 
banner of TMT (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı) against Greek-Cypriot enosis and ultimately for the 
partition of the island in order to unify with Turkey (taksim). The establishment of an 
independent, bi-communal Republic in 1960 failed to resolve the violent nationalist conflict 
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which prepared the ground for the de facto partition of the island when large numbers of Turkish-
Cypriots retreated into ethnic enclaves (1963-64). Turkish-Cypriot enclavement contributed 
significantly to the further deterioration of relations between the two communities but most 
importantly, it consolidated the hegemony of Turkish nationalism. Territorial separation was also 
fortified with the ideological exclusion of Cypriotness from official discourses dominated by a 
monolithic conception of Turkishness. The Turkish-Cypriot community remained under 
nationalist instigation when the island was partitioned as a result of Turkish military 
intervention26 and declared separate statehood with the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983 (Fig.5). 
 
The nationalist leadership maintained its control over the community until the early 
2000s when it was ousted by a societal movement championing the reunification of the island 
within the European Union. International non-recognition of the Turkish-Cypriot statehood, 
limited prospects of its overall viability in the context of international isolations and change in 
domestic perceptions of Turkey were key to setting the stage for the gradual emergence of 
alternative political identities from late 1980s onwards that began to gradually challenge 
predominant notions of Turkishness; they would later converge with the ‘EU effect’ (see below) 
to produce a dramatic political upheaval in the Turkish-Cypriot community on the eve of Cyprus’s 
EU accession. The political sea-changes that took place within the Turkish-Cypriot community  
                                                          
26 First launched in July 1974, chiefly in reaction to a coup attempt orchestrated by the Junta in Greece to 
overthrow President Makarios, and again in August that year to ‘restore peace’, the Turkish military intervention is 
described as ‘peace operation’ and ‘invasion’ in official Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot narratives respectively. 




Figure 5. Cyprus map – administrative divisions (CIA, 2017) 
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during this time were drastically deflated however, when Cyprus acceded into the EU as a still-
divided island. The inability of the ‘EU Project’ to integrate northern Cyprus into the European 
mainstream has resulted in a dislocatory experience which gradually led to a crucial discursive 
shift in oppositional, pro-EU discourse to transform and reorganise around the issue of Turkish 
settlers and opposition against the ‘assimilationist’ immigration-settlement policies purportedly 
engineered by the AKP government in Turkey.  
 
 The main aim of this chapter is to chart the historical trajectory of these antagonistic 
conceptions of collective identity in the Turkish-Cypriot community in a structured, historical 
context before turning to examine more closely the effect of populations migrating from 
mainland Turkey on such conceptualisations over the selected timeframe in the subsequent 
chapters (4, 5 & 6). In this sense, the chapter acts as the link between the conceptual and the 
empirical parts of the thesis by a) further building the conceptual argument presented in chapter 
2 and b) presenting the dominant discursive contexts that act as mediating factors for the settler 
antagonisms under investigation. These include: i) non-recognition and de facto statehood ii) 
bilateral relations with Turkey iii) the Cyprus Problem and iv) EU accession.  
 
 The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section (3.2) discusses the specific 
historical juncture at the beginning of the twentieth century by providing a brief chronological 
analysis of the spread of Turkish nationalism which rendered Turkishness the primary site of 
collective identity. Key elements of the nationalist discourse which came to constitute and 
entrench Turkishness are also highlighted throughout. The remaining sections in the chapter then 
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present the diachronic development of other, subversive conceptions of collective identity which 
began to challenge the hegemonic Turkishness discourse. Section 3.3 deals with the period which 
followed the partition of the island as a result of the Turkish intervention into the early 1990s. 
The domestic political scene of the Turkish-Cypriot community is presented with a particular 
focus on immigration from mainland Turkey that became a contentious issue during that time. 
The next section (3.4) then focuses on the period marked by Cyprus’s application for EU 
membership and its aftermath; developments triggered by the publication of a UN peace plan 
(the so-called ‘Annan Plan’) and the post-accession period which is characterised by the ongoing 
relevance of Turkish settlers for discussions on identity within the Turkish-Cypriot community are 
also highlighted in this section. Section 3.4 deals with the period 1994-2014 that falls, to a large 
extent, within the analytical timeframe set for the empirical Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Discussions in 
these chapters nonetheless depart from the general overview of the introductory section to focus 
in detail and almost exclusively on distinct spheres of the Turkish-Cypriot identity politics 
(political parties, civil society and the print media respectively) and how they have contributed 
to the initiation and reproduction of competing identity narratives over the specified timeframe. 
Finally, the concluding part of this chapter (3.5) underlines the main themes that are relevant to 
the subsequent investigation of immigration-settlement from mainland Turkey on conceptions 
of collective identity in the Turkish-Cypriot community and link this historical review to the 






3.2. Historical Legacies: Early conceptions of Turkishness in colonial Cyprus 
 
A brief survey of the existing scholarly accounts on rival Greek and Turkish nationalisms 
in Cyprus reveals that the latter, in comparison with the chronological development of a 
Hellenocentric consciousness among the island’s Orthodox community, flourished much later – 
gaining significant mainstream exposure only at the turn of the twentieth century (Attalides, 
1979; Pollis, 1973, 1996; Kitromilides, 1990; Kızılyürek, 2002; Morag, 2004; and Nevzat, 2005). 
Certainly, as Nevzat (2005) has recently shown, there were early signs of a certain nationalist 
sentiment that was promoted by the elite and intellectuals in the late nineteenth century 
onwards. However, as he also concedes, this sentiment was largely based on loyalty to the 
Ottoman state and the Muslim identity attached to it (Nevzat, 2005).  
 
Another important premise that is highlighted more specifically by the literature on 
Turkish nationalism is that the spread of Turkish nationalist sentiment in Cyprus was both a 
product of domestic and external circumstances. With regards to the external dimension of 
Turkishness, the creation of the new Kemalist Republic in Turkey in 1923 was the ultimate event 
that would enable the fostering of a Turkish identity. Yet, even before the actual emergence of 
Turkishness as the official ideology of the Kemalist Republic in Turkey, the Muslim elite in Cyprus 
had begun promoting nationalist views largely in reaction to Greek-Cypriot campaign of enosis. 
Encapsulating the idea of Cyprus’s union with Greece, the goal of enosis laid at the heart of 
Cypriot Muslims’ fears over their autonomy as a religious community. And in the following 
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decades, it would gradually galvanise these anxieties into stronger national identification with 
Turkishness.  
 
Before proceeding with the analysis of these external but also internal factors which 
progressively transformed the Ottoman-Muslim community into the ‘Turkish community of 
Cyprus’ by the mid-twentieth century, it is important to briefly outline some of the legacies of 
the Ottoman era in terms of the administrative setting and ethno-cultural cleavages and in 
comparison with the political setting under British rule. As it will be shown below, these legacies 
display intriguing continuities and overlaps in the constitution of collective identities later on. 
 
During the Ottoman rule, the Muslim millet of Cyprus was given clear privileges in the 
administration of the state.27 As Navaro-Yashin remarked: ‘if anything differentiated “Muslim” 
from “non-Muslim” subjects of the Ottoman Empire, it was the easier access of the former 
(sometimes through conversion to Islam) to political (i.e. state and military) power’ (2008: 111). 
Indeed, the most explicit of such privileges and the one which indicated the island’s Muslims 
belonged to the ruling group was the exclusive right to military service and to bear arms 
(Attalides, 1979: 38). In this respect, the Muslim political elite opposed any increase in political 
power of the numerically superior Orthodox Cypriots and rejected demands to extend citizenship 
privileges to non-Muslims. Muslim religious authorities also regularly appealed to their 
congregations on the basis of a threat to Islam posed by the strong Orthodox Church or the 
possible political equality of the Christians (Nevzat, 2005). With the start of the British colonial 
                                                          
27 For a recent discussion of the Ottoman millet system, see, Stamatopoulos (2006) 
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rule in 1878 however, the privileged position Muslims enjoyed under Ottoman rule ended and 
the traditional millet system characterised by religious autonomy was replaced with a centralised 
state.28  
 
The British colonial period also marked a new era of communal representation which was 
to further intensify the enosis-related anxieties of the Muslim elites. More specifically, the 
Muslim elite which had enjoyed a privileged/ruling status under the Ottomans feared that a 
proportionally elected ‘Legislative Council’ introduced by the colonial administration would pave 
the way for independence and ultimately enosis. Such prospects of ‘Greek-rule’, for the Muslim 
community, translated into their exodus from Cyprus. 29 An important reference point for such 
Muslim anxieties, in this respect, was the former Ottoman territories of Thessaly (Thessalía) and 
                                                          
28 Others have also accused Britain of initiating the process of ‘ethnicisation’ and recasting of religious identities thus 
contributing to the rise of ethno-nationalism (Pollis, 1996; Morag, 2004). Pollis, for example, has argued that it was 
the colonial administration which introduced structures “designed to pit the two communities against each other” 
(p.76). While Pollis’ starting-point, that there was ‘no preordained necessity and inevitability leading to the existence 
of two nationalities on Cyprus’ is certainly commendable, her tentative assertion that it was the British who 
intentionally created interethnic cleavages ipso facto is too simplistic an argument to claim. In fact, as Peristianis 
(2008, p. 439) has argued, ‘the roots of the problem were there long before the British arrived’ since the Greek 
nationalism had been on the rise since 1830s.  
29 The following Memorandum which was sent to British Secretary of State Lord Kimberley by the Muslim members 
of the Legislative Council in 1882 after the announcement of a new constitution to introduce proportional 
representation in the Council is particularly revealing of earlier Muslim elite positions on the status of their 
community, its relations with the Greek/Orthodox Cypriot community and as well as its attitudes towards the 
Colonial administration and is quoted at length below: ‘Our forefathers occupied this land more than three hundred 
years ago comfortably with the established rules respected by all nations, leavening and dyeing its soil with their 
own blood and sacrificing their lives even for a handful of its earth […] ever since that time we have been the ruling 
element; […] while at the time of the change of the administration of the island we knew we were losing a 
Government of our own faith, we willingly submitted to Her Britannic Majesty’s Rule [… ]it is proposed that  the 
Greek-Cypriot community whose thoughts and intentions of oppressing and vexing us are made manifest under all 
circumstances, and in every one of their acts, who have constantly made all sorts of complaints[…] and whose 
endless cries of ‘We want the Hellenic Government for our rulers’ […] should all at once be granted a privilege [of 
proportional representation] The Legislative Council, which is hereafter the basis of the administration of the island, 
will ultimately become a prelude to the independence which is the motto constantly repeated by our Christian 
compatriots[…] the franchise in question […] if enforced, will absolutely compel us all to leave the island for some 




of course, Crete which had now become part of the Greek state.30 Muslim grievances in former 
Ottoman territories was also a bone of contention between the Muslim and Orthodox members 
of the Legislative Council (Samani, 2011:  46). From then on, the Muslim elite regularly expressed 
these anxieties in frequent protests. It is also within this context that the annexation31 of Cyprus 
by Britain in 1914 was tentatively welcomed by the leaders of the Muslim community since the 
elite believed that it would derail the establishment of a protectorate and potential handing of 
the island to Greece.32  
 
With the start of the ‘Turkish War of Liberation’ (1919), the nationalist sentiment would 
converge with such anxieties to leave its mark on the Muslim community. In this sense, pro-
Kemalist coverage of the war by influential Turkish-Cypriot newspapers and magazines were 
instrumental in the amplification of nationalist sentiment amongst the Muslim community 
(Nevzat, 2005). Public affection created around the ‘Turkish War of Liberation’ was also displayed 
in several high-profile rallies. In particular, the military victory in Izmir (Smyrna) on 9 September 
                                                          
30 It is important to note here, that Cretan War was fought in 1897 and it is only in the years following the war that 
it entered the nationalist discourse as a reference point. As Bryant (2004, p.98) has further stressed, the commotion 
Cretan war caused in Cyprus at the time it broke out was limited to ‘isolated coffee house fights, much the way a 
football match may cause today’.  Nevertheless, Crete would become an important reference point for Turkish 
nationalism in the years ahead and nationalist leaders such as Rauf Denktash would regularly point to the ‘massacres’ 
of Muslims in Crete by that island’s Greeks as proof of the prospects that awaited Turkish-Cypriots were they not to 
resist the Greek-Cypriots’ struggle for enosis.(Denktaş, 2005). 
31 Cyprus became a British protectorate in 1878 although it remained under Ottoman sovereignty until 1914. The 
island was then annexed by Britain in 1914 following the Ottoman Empire’s decision to declare war against Britain 
and the other entente powers. 
32 For the Cypriot Muslims, there was thus an ‘imminent danger’ from the side of the Greek-Cypriot nationalists who 
agitated for enosis, and rekindled hope from the side of the colonial administrators who, having now annexed the 
island officially, could act as a buffer against Greek-Cypriot national aims. Fears of enosis would thus intensify again 
in 1915 when Britain offered to hand Cyprus to Greece on condition that the latter sided with the Allies in Serbia. 
Due to the pro-German attitude of the King Constantine, however, the offer was not taken up and never renewed 
(Crawshaw, 1978: 25).  
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1922 caused considerable excitement amongst the Turkish-Cypriot community followed by a 
large gathering in capital Nicosia to celebrate the events (Ateşin, 1999: 20). Indeed, as Dr Fazil 
Kuchuk who would later serve as the Vice-President for the Republic recalled: ‘At the end of that 
gathering, people decided to support Ataturk without reservation and celebrate all his victories 
from then on’ (Ateşin, 1999: 20). The Muslim elite was now in the process of elevating the 
Turkishness discourse as the primary form of identification.  
 
By the late 1920s, advances in education also meant that Muslim children attended 
segregated schools and taught Turkish curricula which further cultivated ideas of Turkishness. 
While the colonial authorities tried to curb these tendencies, their efforts were largely dismissed 
by nationalist schoolteachers who were educated in and brought directly from Turkey.33 Perhaps 
more remarkably, the influence of the nationalist schoolteachers in most cases, went beyond the 
confines of the classroom. While pupils were taught nationalist ideas by their teachers during 
classes, the latter would also indoctrinate the coffee-shop congregations by reading them 
nationalist/patriotic articles (Nevzat, 2005). As Kızılyürek (2002) and others have also pointed 
out, when the British did try to play a more intrusive and direct role in the educational affairs of 
the community, especially in the late 1920s and following the 1931 ‘October Revolt’34 their 
                                                          
33Indeed, despite official restrictions introduced by the British following the 1931 October Revolt (see below), 
school teachers in Turkish schools were to continue disseminating nationalist discourse in secret. As Dr Kuchuk 
recalled: ‘Turkish teachers would get hold of books, secretly and at their own expense, […] and read these to their 
students during class’ (Kuchuk, 2010: 205). 
34 This was an island-wide revolt, largely motivated by economic reasons against the background of the Great 
Depression that lead to the burning down of the British Governor’s Residence in Nicosia. In the aftermath of the 




efforts only provoked further nationalist sentiment.35 The ideology and reforms of the Kemalist 
Republic were also progressively adopted in Cyprus to foster the growth of the Turkish nationalist 
sentiment. Such revolutionary reforms to replace Arabic with the Latin alphabet and adopt 
western attire (abandoning the fez and the niqab36) were closely followed and widely 
introduced.37 Turkish national commemorations also began to be enacted in Cyprus, becoming 
semi-official occasions that celebrated Turkishness.  
 
Last but not least, the rise of nationalist sentiment during the 1920s championing 
Turkishness soon began taking hold in the ranks of the Turkish leadership. Since the start of the 
British rule, Cypriot Muslims had been represented by the conservative, loyalist elements of their 
community. The leading conservative politician İrfan Bey, for example, had served in various high 
ranks (as delegate of the Evkaf, member of the Legislative Council but also as the member of the 
Executive Council) and remained a loyalist until his death. He was replaced by Sir Münir (the first 
ever Turkish-Cypriot to be knighted for his loyalty, see appendix 2) in October 1925. While İrfan, 
and then Münir did oppose the spread of Turkish nationalism, they were soon challenged and 
eventually defeated by the so-called ‘populists’ (halkçılar) led by Necati Özkan and Mehmet Zeka 
who were to rise from 1930s onwards on a Turkish nationalist platform (Nevzat, 2005; Evre, 
2004). 
 
                                                          
35 Thus, for example, the British decision to change the name of the ‘Turkish Lycée’ in Nicosia to ‘Islam Lycée’ causing 
a public outcry, see Kizilyurek (2002). 
36 Niqab is a full body cloak that leaves the area around the eyes clear  
37 Nonetheless, it would be incorrect to claim there was no dissent amongst the Turkish-Cypriots towards these 




As mentioned earlier, while Turkish nationalism in Cyprus was to an important extent 
characterised by kin-state nationalism, inspired by the nationalist developments in the Turkish 
mainland, yet it also had its own specific characteristics and conditions which instigated, 
sustained and at times, magnified nationalist sentiment. Of these domestic factors, the long-term 
economic prospects of the Turkish-Cypriot community, rapid and large-scale emigration but also 
the prospects of communism — all perceived as threats to the very survival of the Turkish 
community in the face of enosis — were particularly instrumental in the articulation of the early 
Turkishness discourse in Cyprus. The framing of ‘economic backwardness’ as an existential threat 
had already began gaining sway among the Muslim intellectuals at the end of the nineteenth 
century (An, 2006). The argument advanced here was that economic prosperity was not only a 
goal in-itself but would provide the Muslim community with the means they desperately needed 
in order to maintain their cultural identity and reassert their autonomy against the economically 
superior Greek/Orthodox community. By the 1920s, numerous articles and editorials appeared 
on Turkish newspapers on a regular basis lamenting the Muslim dependence on Greek 
businesses, presenting such economic reliance as an existential threat; the idea of economic 
segregation, namely that Turks should exclusively support fellow Turks, a policy that was formally 
put in practice in the 1950s (see below) was also being advanced during this time. In addition, 
the leading business elite began appealing for assistance from Turkey to support the community’s 
economic development not only through direct involvement such as by establishing a 
commercial/national bank that would provide ‘Turkish businesses’ with much-needed credit and 
encourage investment but also by ‘[sending] immigrants to boost the population’ (An, 2006: 166). 
Indeed, by the 1950s, nationalist instigators were championing the idea that economic well-being 
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of the Turkish population, hence their very survival as a ‘national community’, depended on 
assistance from Turkey.38  
  
A second discursive element which came to be embedded in the Turkish nationalist 
discourse in this period was related to demographic fears caused by intensified Muslim/Turkish 
emigration from the island. The flow of emigration from Cyprus to Turkey, mainly for economic 
reasons (as a result of successive droughts and the Great Depression in particular) but also on 
ideological/nationalist motives, began in the aftermath of the First World War and continued at 
varying intensities until the Second World War. It was also facilitated by the decision of the 
Turkish government after the ‘Lausanne Agreement’39 in 1923 to extend citizenship rights to 
those Turkish-Cypriots who wished to settle in Turkey. This was a cause of great concern for some 
Turkish nationalists alarmed by the prospects of a numerically diminished Turkish community in 
the face of enosis; some even argued that emigration, by weakening Turkish presence on the 
island, ultimately served Greek-Cypriot national aims (Nevzat, 2005). In any case, many continued 
to migrate to Turkey in subsequent years, further fuelling Turkish-Cypriot demographic 
anxieties.40   
                                                          
38 By this time the nationalist leadership had put in place a policy of self-imposed economic segregation on part of 
the Turkish community (09 July 1958). This was followed by the creation of a separate Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of 
Commerce (Kıbrıs Türk Ticaret Odası) on 18 October 1958 chiefly aimed at organising Turkish businessmen and 
mobilizing support to facilitate what became known as the ‘Buy Turkish’ (Türk’ten Türk’e) campaign (An, 2006: 233). 
39 The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, signed between Turkey on one side and the Allies (Britain, France, Italy, Japan, 
Greece, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) established the boundaries of the modern 
Turkish state, removing Turkish claims to its Arab provinces and upholding the British possession of Cyprus. 
40 An article published in July 1957, in Halkın Sesi, entitled ‘Population of Cyprus and the Office of National 
Statistics’ reflected such anxieties. In it, Halkın Sesi argued that the population figures of a 1947 Census giving the 
total number of Turkish-Cypriots as 92,642 was simply false since the number surely was ‘above the 120,000 mark’ 
though failing to substantiate this assertion (An, 2006: 228). Another article published in Hursoz shortly after tried 
to back such claims that the census data was inaccurate on the grounds that only those Turkish-Cypriots who had 
in their possession valid identification documents were counted (An, 2006: 229). 
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Yet another factor which did worry Turkish nationalists was the possibility of Greece (and 
later, Cyprus) becoming communist especially following the break out of the Greek Civil War in 
1946. As Nevzat (2005) has noted, this was an alarming prospect for a community with a religious-
conservative leadership since Cyprus also had a small but well-organised communist movement. 
First institutionalised under the banner of the Communist Party of Cyprus (KKK, or Koumounistiko 
Komma Kyprou), the pan-Cypriot communist movement was manifestly pro-independence and 
championed the idea of an independent, socialist Cyprus that would eventually join the ‘Balkan 
Communist Federation’ (Peristianis,2008). In this sense, the movement was also anti-national; it 
thus took a stand against enosis which it considered ‘a goal promoted by bourgeoisie nationalist 
politicians, supported by the capitalist class of mainland Greece’ (Peristianis, 2008: 148). Whilst 
such radical ideas did initially stoke up anti-communist anger on part of the British and the Greek 
Orthodox Church and fear on part of the Muslim/Turkish-Cypriot community, the latter was 
further agitated when the Communist movement dropped its commitment to independence and 
began siding with the idea of enosis. Furthermore, as Plutis Servas who had served as the leader 
of both KKK and AKEL recognised, latter’s decision in 1946 to use the slogan ‘Self-government – 
Enosis’ would inevitably alienate many Turkish-Cypriots from the movement (1999: 119).   
 
Faced with such prospects of imminent enosis, Turkish-Cypriot nationalists began 
organising politically.41 In the 1940s when Greek nationalist agitation was nearing its peak, 
                                                          
41 First, in 1943, the ‘Cyprus Turkish Minority’s Association’ (Kıbrıs Adasi Türk Azınlıklar Kurumu, or KATAK) was 
established. Among the leading members of KATAK were political rivals Dr Kuchuk and Necati Özkan. Özkan was 
later side-lined by a clique and in 1945 and he left KATAK to later organise the Istiklal Party. Dr Kuchuk also parted 
ways with KATAK to establish the ‘Cyprus Turkish National Union Party’ (Kıbrıs Türk Milli Birlik Partisi). By 1947, the 




Turkish nationalism strengthened in response. About that time Turkish-Cypriots began to be 
mobilized en masse in demonstrations to express opposition to enosis.42 This period also marked 
the direct involvement of the Turkish government in organizing the nationalists in Cyprus. The 
‘Cyprus is Turkish’ party was first to appear on the scene and was established with the help of a 
Turkish undercover assignee Hikmet Bil (Kızılyürek, 2002). Turkey also provided financial and 
logistical aid for the organisation of a Turkish-Cypriot underground organisation Volkan, which 
would later be replaced by the paramilitary ‘Turkish Resistance Organisation’ or the TMT (Türk 
Mukavement Teşkilatı).43  
 
The TMT existed as the Turkish counterpart of EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot 
Fighters or Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston). As Attalides (1979: 48) put it succinctly, it was 
‘just as nationalist and anti-communist but not anti-British’. Through a toxic combination of 
propaganda, intimidation and terror44, TMT served as a critical instrument that would prop and 
                                                          
atrocities’ faced by other Turkish populations who now lived under Greek ‘occupation’ (and, under perpetual fear) 
and asserted that it would strongly oppose any efforts to introduce self-government. It also added that if the British 
left Cyprus the island had to be retorted back to Turkey (Kuchuk, 2010: 322). In July 1955, ‘Cyprus is Turkish’ (Kıbrıs 
Türktür Partisi) party was established. Two years later, on 26 May 1957, the party proclaimed itself the sole 
representative of the Turkish community and adopted the policy of taksim, i.e. territorial separation, as ‘the only 
viable solution to the Cyprus issue’ (Kuchuk, 2010: 379). 
42 See also appendix 2; from one such anti-enosis rally, a telegram was sent to the Turkish Prime Minister, Hasan 
Saka, saying: ‘Fifteen thousand Turks [total number of those said to have attended the rally] unanimously declared 
their refusal to bow to Greek demands for self-rule and ultimately union of Cyprus with Greece. They believe that 
self-rule or enosis will bring about the annihilation of Turkish minority’ (cited in Attalides, 1979: 46). 
43 In an interview he gave in 1971, Dr Kuchuk who founded the party would also stress that it was in 1955 that the 
Turkish-Cypriot community began organising politically: ‘Although the nucleus of the first Turkish-Cypriot political 
party was organised in 1942, it was not until 1955 that the Turkish-Cypriot community became politically active. 
Within the next three years, a community political structure was developed as result not only of effort of Turkish-
Cypriot leaders to oppose enosis, but also of encouragement from British and Turkish officials who were seeking to 
safeguard their countries’ strategic interests’ (cited in Attalides, 1979: 46). 
44 As An describes: ‘in its first proclamation, on November 2, 1957, TMT gave the first command to the Turkish-
Cypriots concerning total obedience to the orders of the organisation and announced the following: in this struggle 




sustain the hegemony of Turkishness during this time. In this sense, it was also the TMT 
leadership that would deliver the fatal blow to efforts aimed at constructing an overarching 
Cypriotness discourse by pronouncing the Cypriot communist movement ‘the archenemy of the 
Turkish nation’.45  
 
While the TMT used nationalist propaganda, intimidation and violence to soon hold 
control of the Turkish-Cypriot community, it was also greatly assisted by the inter-communal 
strife which broke out with the beginning of the Greek-Cypriot armed struggle for enosis. When 
violence escalated in December 1963,46 Turkish-Cypriot fears were reinforced and a large 
majority of the Turkish-Cypriot population retreated into barricaded ethnic enclaves.47 The so-
called ‘Enclave Period’ saw the island de facto partitioned into Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot 
areas — each with its own polity and social structure.48 The government of the Republic, now led 
                                                          
unavoidable’ (cited in Yennaris, 2003: 125). Hikmet Afif Mapolar, a prominent Turkish-Cypriot journalist also recalled 
in his memoirs that many Turkish-Cypriots fearing for their lives had been forced to place ads on newspapers to 
denounce any participation in left-wing activity and declare their alliance and devotion to Turkish nationalism and 
TMT leadership (Mapolar, 2002). 
45 TMT’s rhetoric also indicated that Turkish-Cypriot participation in bi-communal, left-wing activities was rendered 
tantamount to treason, punishable by death. In the following years, nationalist attacks on Turkish-Cypriot trade 
unionists and AKEL members would cut-off the few remaining Turkish-Cypriot links with this movement. By the end 
of TMT’s anti-communist campaign, the bi-communal workers’ movement was totally dismantled. Ordinary Turkish-
Cypriots engaged in other bi-communal activities were also intimidated by TMT militants for committing ‘treason’. 
46 In November 1963, the Vice President of the Republic, Dr Kuchuk was presented with the infamous ‘Thirteen 
Points’, proposals tabled by President Makarios for wide-ranging constitutional changes to overcome the political 
gridlock over key legislation on municipalities and taxation. These proposals included the scrapping of veto powers 
for both the President and Vice President, abolition of separate municipalities and the modification of the ratio of 
Greeks to Turks in the civil service (3:1) with a population ratio (Morag, 2004: 618). The Turkish-Cypriot leadership 
regarded the proposals as an attempt to strip-away their communal rights and rejected them outright. 
47 As Hatay and Bryant has noted, the first conflict-related displacement took place in 1958 with most inhabitants 
returning to their homes when independence was declared in 1960. By mid-1960s however, some 90 percent of 
the Turkish-Cypriot population lived in these enclaves (2011: 634).  
48During the ‘Enclave Period’, Turkish-Cypriot leadership promptly set up a self-governing entity, or a ‘state within 
a state’ to meet the needs of the displaced and organise other aspects of the enclave life. A ‘General Council’ was 
established to oversee the administration of the new entity, though its role was quickly overshadowed by TMT’s 




solely by the Greek-Cypriot community imposed an embargo on the ethnic enclaves and 
suspended its own jurisdiction beyond the areas under its effective control. This, in effect, would 
increase Turkish-Cypriot dependence on mainland Turkish assistance for its long-term viability. 
Indeed, Turkey’s financial aid officially started in 1964, initially to pay public-sector salaries 
(including salaries of those civil servants who had been employed by the RoC before December 
1963 (see, Hatay 2005) but intensified in the following years to wholly sustain and prop-up the 
Turkish-Cypriot economy (see, Chapter 4).  
 
Needless to say, Turkish-Cypriot enclavement also contributed significantly to the further 
deterioration of relations between the two communities. During this period, most Turkish-
Cypriots had no contact with Greek-Cypriots and vice versa which allowed each side to 
consolidate their own conflict narratives.49 For the Turkish-Cypriot community, the unique 
conditions of their enclaved lives also led to an amplification of national unity. Many Turkish-
Cypriots came to believe that they were targeted by Greek-Cypriots indiscriminately, and it was 
because of mortal fear they were crammed into camps, forced to live under ‘economic siege’ and 
came to depend on mainland Turkish military and economic tutelage. In other words, their 
enclaved lives were determined by the fact of their Turkishness, perceived as an endangered 
                                                          
Turkish Administration’ (Kıbrıs Geçici Türk Yönetimi). This was set up with the aim of bringing together legislative, 
administrative and judicial functions of the Turkish-Cypriot entity ‘under one roof’. The new entity also adopted a 
self-styled enclave law, the so-called ‘fundamental rules’ (temel kurallar) which provided for the administration to 
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over enclave residents; available online at TRNC Supreme Electoral Council website, 
http://ysk.mahkemeler.net/ 
49 A ceasefire was declared in 1968 which saw the opening of the barricades surrounding the enclaves. As Hatay 
and Bryant (2011) have noted, this was met with little enthusiasm on the part of Turkish-Cypriots however, and 
even though the lifting of the restrictions allowed those Turkish-Cypriots living in the enclaves to travel for work, or 
return to their abandoned homes, negligible numbers made that choice. 
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condition of survival. And with the authorities constantly reinforcing the belief that enosis 
continued to pose an existential threat, Turkish nationalist discourse based on the articulation of 
demonised Greeks and primordial Turkishness (which conceived the Turkish community in Cyprus 
as an organic part of the greater, mainland Turkish nation) prevailed. In effect, all forms of 
political opposition towards the leadership was discouraged on the basis of national unity and 
with reference to an existential threat.50 This, in turn, would consolidate the political hegemony 




This section has outlined the historic legacy of Turkish nationalism in the hegemonic 
elevation of Turkishness which dominated the official narratives in northern Cyprus until recently. 
As the discussion above highlighted, religious affinity remained the primary marker of identity 
until it was replaced by a Turkishness discourse that was largely exported but also domestically 
instigated, to a large extent, in response to Greek-Cypriot nationalist aspirations or enosis. Also 
discerned above was that the version of Turkishness that began taking root in Cyprus from the 
early 1920s onwards conceived not a sui generis identity but rather a notion of belonging to the 
greater Turkish nation. The Turkishness discourse remained prevalent after 1974 when the island 
was partitioned as a result of the Turkish military intervention and dominated official conceptions 
of identity for much of the Turkish-Cypriot administration’s history. As such, it is relevant for 
                                                          
50 Those who were seen as a serious threat to leadership’s taksim and ‘Buy Turkish’ policies were simply murdered 
as was the tragic case of two young lawyers Ayhan Hikmet and Muzaffer Gürkan. For a detailed account of the 
events leading to their murder, see Attalides (1979: 164) 
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investigating the impact of immigration-settlement from Turkey on conceptions of identity in the 
Turkish-Cypriot community in the subsequent chapters (4, 5 and 6). In addition, the period 
presented here marks the beginnings of Turkish-Cypriot dependence on mainland Turkey for 
political/military and economic support. This dependence (which is discussed at length later on) 
is much contested and plays an important role in conceptualising collective identity in tandem 
with the immigration and the citizenship status of Turkish settlers. 
 
3.3. Turkish-Cypriot conceptions of identity after partition:  ‘A Turk comes, another Turk 
goes’? 
 
First launched in July 1974, chiefly in reaction to a coup attempt orchestrated by the Junta 
in Greece to overthrow President Makarios, and again in August that year to ‘restore peace’, the 
Turkish military intervention consolidated the physical separation of the two communities. As a 
result of the military action, Turkish-Cypriots who had lived outside the ethnic enclaves until then 
left their homes and moved north while the vast majority of Greek-Cypriots and other Cypriot 
communities in the north (Armenian and Latin communities in particular) were forced to relocate 
to south for the Greek-Cypriot controlled territories. On 13 February 1975, the ‘Cyprus Turkish 
Administration’ (Otonom Kıbrıs Türk Yönetimi) was upgraded to a ‘Turkish Federated State of 
Cyprus’ (Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti). In parallel, the remaining 45,000 Turkish-Cypriots who still 
lived in the Greek-Cypriot controlled areas were transferred by the United Nations (UN) forces 
to the Turkish-Cypriot controlled areas. By 1977, almost all Greek-Cypriots and members of other 
Cypriot communities, apart from the Greek-Cypriot inhabitants of one village in the Karpas 
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(Karpaz or Karpasia) peninsula and some Maronites from the village of Kormakitis (Koruçam), 
were also transferred to the south. 
 
For Turkish-Cypriot nationalists, Turkey's military intervention, what their official 
discourse called the ‘Peace Operation’ had finally settled the ‘Cyprus problem’. This period also 
saw intensified efforts to build and shape the Turkish-Cypriot community economically and 
culturally along the lines of Turkish nationalism. As part of the so-called ‘Turkification’ efforts, all 
geographical names were also renamed in Turkish and nationalist monuments were erected to 
signify Turkishness (Killoran, 2000). Economically, the large proportion of the island’s economic 
structure (factories, warehouses, hotels, etc.) left behind by the Greek-Cypriots, were now under 
Turkish-Cypriot control.51 Arguably, a major challenge Turkish-Cypriot authorities faced with 
regards to utilising this economic potential in order to kick-start their economy was an acute 
shortage of low-skilled workers to be employed in agriculture, construction and light-
manufacturing. A ‘settler recruitment programme’ was thus launched by 1975 which facilitated 
the arrival into Northern Cyprus of settler families from Turkey. Turkish-Cypriot authorities at the 
time argued that these seasonal and low-skilled ‘migrant workers’ were crucial in order to fill the 
labour shortages and to build a viable economy. Such economic calculations notwithstanding, 
the ongoing immigration from mainland Turkey has since converged with the citizenship status 
of the newcomers to constitute a central crux of identity politics in the Turkish-Cypriot 
community.  
 
                                                          
51 For a comprehensive review of the impact of the partition on the island’s economy, see Strong,1999 
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The so-called ‘settlement programme’ (1975-1983) was initiated in close coordination 
with Turkey52 and offered assisted settlement and instant citizenship rights to a number of groups 
including Turkish farming communities with limited access to arable land, the victims of the 1975 
flood and to those who wished to settle in Cyprus voluntarily (Hatay, 2007). In order to recruit 
volunteers, local radios in Turkey run public ads and muhtars were assigned to publicise details 
in their villages (Gündem.net, 2011).  Once their applications for settlement were approved by 
the regional Turkish-Cypriot consulates, settler families were then issued with passports (one 
passport per family) and given a date for their transfer to the port of Mersin from where they 
travelled to northern Cyprus by ferryboats (Gündem.net, 2011). Upon their arrival, the settler 
families were first accommodated in empty schools, hostels and in other available lodges (some 
belonging to what soon became the Eastern Mediterranean University) in Famagusta until they 
were allocated Greek-Cypriot houses (Gündem.net, 2011). As Hatay (2007) has also noted, these 
houses were distributed among the Turkish families by the lot. In a similar fashion, farmland was 
also distributed on the basis of the number of persons in each household.53 On the whole 
however, their distribution was conducted in a rather ad hoc fashion. Consequently, as Birand 
described: ‘While those villagers from [Turkey’s] woodland regions were allocated coastal 
                                                          
52 While available information on how this initial policy was formulated is scant, the information there is at present 
suggests that details on policy and strategy were enclosed by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership in a classified 
despatch, to Ankara in May 1975. According to Birand (1990), a report entitled ‘(Immigration and Worker 
Authorisation) Regulations on Turkish workers to be recruited for the purposes of alleviating labour shortages in 
the Turkish area(s) of Cyprus, No.60, Classification: Secret’ was prepared by the ‘Cyprus Coordination Committee’ 
(Kıbrıs Eşgüdüm Kurulu) headed by a Turkish civil servant, Ziya Müezzinoğlu, in close coordination with Rauf 
Denktash, the Turkish Embassy in Cyprus and authorities in Ankara. 
53 Accordingly, those households with five or more people were allocated between 100 and 150 donums (1 donum 
= 1000msq). For each extra child there on, there was a ten percent increment not to exceed 50 percent of the 
original land allocation. For more details, see also Morvaridi (1993). 
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settlements, traditional fishing communities of the Black Sea region, who might had never seen 
an orange fruit until then [!], were endowed with robust citrus groves’ (1990: 86).  
 
What became evident almost from the outset furthermore, was that a large majority of 
the settler families came from rural and conservative backgrounds. The socio-economic profile 
of the settlers would soon constitute the cultural axis of the Cypriotness discourse in the context 
of ethnic cleavage between the ‘educated’, ‘modern’ and ‘secular’ Turkish-Cypriots and 
‘religious’, ‘backward’ and ‘illiterate’ settlers from Turkey (this is elaborated further in the 
subsequent chapters). From the start, those Turkish nationals especially from rural backgrounds 
and attributed ‘non-assimilable’ cultural characteristics (religiosity, appearance, language, etc.) 
were framed as ‘undesirables’ (Ladbury, 1977: 317). And before long, all were positioned within 
the nativist discourses as threatening others who disturbed a ‘harmonious’ but also ‘culturally 
superior’ society by their otherness and presence.  
 
Yet, far from representing a unitary group and in stark contrast to what is widely assumed 
within nativist discourses on both sides of the island, Turkish settlers displayed a range of ethnic, 
economic and political outlooks. In other words, there were settlers of Alevite, Laz as well as 
Kurdish ethnicity from all economic backgrounds hence some naturally more privileged than 
others; this socio-political diversity was also displayed in another group of settlers consisting of 
war veterans and martyrs’54 families. Accordingly, they adopted different political affiliations (see 
section 5.3 in Chapter 5). Nevertheless, an important factor that has largely overshadowed such 
                                                          
54 Martyr refers here to those Turkish servicemen who lost their lives during the 1974 military intervention. 
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diversity in the past, hence consolidating the aforementioned nativist beliefs (see also below), 
was the voting patterns that traditionally reflected an overwhelming support in favour of 
nationalist politicians. This would, in turn, transform the citizenship status of Turkish settlers into 
a political battleground beginning with the first general elections settlers took part in 1981. In 
the 1981 presidential elections, settlers casted their vote overwhelmingly in favour of Rauf 
Denktash who came out on top vote with 70 percent of the vote with such settler hamlets of 
Karpaz (or Karpasia) and Maras (or Varosha) recording almost 90 percent of his support (Hatay, 
2005). From then on, naturalised Turkish settlers were largely conceived as a homogenous pool 
of voters that invariably supported the nationalist status quo and the Turkish tutelage over it (see 
below).  
 
The period of facilitated migration initiated with the 1974-5 ‘settler recruitment 
programme’ was discontinued by late 1980s when a new citizenship statute tied citizenship to a 
minimum one-year residency. In addition, new rules were introduced to administer border 
controls and regulate the issuing of work permits. New legislation also removed automatic access 
of newcomers to the housing register. According to the Turkish-Cypriot ‘Home Office’ data, a 
total of 21,851 citizenships were offered to Turkish nationals as part of the ‘settlement 
programme’ between 1974 and 1981.55 On 15 November 1983, the Turkish-Cypriot Parliament 
ratified the ‘Declaration for Independence’ proclaiming the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. 
Amidst domestic tension (see section 4.1 in Chapter 4) and international condemnation, the 
                                                          
55 Hatay (2005); It should also be noted that this number does not show the total number of settlers who had arrived 
through settlement policies since citizenship was given upon application and some settlers simply did not apply. In 
addition, out of those who did opt out of ‘TRNC’ citizenship, some returned back to Turkey after a short period.   
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constitution of the new entity was approved on 5 May 1985 by 70 percent of the votes. A month 
later, staunch-nationalist Rauf Denktash became the first President of the new state endorsed 
with 70.2 percent of the votes. Then in the parliamentary elections held on 23 June 1985, the 
‘National Unity Party’ (Ulusal Birlik Partisi, or the UBP) secured 24 of the 50 seats. Spearheaded 
by Denktash, the UBP promoted a nationalist agenda aimed at developing ever-closer ties with 
Turkey (see Chapter 4). Remarkably, a new ‘ethnic party’, YDP (‘New Birth Party’ or Yeni Doğuş 
Partisi) managed to get almost 9 percent of the votes and secured four seats.56 These elections 
were once again dominated by allegations of Turkish interference that was now a defining 
feature of the opposition’s rhetoric – in this context, intimately related issues of the (growing) 
number of Turkish settlers and their citizenship status also began taking centre stage and 
receiving substantial press coverage (discussed at length in Chapter 6).  
 
In one particularly fiery editorial, the leftist Yenidüzen newspaper asserted that migration 
both from Cyprus outwards and into it (from Turkey in particular) was a serious threat for the 
Turkish-Cypriot community (Yenidüzen, 1986). The editorial claimed that while Turkish-Cypriot 
emigration was not itself a novel phenomenon, the ‘demographic balance’ that had been in place 
before 1974 between ‘those who left’ and the ‘natives’ who replaced them was drastically 
altered. In fact, the ‘educated’ Turkish-Cypriots who had been migrating to other countries such 
as Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada, the editorial argued, were disproportionately 
                                                          
56  It is important to note that the political mobilisation of the Turkish settlers dates earlier. The first ethnic party, the Turkish 
Unity Party or the TBP (Türk Birlik Partisi) was founded in 1978 by Ismail Tezer, a retired Turkish army officer who had settled in 
Cyprus after 1974. TBP was the first settler party as such, appealing primarily to the settler constituency. In 1981 parliamentary 
elections, it polled 5.5 percent of the vote thus securing one seat in the assembly. The ‘New Birth’ was established essentially as 
an umbrella party which absorbed the earlier TBP. As Hatay (2005) has pointed out, the primary factor that had triggered the 
creation of the alliance was the introduction of an 8 percent threshold in the parliamentary elections. 
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replaced with growing numbers of Turkish immigrants: ‘Scores of people arriving to northern part 
of Cyprus [from Turkey] as “tourists” are not going back’ (Yenidüzen, 1986). Other than the 
‘tourists who never returned back’ and several thousand unauthorised workers who were 
naturalised in a matter of several months, the newspaper also claimed that many Turkish 
nationals who served their national service on the island were also settling (hence acquiring 
citizenship) following completion. Most remarkably, the article warned that the northern part of 
Cyprus was in danger of losing its ‘Cypriot character’ and that Turkish immigrants, arriving in 
numbers far supplanting those Turkish-Cypriot émigrés, would soon become numerically 
superior (Yenidüzen, 1986). Put differently, Yenidüzen indicated that Turkish immigration put 
native Turkish-Cypriots under risk of losing their cultural identity and becoming a minority. In a 
rather bold fashion, the newspaper insisted that Turkey halts the continuous influx of its nationals 
into the island if the latter wanted to demonstrate to the rest of the world that it was not engaged 
in a covert act of ‘colonisation’ (vilayetlestirme).  
 
Other ‘everyday’ accounts also indicated that large-scale immigration had created 
resentment among ordinary Turkish-Cypriots toward Turkish nationals. According to a Turkish 
military officer who had served during the military intervention in 1974 and returned back when 
he was reassigned a decade later: ‘Much water had gone under the bridge, there was little left 
unchanged. It was ‘us’ who had brought about much of the change. The genuine respect and 
affection shown to a Turkish general […] during and after the ‘Operation’ wasn’t really there 
anymore. In fact, you were now greeted with groaning, grumpy faces. The most upsetting was 
the situation of those Turkish immigrant families who had settled in Cyprus. Turkish-Cypriots 
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were treating our people as second-class citizens just like the Priest [President Makarios] had 
treated them. Such discrimination was visible everywhere. It was nothing less than [ethnic] 
segregation’ (Çilingir, 1997: 124). 
 
The official, nationalist view, on the other hand, considered the arrival of Turkish migrants 
as no such threat, especially in terms of the ‘Turkish-Cypriot’ identity. This was, to a large extent, 
due to the particular conception of identity based on a primordial notion of Turkishness that had 
guided official/nationalist narratives. Cultivated in the years preceding the partition of the island 
(see section 3.2 in Chapter 3), the prevailing identity discourse conceived the Turkish-Cypriot 
community as an extension of the ‘greater Turkish nation’ with no sui generis identity. From this 
perspective, the nationalist rhetoric made no ethnic or cultural distinction between Turkish-
Cypriots and Turks of mainland origin. In this sense, Denktash’s oft-cited formulation on identity 
is particularly revealing: ‘I am a child of Anatolia. I am a Turk in its truest sense, and my roots are 
in Central Asia. With my culture, my language, my history and my whole persona, I am a Turk […] 
I have a state and a motherland. Such notions as ‘Cypriot culture’, ‘Cypriot-Turk’, ‘Cypriot-Greek’, 
‘common Republic’ are all nonsense [...] Cypriot-Turk and Cypriot-Greek simply don't exist and 
neither do Cypriots […] In fact, the only true inhabitant of Cyprus is the Cyprus donkey’ (Kıbrıs, 
2000).  
 
 Within this discourse moreover, the Turkish-Cypriot community was articulated as a 
‘continuity’ that was first established with the Ottoman conquest/invasion of 1571 (Calotychos, 
1998; Bryant, 2004). In nationalist mythology, it was the ‘blood’ shed by the ancestors in the 
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conquest of Cyprus by the Ottomans but also by the ‘martyrs’ during the inter-communal fighting 
(1963-1974 period) that ultimately legitimised Turkish-Cypriot presence and gave them the right 
to make a claim on the land (Bryant, 2004). Such references to ‘land’ and the ‘blood’ of the 
Turkish martyrs within the Turkish nationalist mythology, conceived Cyprus as an ‘offspring’ of 
the Turkish nation (Killoran, 1998; Bryant, 2004). Furthermore, this conception of the national 
family (with reference to the matrimony of ‘blood’ and ‘land’) plays a dual role not only in 
designating Turkish immigrants and settlers as ‘ethnic kins’ of a lineal descent, or ‘our brothers’ 
(kardeşlerimiz) but also in constructing the contested ‘statehood’ of northern Cyprus with 
reference to the Turkish state. In this respect, official discourses refer to ‘TRNC’ as the ‘infant-
land’ or ‘baby-land’ (yavruvatan), in need of protection and nurturing for its survival from the 
‘motherland’ Turkey in the context of a pervasive insecurity. Indeed, nationalist narratives not 
only constantly reproduce the violent past, with the 1960-1974 period as the bloodiest time in 
the Turkish Cypriot history, but also seek continued Turkish protection to survive in the face of 
an existential threat posed by the ‘unchanging Greek-Cypriot aspirations of enosis’. 
   
 Such nationalist conceptions have nonetheless been challenged by alternative notions of 
belonging that gradually began to appear from the 1980s onwards in intellectual circles, left-
leaning trade unions and political parties (see Chapters 4 and 5). These rather subversive 
conceptualisations of identity emphasised an ethnically distinct Turkish-Cypriot community 
characterised by an overarching notion of Cypriotness. In a political vein, they also carried 
references to the precarious positioning of the Turkish-Cypriot community ‘between a rock and 
a hard place’ and rejected the zero-sum prospect of minority status with regards to Greek-
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Cypriots or that of cultural assimilation in relation to Turkey. More radical versions of the 
Cypriotness discourse later developed elaborate conceptions of a Cypriot national identity, in the 
form of an autochthonous narrative which now referred to Cyprus as the ‘motherland’ and 
emphasised the commonalities with Greek-Cypriots in history and culture. (Ali, 1988: 64) These 
all meant a revival of Cypriotness in cultural terms, to construct and promote a common Cypriot 
heritage, art and folklore (see for example, Hatay and Bryant, 2011). In parallel, there were 
renewed efforts with the beginning of the 1990s to reconnect with the South in the context of 
bi-communal activities with Greek-Cypriot groups (see section 5.2 in Chapter 5). Perhaps more 
remarkably, such nativist conceptions were also cultivated with reference to immigration from 
mainland Turkey, conceived as a threat to such distinct cultural/ethnic identity.  Whether 
because of a ‘cultural concern’ in relation to the withering away of ‘Cypriot consciousness’ and 
the eroding of Turkish-Cypriot identity or as a political threat seen in this sense as endangering 
the Turkish-Cypriot autonomy (see below, Chapter 4 but also section 5.2 in Chapter 5), 
immigration from mainland Turkey and the citizenship status of Turkish nationals soon became 
inextricably linked to debates on identity.  
 
 The growing international attention on Turkish immigration into northern Cyprus from 
late 1980s onwards would also maintain the issue on the political agenda. For example, 
communiques from the Commonwealth Heads of Government (Vancouver 1987, Kuala Lumpur 
1989 and Harare 1991) contained explicit references to the need for ‘a speedy withdrawal of all 
Turkish troops and settlers from Cyprus’ (Cuco, 1992: par.114). A similar position was also 
expressed at various ministerial meetings of the non-aligned countries (New York 1987, Belgrade 
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1989 and Algiers 1990), which likewise called for the immediate withdrawal of the ‘occupying 
forces’ and ‘settlers’. The European Parliament, in a resolution adopted in May 1988 on the 
situation on Cyprus, was also in favour of establishing a ‘precise timetable for the withdrawal of 
the Turkish troops and settlers’ (Cuco, 1992). Last but not least, in 1992, at the request of the 
Council of Europe (CoE) the Spanish parliamentarian Alfonse Cuco prepared a comprehensive 
report on the ‘Structure of the Cypriot Communities’ (‘Cuco Report’ thereafter) which was 
endorsed by the Council of Europe in a resolution on 7 October 1992 (No. 1197), recommending 
the Turkish-Cypriot authorities to conduct (together with European observers) a census in the 
northern part of the island. In addition, both the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish-Cypriot 
administration were requested to keep the numbers of new arrivals under strict control. Turkey 
was also invited to register at its embassy in Nicosia all Turkish citizens residing and arriving in 
Cyprus (CoE, 1992b). It was against this backdrop that other international developments, 
especially those pertaining to Cyprus’s EU accession that had been lurking in the background 
would soon introduce a new factor that would not only have significant repercussions for the 
unresolved Cyprus conflict in general but also a more intriguing effect on the much-politicised 
conceptions of Turkish-Cypriot identity and the framing of settlers within it. 
*** 
 This section has presented the historical juncture in which alternative conceptions of 
collective identity gradually emerged within the context of an unrecognised state dominated by 
a monolithic leadership. In the aftermath of the Turkish military intervention in 1974, the 
nationalist leadership consolidated its authority over the Turkish-Cypriot community that now 
lived in the ethnically homogenous, northern part of the island. It was precisely within this 
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context that the arrival of Turkish immigrants/settlers into northern Cyprus, initially as part of a 
‘settlement programme’ launched in 1975, became a major cleavage of the Turkish-Cypriot 
politics and sociality. While settlers displayed a range of ethnic, social and political outlooks, they 
were immediately cast aside in an orientalist manner (Said, 1995), as ‘backward’ and culturally 
‘non-assimilable’. Perhaps more remarkably, they were also seen as a homogenous constituency 
that invariably supported the nationalist status quo and the Turkish tutelage over the domestic 
affairs of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Alternative notions of belonging that began challenging 
the dominant, nationalist conceptions of collective-identity based on primordial Turkishness from 
late 1980s onwards, would articulate these claims together with an appeal to the insecurity of 
the Turkish-Cypriot community as somewhat of an ‘endangered minority’. In other words, such 
a commitment to the indigenous character of the Turkish-Cypriot identity, often (though not 
exclusively) within the framework of an overarching Cypriotness discourse was constructed 
against a ‘threat’ that conceived Turkish settlers/immigrants and their naturalisation as part of 
the assimilationist policies of Turkey to ultimately undermine the distinct Turkish-Cypriot identity 
and its long-term autonomy. 
 
3.4. The EU and collective identity in northern Cyprus (1995-2013) 
 
 Cyprus-EU relations, that is the relationship of the Greek-Cypriot controlled Republic of 
Cyprus with the European Union, was first initiated in the context of an association agreement in 
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1972.57 The agreement provided for a customs union which was fully implemented by the late 
1980s. It was with the application of Cyprus to join the European Community (EC) on 4 July 1990 
that what could be described as largely an economic relationship until then would spill onto the 
political realms of a very complex dispute. For the RoC, there were clear economic, social and 
political benefits to be attained from EU membership. Perhaps more importantly, the prospects 
of joining the EU were also conceived, in the context of the ‘Cyprus problem’, as a ‘catalyst’ that 
could facilitate a settlement by offering incentives to convince the intransigent Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership. While the decision of the European Council in 1994 to include Cyprus in the next 
round of enlargement and the initiation of the accession process which then followed would not 
live up to such promise of reunifying the island, the prospects of EU membership had a profound 
impact, not least, on the Turkish-Cypriot community that was later left on the ‘margins’ once a 
divided Cyprus became an EU member in May 2004. 
 
 As indicated above, Cyprus’s accession process was an exclusively Greek-Cypriot affair.  
The then Turkish-Cypriot leadership led by President Denktash was hostile to the idea of Cyprus 
joining the EU and did not take part at any stage of the accession negotiations. In line with its 
long-term goal of international recognition for the TRNC, the Turkish-Cypriot side also rejected 
any claims that the Republic of Cyprus could pursue accession talks on behalf of the whole island. 
In this respect, the Turkish-Cypriot side during this time questioned the legality of the RoC 
application with reference to the ‘Treaty of Guarantee’ annexed to the 1960 Constitution, 
                                                          
57 It is important to underline that the Turkish-Cypriot community has taken no part in the governing of the Republic 




prohibiting Cyprus from union with a third-state (or an organisation, the Turkish side stipulated) 
of which Turkey, as the ‘guarantor’ of its constitutional integrity, was not a member (Treaty of 
Guarantee, 1960). On the whole, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership asserted that Cyprus could and 
should join the EU only if a deal could be struck to solve the ‘Cyprus problem’ and only after 
Turkey itself became a full member.  
 
 Such claims were nonetheless dismissed by the EU which endorsed Cyprus’s application 
on behalf of the whole island by formally accepting it in 1993 but tying membership to the 
solution of the ‘Cyprus problem’ (European Council, 1993). This strategy was later abandoned in 
favour of a more direct approach towards Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish intransigence when the 
1995 Corfu Summit decided for Cyprus to be included in the next round of enlargement 
regardless of a solution being reached ahead of the date of accession. That year, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) also took a decision in the infamous Anastasiou case (C-432/92) which 
effectively excluded Turkish-Cypriot exports from the European Union market by disallowing 
movement certificates issued by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities.58 Given that the EU, and the 
United Kingdom in particular was TRNC’s largest export market, this ruling was a substantial blow 
to the Turkish-Cypriot economy.59   
 
                                                          
58 Up until 1994, the European Community traded with northern Cyprus despite international non-recognition of the TRNC. In 
particular, the UK and Ireland imported Turkish-Cypriot goods under preferential treatment by appealing to Article 5 of the 
1972 EC-Cyprus Association Agreement, which stated that the Community would not discriminate between the nationals or 
companies of Cyprus. With the Anastasiou case, although the ECJ did not impose a formal embargo, it effectively closed the 
doors of the European markets to goods originating from northern Cyprus; for a detailed discussion of the case and its legal 
implications, see Talmon (2001). 
59 At the time of the judgement, 74 percent of Turkish-Cypriot exports were directed to the EU and only 14 percent went to 




In response to the somewhat ‘boosted’ status of Cyprus’s EU application and to the ECJ 
verdict, the Turkish-Cypriot side initially reacted with fury and immediately revoked from the 
TRNC’s constitution the commitment to a future federation and declared itself in favour of 
integration with Turkey. On 28 December 1995, Turkey and the TRNC signed a joint declaration 
reasserting that accession negotiations should be initiated with the EU only after a final 
settlement safeguarding Turkish-Cypriot sovereignty had been reached and that federal Cyprus 
and Turkey should only join the EU simultaneously (Joint Declaration, 1995). This was followed 
by another joint statement on 20 January 1997 claiming that structural cooperation and 
harmonisation of Cyprus with the EU would be followed by similar action to accelerate the 
integration process between the TRNC and Turkey (Joint Declaration, 1997). On 6 August 1997, 
an Association Agreement was signed which provided the framework for: ‘determining the 
measures to be taken with the aim of achieving partial integration [...] in the economic and 
financial fields and in matters of security, defence and foreign affairs on the basis of association’ 
(1997: par. 2). A further retaliation came after the Luxembourg Summit (December 1997) when 
the Turkish-Turkish-Cypriot leadership demanded that the future talks between Greek and 
Turkish-Cypriots be conducted on a state-by-state basis.60  
 
There was nonetheless a brief period of optimism by the end of that decade when the ‘EU 
factor’ appeared as a significant catalyst in the UN efforts geared-up towards reaching a federal 
solution ahead of Cyprus’s accession. This was largely due to the European Council’s decision at 
Helsinki Summit in December 1999 to accord Turkey with formal candidate status. The greater 
                                                          
60 For a comprehensive overview of Cyprus talks under the aegis of the UN, see Tocci (2004). 
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optimism in Turkey-EU relations, culminated in the context of Greco-Turkish rapprochement 
following the so-called ‘earthquake diplomacy’61 paved the way for a fresh round of proximity 
talks in Nicosia.  In 1999, the UN Security Council called for the launching of Cyprus ‘proximity 
talks’, and between December 1999 and November 2000 five rounds were held under UN 
auspices (Tocci, 2004). Such optimism was nonetheless short-lived when it became clear however 
that UN efforts to convince the sides to engage in direct talks was futile and in December 2000, 
the Turkish-Cypriot side unilaterally abandoned the proximity talks, plunging the negotiations 
into deadlock.  
 
During this time, the nationalist elites in power continued to view the EU with suspicion 
if not as a threat.  The merits of EU membership at that time was seen primarily through an 
economic lens, largely evidenced in the EU’s engagement almost exclusively with the Turkish-
Cypriot business circles and the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (KTTO)  in particular. But 
such economic incentives were regarded as ‘bribery’ and the leadership continued to warn of an 
international plot to lure the Turkish-Cypriots into compromising on their security and identity. 
The nationalist parties UBP and the DP also repeatedly claimed that EU membership would 
inevitably eliminate the bi-zonal and bi-communal character of a settlement and that it would 
severe vital Turkish-Cypriot links with Turkey (see section 4.3 in Chapter 4). Hence, the dominant 
view in northern Cyprus was that EU membership could take place only after a settlement and/or 
after Turkey’s accession.  
                                                          
61 This was initiated in the context of the successive earthquakes that hit both countries in August-September 1999 




This was about to change however, when a devastating banking crisis hit northern Cyprus 
in early 2000 involving 30,000 depositors.62 Daily public protests, civil discontent and the 
possibility of state bankruptcy dominated the headlines for the larger part of that year and 
culminated in the spectacular occupation of the Turkish-Cypriot Parliament by the protesters. It 
was during this time that the appeal of the EU began to gain hold amongst the public that became 
disillusioned with the corrupt status quo. The unregulated and unchecked banking sector 
together with the dubious lending practices of some banks which led to the banking crisis, also 
exposed in this sense what many saw as the fundamental flaw of an unrecognised regime which 
remained outside of accepted norms and rules such as accountability, democracy and the rule of 
law. Indeed, as Lacher and Kaymak put it, ‘the status quo was no longer able to contain the fact 
that the overall project of statehood failed in its quest for external as well as internal legitimacy’. 
The banking crisis left its mark on popular attitudes toward the political elite and intensified the 
prevalent fears related to the viability of the Turkish-Cypriot community and its well-defined 
identity as a self-governing entity in northern Cyprus. At the same time, it also had a significant 
effect on attitudes toward Turkey. As indicated earlier, international isolations which left the 
Turkish-Cypriot community outside the international community also meant the latter had no 
choice except to rely on Turkish assistance which (more often than not) came with strings 
attached (see below). This had, in turn, led to a growing sense among many that far from 
democratically governing themselves, they were being controlled by Turkey and its ‘puppet 
                                                          
62 This was triggered largely in response to the banking crisis in Turkey in late 2000 and the collapse of the Turkish 
Lira during the 2001 Turkish financial crisis (see, Yeldan, 2008). During this period (2000-2002), ten commercial 
banks were forced to suspend their operations by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities (see Gunsel, 2006). 
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regime’ in Cyprus (this is explored further in subsequent chapters). It was also within this context 
that immigration from Turkey and the large-scale naturalisation of Turkish immigrants 
increasingly came to be seen as a threat not only in terms of cultural identity but also political 
autonomy.  In this ferment of rage, the tide began to turn in favour of the pro-settlement and 
pro-EU opposition and by 2002 EU accession was no longer viewed as a threat but as the ultimate 
precondition of the community’s ‘survival’.  
 
 Drastic changes during this time in Turkish-Cypriot attitudes were also critically linked to 
other external developments, not least to those happening in Turkey. In November 2002, 
elections in Turkey saw the rise to the power of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, or ‘Justice 
and Development Party’) headed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The AKP’s victory signalled a radical 
shift in Turkish policy towards Cyprus favouring a federal solution to the ‘Cyprus Problem’ in line 
with its own EU-related aspirations. Perhaps more remarkably, its absolute majority in the 
Turkish Parliament indicated that the AKP was in a position to undertake such radical policy 
changes on ‘national issues’ like Cyprus. On the tide of AKP’s victory but also bolstered by the 
publication of a comprehensive UN Plan (the ‘Annan Plan’ hereafter) envisaging imminent entry 
into the European Union, Turkish-Cypriot opposition began to mobilise against the nationalist 
regime in a series of spectacular demonstrations.63  
 
                                                          
63 It is estimated that between November 2002 and January 2003, between 45,000-70,000 Turkish-Cypriots (from a community 
of less than half a million) attended these pro-settlement and pro-EU rallies.   
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The ‘Annan Plan’, with its thousands of pages of draft federal laws (inspired by the 1977-
79 ‘High Level Agreements’, the 1992 Set of Ideas and the 1960 Constitution) and international 
agreements and treaties, represented the most comprehensive blueprint by the UN to bridge the 
gaps and settle the decades-old ‘Cyprus Problem’. In essence, the fundamental provisions of the 
Plan formulated a ‘loose federation’ with two constituent states, called for gradual 
demilitarisation of the island, allowed for the return of a large number of refugees through 
territorial adjustment and included guidelines for the settlement of the notorious ‘property 
issue’. It also contained specific provisions over the number of naturalised TRNC nationals of 
Turkish origin who would be granted federal citizenship, thus bringing the settler issue, for the 
first time, on the negotiating table.64  
  
 From the outset, the Plan ratcheted up fiery rhetoric from the nationalist camp against 
such dangers of ‘diluted sovereignty’, ‘economic subjugation’ (by the more prosperous Greek-
Cypriot community) and a ‘numerically weakened’65 Turkish-Cypriot community. But above all, 
the nationalists claimed, Turkish-Cypriot membership of the EU preceding Turkey’s own 
membership was tantamount to ‘backdoor enosis’ which threatened the very Turkish presence 
in Cyprus, and in which Turkish-Cypriots would ultimately become a ‘defenceless minority’ 
                                                          
64 Whilst the Plan did not engage with the legal status of Turkish settlers, it nonetheless introduced a number of 
provisions to deal with the issue through the interpretation of a general ‘citizenship provision’. According to Article 
3 of the said law, the Plan allowed for any person who held Cypriot citizenship on 31 December 1963 together with 
their spouses and descendants (the great majority of native Turkish-Cypriots fall in this category) to be considered 
citizens of the new Republic. In addition, each side was asked to prepare a list of up to 45,000 persons (for the T-C 
side, this would consist of settlers and their descendants) who would also be granted federal citizenship (UN, 2004: 
Appendix F, par.4) 
65 This would be caused by a supposedly accelerated outflow of Turkish-Cypriots to wealthier member states with 
the lifting of travel restrictions upon entry into the EU. 
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(discussed at length in Chapter 4). For the opposition forces also concerned about the integrity 
of the Turkish-Cypriot identity not because of enosis but because of the status quo, a solution to 
the Cyprus Problem and the simultaneous EU membership was similarly conceived in existential 
terms, inextricably linked to the long-term survival of the Turkish-Cypriot community. The 
Turkish-Cypriot opposition believed that EU membership (tied to a solution) would end their 
economic ostracisation hence the reliance on Turkish finance. EU membership would also curtail 
the interference of Ankara in Turkish-Cypriot affairs by fortifying the latter’s autonomy within a 
federal sovereignty and stem not only the outflow of ‘native’ Turkish-Cypriots but also the much-
controversial influx of Turkish immigrants and their wholesale naturalisation.66 In this respect, 
the prospects of EU membership represented a social imaginary, incorporating a number of social 
demands such as (international) ‘recognition’, ‘autonomy’, ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’ and ‘peace’. 
Large segments of the Turkish-Cypriot community would soon be mobilised in spectacular rallies 
in support of EU membership by the more vocal anti-establishment and pro-settlement Turkish-
Cypriot opposition and civil society (see below, Chapters 4 and 5).  
 
 In the meantime, the partial lifting of the restrictions on the freedom of movement across 
the island by the Turkish-Cypriot side in April 2003 further put the issue of Turkish-Cypriot 
identity under the spotlight (see Chapter 6). The partial lifting of the border restrictions meant 
that Turkish-Cypriots could now acquire passports issued by the RoC and exercise their 
citizenship rights by seeking employment and accessing healthcare in the south. Perhaps more 
                                                          
66 Indeed, the Annan Plan did contain specific provisions to limit the immigration of Turkish nationals, for a 
transitional period of up to 19 years or until Turkey becomes an EU member, with explicit reference to the 
protection of ‘identity’ (UN, 2004: Art.3, par.5) 
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importantly, with the imminent accession of Cyprus into the European Union the following year, 
a Cypriot passport for Turkish-Cypriots meant European citizenship rights beyond Cyprus. In a 
similar vein, the opening of the long-closed borders also laid bare another tangle of the identity 
debate. In stark contrast to the overall ‘positive’ atmosphere and enthusiasm that was reported 
of Greek and Turkish-Cypriots in their thousands rushing to the borders to visit their old homes, 
simply stroll to the ‘other side’ or indeed apply for a passport, naturalised TRNC citizens (i.e. 
settlers) including their children but also the children of Turkish-Cypriots married to Turkish 
nationals were denied the right to travel. For naturalised TRNC citizens and second (or even third) 
generation Turkish-Cypriots of Turkish origin, the opening-up of the borders meant that their 
citizenship status was thrown further in limbo, also raising questions about who belonged to the 
Turkish-Cypriot community and who did not (see section 5.3 in Chapter 5).  
 
On 24 April 2004, simultaneous referenda were held on both sides of the island in which 
voters were asked to approve the final text of the ‘Annan Plan’ to reunify the island on the eve 
of EU accession. Despite much anticipation, whilst 65 percent of the voters in the north approved 
the Plan, it was rejected by an overwhelming 76 percent of the voters in the south. In any case, 
the failure of the ‘Annan Plan’ in the referenda did not derail the plans to admit a divided island 
and Cyprus joined the EU together with Malta and 8 other CEEC countries on 01 May 2004. While 
the Republic became a member of the European Union on behalf of the whole island, the 
application of EU law (or the acquis communitaire) was suspended in the territory that fell 
‘outside the effective control of the RoC’ (Treaty of Accession, 2003: prot.10). As such, the 
collective advantages and institutional privileges of EU membership for the Turkish-Cypriot 
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community was ‘put on the shelf’. While the suspension of the acquis did not have any bearing 
on individual rights and entitlements as EU citizens outside northern Cyprus, Turkish-Cypriots as 
members of a territorially-defined community were somewhat left on the ‘margins’ of the 
European Union. 
 
Rather remarkably however, there was initial optimism in the north despite such peculiar 
positioning of the latter in the wake of the referenda. This was, to an important extent, due to 
the fundamental change of attitude on the part of the international community in general and 
the EU in particular towards the Turkish-Cypriot community in the face of the overwhelming 
desire to settle the ‘Cyprus Problem’ and join the EU. As such, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership was 
no longer considered a stumbling-block in reunification efforts. The ‘yes’ vote was also a clear 
affirmation of the aspiration of the community to end the paralysing ostracisation of their 
community but also to safeguard their distinct identity by joining the European Union (see 
Chapter 4, 5 and 6). Though disappointed with the Greek-Cypriot ‘no’, there was now a 
discernible expectation in the north that the ‘yes’ vote would translate into tangible benefits and 
most importantly the lifting of international isolations. Without a doubt, expectations were also 
raised in the immediate aftermath of the referenda by various international actors in echoing the 
Turkish-Cypriot position that it would be unjust to leave the community ‘out in the cold’ and that 
they stood to be ‘rewarded (for citations, see Chapter 6).  
 
As it soon became all too clear however, the Turkish-Cypriot ‘yes’ vote would not be a 
‘game-changer’ and the isolations remained in situ. This, in turn, meant that the institutional 
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engagement of the EU took a ‘bureaucratic character’ 67 against the increasing disillusionment 
on the part of the Turkish-Cypriot community. More importantly, the inability of the ‘EU camp’ 
to fulfil its promise to ‘integrate northern Cyprus into the European mainstream’ has resulted in 
a dislocatory experience which led to a crucial discursive shift in the earlier oppositional, pro-EU 
discourse to radically transform and reorganise around the issue of Turkish settlers and 
opposition against the ‘assimilationist’ immigration-settlement policies purportedly engineered 
by the AKP government in Turkey. This crucial shift in the trajectory of identity politics within the 
Turkish-Cypriot community in the post-referendum period is elaborated further in the empirical 




 Though led solely by the Greek-Cypriot leadership, Cyprus’s membership application for 
the European Union and the accession process which then ensued had a profound impact on the 
domestic politics of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Bolstered with the publication of the ‘Annan 
Plan’, the period of anticipated EU integration leading to simultaneous referenda in April 2004 
was marked by a political upheaval. Indeed, it would be hard to imagine the unprecedented 
public rallies, the massive swing to the opposition at the parliamentary elections in December 
2003 (see below, Chapter 4) and ultimately the Turkish-Cypriot referendum results without the 
EU conditionality. Most importantly, the EU during this time became a key signifier of the 
                                                          
67 For a detailed discussion of the EU engagement with the Turkish-Cypriot community in the post-referendum 
period, see Kyris (2015). 
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discussions on Turkish-Cypriot identity in which the two sides (pro-unification forces vs. 
nationalists) competed with each other to articulate within their competing visions of political 
community and the notion of belonging attached to it.  
 
With the accession of Cyprus into the European Union and despite pledges to end their 
isolation and to ‘bring them in from the cold’, the Turkish-Cypriot community was left on the 
margins of the EU. In this sense, the accession of a still-divided Cyprus did not diminish the EU’s 
overall importance but altered the privileged position of the EU within Turkish-Cypriot 
conceptions of collective identity, a consequence mainly due to the latter’s lack of self-realisation 
(and largely bureaucratic realisation) rebuked by a disillusioned Turkish-Cypriot community. Put 
differently, the unsuccessful attempt to integrate the Turkish-Cypriot community into the 
European mainstream obstructed the continuity of the common ‘social imaginary’ that was 
represented by the ‘EU camp’ and led to a new reconfiguration of the pre-existing elements 
articulated within the oppositional Cypriotness discourse in which immigration-related 
antagonisms took centre stage.  Before the study turns on to substantiate these claims in more 





 This chapter provided a historical account of competing identity claims in the Turkish-
Cypriot community. It discussed the specific historical juncture at the beginning of the twentieth 
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century which elevated Turkishness as a hegemonic identity discourse by accounting for the 
spread of Turkish nationalism (see section 3.2 in this chapter). Key elements of the nationalist 
discourse which came to signify and entrench Turkish identity during that time were also 
highlighted throughout. This is particularly relevant for the hypothesis outlined in the previous 
chapter: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Given the local history and in the context of the Cyprus conflict, Turkish-Cypriot 
identity was cultivated and subsumed within a hegemonic notion of Turkishness that did not 
distinguish between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish settlers.  
 
This was then followed with a discussion of other, subversive conceptions of collective 
identity which began to emerge in the unique post-partition context characterised by non-
recognition and critical perceptions of Turkey to challenge the predominant conceptions of 
Turkishness (see section 3.3 in this chapter). An overarching theme of this section was 
immigration-settlement from mainland Turkey which became a contentious issue in relation to 
nativist perceptions of identity in that period, formulated in the following hypothesis: 
 
 Hypothesis 2: In the context of Cyprus’s accession into the EU and the anticipated Turkish-Cypriot 






In this respect, the next section (3.4) then focused on the period initiated with Cyprus’s 
membership application for the EU and its eventual accession in 2004 also accounting for parallel 
developments, particularly the publication of the ‘Annan Plan’. The final section then discussed 
the post-accession period marked by the discursive shift in the trajectory of Turkish-Cypriot 
identity politics that saw settler antagonisms taking centre stage, formulated in Hypothesis 3: 
 
Hypothesis 3: With the failure of the ‘Annan Plan’, the pro-EU Cypriotness discourse is 
disorientated and settler antagonisms take centre-stage 
 
 A further aim of the chapter was to present the dominant contexts that act in tandem 
with settler antagonisms in the discursive construction of the Turkish-Cypriot identity under 
investigation. In the first place, it is crucial to underline that there is no singular identity concept 
that defines ‘Turkish-Cypriotness’ (see ‘theoretical framework’ in Chapter 2). Rather, multiple, 
subversive discourses compete with each other by articulating antagonistic notions of the 
political community and belonging attached to it. Traditionally, these have been broadly 
organised under the forms of Turkishness and more recent assertions of Cypriotness (see sections 
3.2 and 3.3 in this chapter). In the empirical chapters that follow, these narratives are delineated 
further in view of revealing the impact of immigration-settlement from mainland Turkey on their 
dispersion but also modification. Alternative interpretations that similarly articulate immigration-
settlement within their notion of belonging but do not particularly fit the predominant categories 




 The persistence of the ‘Cyprus problem’ is an important thread that unravels in relation 
to identity. The Turkishness discourse that is characterised by loyalty towards statehood (i.e. the 
TRNC) and preference for ever-closer ties with Turkey is largely incompatible with efforts to find 
a federal solution to the ‘Cyprus problem’ or with the notion of political community that such a 
solution implies. Reunification of the island based on some form of federal governance, on the 
other hand, involves commitment and loyalty to bi-communal and conciliatory conceptions of 
belonging often articulated with reference to the overarching notion of Cypriotness.  More 
recently, from the late 1990s onwards, the prospects of EU integration resulted in the emergence 
of a new element which has become a bone of contention between the two rival identity 
narratives, with the Cypriotness narrative displaying overwhelming support for a federal solution 
in itself but also to join the EU versus the euro-sceptic Turkishness discourse willing to 
compromise on EU membership in ethno-nationalist terms, prioritising statehood. Subsequent 
chapters look at ways in which the EU has penetrated/modified these identity narratives 
articulated by various actors that have aligned themselves with these camps. 
 
 Another focal aspect of the identity debate in northern Cyprus is the international non-
recognition of the Turkish-Cypriot governing structures and their ostracisation by the 
international community. Apart from Turkey, neither the Republic of Cyprus nor the international 
community recognises the TRNC. In fact, it is considered an illegal entity by international bodies 
such as the UN. The non-recognition of the Turkish-Cypriot statehood together with the crippling 
ostracisation of that community (going far beyond international diplomacy as the subsequent 
chapters will elaborate) has played a critical role in galvanising support for alternative political 
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projects such as reunification and EU membership that would ensure the viability of the Turkish-
Cypriot identity and self-governance. The enduring status of the Turkish-Cypriot spatiality as an 
unrecognised state in the post-referendum period also had important bearings for how the EU 
was interpreted by the local actors and on the discursive shift which led to a reconfiguration in 
respective identity discourses since the accession of Cyprus into the EU in 2004.  
 
 In a similar vein, bilateral relations with Turkey also present another important context 
(or a ‘discursive structure’) in which debates on identity in the Turkish-Cypriot community take 
place. While the Turkish-Cypriot community has historically maintained strong links with Turkey, 
especially during the colonial period when such links were regarded as ‘existential’, their 
international non-recognition has had the effect of driving them closer to Turkey more than some 
would wish to see so. It is also in this context that immigration from Turkey and the naturalisation 
of Turkish immigrants now constitute one of the central aspects of identity in northern Cyprus 
with ‘native’ but also more recent Turkish-Cypriots taking divergent positions on collective 
identity and what it means to be ‘Turkish’ or a ‘Turkish-Cypriot’ (see section 5.3 in Chapter 5). 
The interplay between these contextual factors in narrating competing versions of Turkish-
Cypriotness as well as the ways in which immigration-settlement has been instrumentalised 
within these discourses articulated at the domestic level (political parties, civil society and the 
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 This chapter analyses how and to what extent the mainstream political parties in northern 
Cyprus have articulated the experience of immigration from Turkey within wider discourses on 
identity. In other words, it places the presence of populations from Turkey at the heart of party 
politics in northern Cyprus and tries to account for continuity and change in the extent to which 
immigration and other closely related issues, most notably the citizenship status of Turkish 
immigrants are represented and instrumentalised within established party-political discourses. 
While diverse conceptualisations of immigration/settlement are the most significant in this 
process, they are delineated here also in tandem with other contextual elements that constitute 
the ‘shared repertoire’ of collective identity discourses in the Turkish-Cypriot community (see 
section 3.4 in Chapter 3). Specific attention is thus paid to attitudes toward the EU as well as the 
centrality of the Cyprus issue and the bilateral relations with Turkey within different identity 
discourses, wherein concepts such as ‘isolations’, ‘solution, ‘statehood’, ‘EU integration’ and 




 The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section (4.2) sets the scene by 
introducing the main political parties in northern Cyprus and the central themes of their 
narratives on identity. In the next two sections (4.3 and 4.4) the impact of Turkish immigration-
settlement on their identity rhetoric is analysed diachronically across two distinct time periods 
distinguished by Cyprus’s accession into the EU i.e. pre-2004 and post-2004 era respectively. For 
the sake of analytical clarity, party discourses are presented largely in the context of Turkish-
Cypriot legislative elections that fall within the main timeframe of this study. Section 4.5 provides 
a summarizing account which highlights the continuity and change in the framing of immigration-
settlement within multiple identity discourses until recently. The final section (4.6) links the 
empirical findings to the conceptual framework developed earlier in Chapter 2 and addresses the 
working hypotheses. 
 
4.2. Turkish-Cypriot Political Parties: An Overview 
 
 The institutional development of Turkish-Cypriot politics can be traced back to the first 
half of the twentieth century when Turkish-Cypriot intra-elite competition intensified partly in 
response to the enosis campaign led by nationalists in the Greek-Cypriot community (see section 
3.2 in Chapter 3). During this time, Turkish-Cypriot political elites competed with each other for 
positions in the central and local administrative mechanisms but also began organising politically 
in their own nationalist platforms (see sections 3.2 and 3.3 in Chapter 3).  Much of the basic 
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alignments of the Turkish-Cypriot political elite in this period were maintained when Cyprus 
gained independence in August 1960.68  
 
 When the bi-communal partnership collapsed in December 1963 following the outbreak 
of inter-communal violence, Turkish-Cypriots abandoned their positions in the government and 
in civil service; many civilians also retreated into ethnic enclaves and began living under a 
separate authority.69 The impact of the Turkish-Cypriot enclavement for the domestic politics of 
that community were profound. In effect, all forms of political opposition towards the monolithic 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership was deflected on the basis of ‘national unity’ and with reference to an 
existential threat (see 3.3 in Chapter 3). Rather paradoxically perhaps, it was only with the 
ultimate, de facto division of the island in 1974 into Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot areas that 
a multiparty system would be introduced in the unrecognised Turkish-Cypriot polity (Kaymak, 
2009: 234).   
 
 In 1975, as a prelude to self-styled independence, a ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’s 
(Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti) was declared with parliamentary elections scheduled a year later, in 
1976. At the same time, a ‘constitutional assembly’ (Kurucu Meclis) was set up with the task of 
                                                          
68 The new constitution of the Republic provided for separate lists for the two communities to elect their own 
representatives for the Assembly and for the segregated legislative chambers responsible for communal matters 
including education, culture, religious matters, etc. Article 62, 93 and 94 respectively; Constitution of the Republic 
of Cyprus (1960). 
69 It is important to note again the conflicting views on this point. Turkish-Cypriot side maintains that they were 
effectively excluded from the government and that the continuing mortal threat as well as the blockade of the 
enclaves by the Greek-Cypriots left them with no choice but to set up their own administrative structures within 
the enclaves. The Greek-Cypriot contention is that since 1963 ‘Turkish-Cypriots wilfully abstain from their duties’, 
Loucaides in Dodd (1992: 38). 
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drafting a constitution for the new statelet. Remarkably, the assembly consisted of a considerable 
number of critics who played an important role not only in the shaping of the constitution but 
also of the Turkish-Cypriot politics as a whole later on, with the emergence of organised 
opposition groups. The ‘Republican Turkish Party’ (CTP) was established several years earlier, in 
1970 under the difficult conditions of enclavement dominated by nationalist politics in opposition 
to the monolithic Turkish-Cypriot leadership headed by Dr Fazil Kuchuk and later, by Rauf 
Denktash (see below). The now-defunct ‘Populist Party’ (HP) was the next to appear (4 August 
1975) and was shortly followed by the ‘National Unity Party’ (UBP, 11 October 1975) founded by 
Denktash though as the President of the TFSC he no longer led.70 A splinter party, ‘Communal 
Liberation Party’ (TKP) was set up a year later (18 March 1976) by a group of schoolteachers and 
dissident TMT veterans who departed from the HP shortly before the general elections (see 
below).  
 
 While all four political parties were successful in securing seats in the Assembly, it was 
Denktash’s UBP that nonetheless came out with a clear victory.71 From then on, the UBP would 
go on to dominate the political affairs of the Turkish-Cypriot community with an impressive 




                                                          
70 Nejat Konuk succeeded Denktash in 1976 as the new leader of the UBP. 
71The UBP became the first party with 53.7% of the votes and secured 30 seats out of the total 40 followed by TKP 




‘National Unity Party’ (Ulusal Birlik Partisi, UBP) 
 
 If the nationalist Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash was the mastermind behind the 
notorious taksim policy which ultimately led to partition and the ‘Declaration of Independence’ 
in 1983 (though arguably with the blessing of the Turkish government and military alike) his 
‘National Unity Party’ (the UBP hereinafter) was the main political platform for his nationalist 
ideas that dominated politics of the Turkish-Cypriot community for the greater part of the 
administration’s history. As such, the UBP has invariably and ferociously championed 
independent statehood in the form of ‘TRNC’ which it had assisted Denktash in its conception 
(UBP, 1998). In this context, the Party is a staunch advocate of ‘ever-closer’ links with Turkey, 
conceived not only in geo-strategic terms that denotes the latter clear political/military rights in 
relation to Cyprus, but also in nationalist-mythological terms as the ‘motherland’ that the TRNC 
(as the so-called ‘infant-land’ or yavruvatan in Turkish) and the ‘Turks of Cyprus’ depends for its 
security and well-being (see below).  
 
 Within this ‘motherland/infant-land’ narrative moreover, identity is conceived not in sui 
generis terms but as a form of ethnic/local variation in which Turkishness takes pride of place and 
signifies belonging to the larger Turkish nation. As the party programme states: ‘The Turkish-
Cypriot people are an indivisible part of the Turkish nation. We share Turkish history, culture, 
language, religion and scientific heritage’ (UBP, 1998, Art.8). The ‘Cyprus Problem’ is also defined 
within this identitarian vein as a conflict between that of Turkishness versus the grand ideology 
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of Hellenism (interview no.1). The UBP has consistently argued that the Turkish military 
intervention in 1974 did in fact, bring with it peace and stability to Cyprus by ultimately resolving 
the ‘Cyprus conflict’ that was incited by the Greek-Cypriots and threatened the very Turkish 
existence in Cyprus (interview no.1). In line with much of the official narratives, the UBP has also 
argued that the ‘Turkish-Cypriot people’72 whose right to self-determination was endorsed by 
the 1960 Constitution that had established the independent Cyprus was effectively ‘thrown-out’ 
of this partnership Republic by means of violence (interview no.2).  
 
 The UBP’s ethno-nationalist narrative further links the controversial issue of immigration-
settlement from mainland Turkey onto the ‘Cyprus Problem’ and its resolution (Fig. 6). In this 
sense, the Party does not differentiate between a Turkish national and a Turkish-Cypriot 
(considered here as ‘ethnic-kins’) but also emphasises the importance of having a large Turkish-
Cypriot population in order to safeguard Turkish-Cypriot rights within any future settlement that 
would introduce demographically-based consociational arrangements (interview no.1 and no.2). 
As it will be elaborated further below, immigration into northern Cyprus is also favoured in neo-
liberal economic terms, not only as ‘cheap labour’ that fills the gaps in the labour market but also 
as ‘human stock’ that is needed for the growth of the Turkish-Cypriot economy (interview no.1 
and no.2).  
 
                                                          
72 Such references to the ‘Turkish-Cypriot people’ or ‘Turks of Cyprus’s in the nationalist narrative (favoured by the 
UBP) are semantically important as they denote an exclusionary national status vis-à-vis the Greek-Cypriots while 
maintaining a hierarchy of Turkishness; the term ‘community’ on the other hand is often used to signify 
commitment to the bi-communal character and tradition of Cyprus.   
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Figure 6. Turkish-Cypriot party positions 
                                                          
73 The Communal Democracy Party (Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi or the TDP) was set up in 2009 to replace the earlier TKP and BDH. 
Name In-group Out-group Position(s) on immigration-settlement 
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‘Democratic Party’ (Demokrat Parti, DP) 
 
 The ‘Democratic Party’ (DP hereinafter) was founded in 1992 against the collapse of the 
grand political fellowship between President Denktash and the UBP. More specifically, the 
internal wrangling for power within the party, between somewhat ‘moderate’ Denktash 
supporters (led by Hakkı Atun but also the President’s son, Serdar Denktash) and those that had 
gathered around its charismatic (and arguably more nationalist) new leader Derviş Eroğlu, led to 
the former breaking away from it to set up the Democratic Party (DP).74 The party, spearheaded 
by President Denktash himself (and led by his son, Serdar Denktash, since 1996) came to attract 
those liberals that no longer felt comfortable with the hawkish line of Eroğlu (see below). Also by 
taking full advantage of Denktash Sr.’s personal prestige, the DP soon became a significant rival 
for the UBP within right-wing politics. Ideologically, the party shares a number of common 
positions with its rival UBP, most visibly in its commitment to the ‘TRNC’.75 The DP’s narrative on 
the ‘Cyprus Conflict’ also overlaps with that of the UBP’s, defined in identitarian terms as the 
struggle to uphold Turkishness against Greek nationalism and British colonialism (DP, 1998). 
 
 Nonetheless, the DP’s rhetoric on ‘Turkish-Cypriotness’ also displays a number of 
important divergences when compared with its ideological counterpart. Most importantly, for 
the DP, ‘Turkish-Cypriotness’ implies a sui generis identity based on a distinct Turkish-Cypriot 
                                                          
74 For a detailed discussion of the friction between Denktash and Eroğlu which ultimately led to the emergence of 
the Democratic Party, see Dodd (1992) but also Sonan (2014). 
75 As noted above, the party was largely masterminded by President Denktash and has retained strong patrimonial 
ties with the latter who had been the staunchest advocate of Turkish-Cypriot statehood; see also, DP (1998). 
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culture and above all, statehood (interview no.3). In this vein, from the mid-1990s onward, the 
party began to argue the case for the so-called ‘Turkish-Cypriot nationalism’ as a form of civic 
nationalism in which the Turkish-Cypriot state (TRNC) represents the Turkish-Cypriot community 
whose membership is regulated by a combination of citizenship ties and active citizenry 
(interview no.3). This particular conception of ‘Turkish-Cypriotness’ also links the controversial 
presence of Turkish settlers onto the civic-national ideas of citizenship. In this sense, ‘regardless 
of their formal citizenship status’ any person ‘who consider themselves Turkish-Cypriot, 
subscribe to TRNC’s political creed and to its shared set of values and practices’ are, for the DP, 
members of the Turkish-Cypriot community (interview no.4). 
   
‘Republican Turkish Party’ (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi, CTP) 
 
 The ‘Republican Turkish Party’ (CTP)76 was founded in 1970 by a group of moderates led 
by Ahmet Mithat Berberoğlu. While the party did not espouse any radical policies at the time, 
the fact that it posed a challenge to Denktash’s authority allowed the party to project an image 
of dissent.77 Indeed, Denktash frequently accused the party of passing on information to the 
Greek-Cypriots and Berberoğlu himself was implicitly accused of being a ‘traitor’.78  The CTP 
would move further left of the ideological spectrum in the 1980s when a group of Marxist 
                                                          
76 In 2003, the CTP expanded its name to “Republican Turkish Party – United Forces [Cumhuriyetci Turk Partisi – 
Birlesik Gucler]” in a bid to appeal to a wider constituency (see below). For consistency, the CTP acronym is used 
hereinafter. 
77 In fact, as Kizilyurek (2002) notes, the party defined itself as nationalist and ‘Kemalist’. 
78 Berberoğlu was the only candidate to stand against Denktash in the 1973 elections but stood down at the last 
minute after allegedly being threatened with death by the Turkish Embassy. For a detailed account of the events 




university students would take over the party leadership upon their return from higher education 
in Turkey. During this time, the party professed socialism with a more vocal, anti-imperialist 
discourse and a clear orientation towards the Soviet Union.79  
 
 The CTP also came to be defined by its association with the Greek-Cypriot communists, 
organised under AKEL.80 Together with AKEL, it argued strongly for a new partnership with the 
Greek-Cypriot community in a bi-zonal, federal state (Hastürer, 2005). In this sense, the party 
narrated the ‘Cyprus Problem’ in somewhat more reconciliatory terms as a conflict instigated by 
imperial powers in close cooperation with nationalists on both sides. It was also during this time 
that the it became highly critical of President Denktash and his self-styled Turkish nationalism 
that not only championed integration with ‘motherland Turkey’ but also denied the Turkish-
Cypriot community of a distinct collective identity (interview no.5). From then on, the party 
became a firm supporter of federal reunification that was largely regarded as the only means to 
ultimately end the Turkish nationalist hegemony and uphold the distinct identity of the Turkish-
Cypriot community.  
 
 It was also within this context that immigration from mainland Turkey that had begun in 
the aftermath of the Turkish military intervention in 1974 came to be seen as part of a wider 
‘imperialist strategy’ to consolidate Turkish influence in Cyprus (see below). From the late 1980s 
onwards, led by the charismatic leader Özker Özgür, the CTP became a vocal critic of President 
                                                          
79 Beratlı (2009); for a discussion of the party’s Soviet orientation see also Ismail (2005). 




Denktash, the nationalist UBP but also the so-called ‘BEY regime’81 dubbed to signify the 
protectoral regime ruled behind the scenes by the TMT leadership82 and through the regular 
meddling of the Turkish embassy83; the party also came to be a fervent opponent of ‘the transfer 
of population from mainland Turkey’ and the granting of citizenship status to Turkish nationals 
that it claimed, undermined Turkish-Cypriot political autonomy and threatened its cultural 
identity (see below, section 4.3 in Chapter 4).  
 
 Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War and from the mid-1990s onwards the CTP 
began to couple its firm commitment to a federal settlement with a robust support for EU 
membership which was included in its programme for the first time in 1990 (CTP, 2011). At the 
turn of the century and with the EU accession for Cyprus fast approaching, the party came to play 
a critical role in the unprecedented and spectacular mobilisation of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community in favour of reunification and EU membership. It was also during this time that the 
party also rebranded itself to attract wider support not only from the civil society but from the 
large ‘settler’ constituency. The Party’s rhetoric was modified to represent a more-inclusive 
notion of ‘Turkish-Cypriotness’ in which identity was articulated together with citizenship ties 
and with reference to human rights. Earlier concerns with relation to immigration and the 
                                                          
81 Bayraktar ve Elçilik Yonetimi; The acronym was widely used to describe the tight grip of the TMT leadership 
[Bayraktar] and the Turkish Embassy [Elçilik] on Turkish-Cypriot affairs. 
82 Bayraktar (a standard-bearer in English) was the codename given to the military commander appointed by 
Turkey to head the Turkish-Cypriot paramilitary organisation TMT; the opposition frequently claimed that while 
officially defunct, the TMT hierarchy had remained in the post-partition period to maintain the nationalist grip on 
the Turkish-Cypriot community. 
83 So much was the influence of Turkish embassy in internal politics even after the partition in 1974 that as one 
former Turkish ambassador recalled ‘the number two in the Turkish embassy used to attend all cabinet meetings, 
act like a second prime minister and later in the day report to the ambassador’ (İnanç, 2007: 100). 
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withering away of the Turkish-Cypriot identity were also downplayed, until recently (see below, 
section 4.4 in this chapter) when the Party begun re-asserting a visibly securitised notion of 
identity not only in relation to the citizenship status of Turkish immigrants/settlers but also in the 
context of bilateral relations with Turkey.  
 
‘Communal Democracy Party’ (Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi, TDP) 
 
 The ‘Communal Democracy Party’ (the TDP hereinafter) was established in 2007 and has 
replaced the two social democratic parties, the BDH and its predecessor, the TKP.84  The TKP was 
set up first in 1976 by a group of TMT veterans led by Alpay Durduran who departed from the 
‘Populist Party’ (HP) which they founded with another group of teachers from the Teachers’ 
Union (KTÖS) shortly before the 1981 general elections. What made the TKP a strong contender 
was its high-profile deputies from TMT background (like Nalbantoğlu and Bozkurt) as well as the 
young and dynamic civil society representatives, most notably from the oppositional KTÖS.85 The 
TKP, which identified itself as ‘democratic left’ increased its support during the 1990s especially 
in Nicosia largely thanks to its new charismatic leader, Mustafa Akıncı who served three terms as 
                                                          
84 BDH: ‘Peace and Democracy Movement’ [Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi]; TKP: ‘Communal Liberation Party’ 
[Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi] 
85 As one of the founding members, recalls, TKP came into being when an initial attempt to unite under the banner 
of the CTP failed and the six members of the parliamentary opposition (known as the ‘libertarians’ or özgürlükçüler 
in Turkish) which had resigned from the HP decided to establish a new party (Azgın, 2012) 




mayor of Nicosia and became known for his reconciliatory efforts together with his Greek-Cypriot 
counterpart, Lellos Demetriades.86  
 
The TDP, like its predecessors, is a left-leaning party and defines itself as social democratic 
(TDP, 2013). To this end, it has championed reunification efforts in Cyprus to create a bi-zonal, 
bi-communal federation and fully supports EU membership. The TDP is also a consistent advocate 
of ‘Turkish-Cypriotness’ which emphasises the ‘indigenous’, ‘autonomous’, and above all, the 
‘Cypriot’ element of such belonging (interview no. 7). This is articulated together with a vocal 
stance against direct Turkish interference in domestic Turkish-Cypriot affairs as well as other 
implicit yet systematic attempts engineered by Ankara to arguably undermine Turkish-Cypriot 
culture (interview no.8). In this sense, the Party has fervently opposed the Turkish immigration 
into northern Cyprus, the large-scale naturalisation of Turkish nationals and more recently the 
introduction of controversial policies on religious education in northern Cyprus that is claimed to 
be part of a larger ‘social-engineering’ agenda of the AKP government in Turkey to ultimately 
assimilate Turkish-Cypriot identity and impose political Islam in northern Cyprus (see below). 
While the TDP’s electoral success to date remains limited (see Figures 7 and 8 below), it has 
nonetheless secured representation at every legislative election since its original founding in 
1976. 
  
                                                          
86 The two mayors despite much opposition from the political leaderships on both sides, worked together with the 
UN and other international organisations on joint projects including upgrading the sewage system but also 




Outside the mainstream party-politics lie a number of smaller political parties that do not 
have parliamentary representation.87 Indeed, others have noted (Sozen, 2009; Kaymak, 2010] 
there is a clear tendency towards the mainstream or the centre in Turkish-Cypriot party politics. 
In any case, on the left of the political spectrum are the ‘New Cyprus Party’ (or the YKP) that had 
replaced the earlier Yurtsever Birlik Hareketi (the YBH), and the ‘United Cyprus Party’ (the BKP 
led by İzzet İzcan) which split from it. These two pro-EU and pro-reunification parties are vocal 
critics of the Turkish presence in northern Cyprus and subscribe to socialist ideas. To the extreme 
right is the ‘National Justice Party’ (Milliyetçi Adalet Partisi, or MAP), which is defined by an ultra-
nationalist discourse and has naturally favoured ever-closer ties with Turkey. Apart from the YKP 
which boycotts parliamentary elections since the late 1990s, these minor parties have 
traditionally received very small numbers of votes, thus failing to secure representation at the 
Parliament.
                                                          




Figure 7. Turkish-Cypriot parliamentary elections (1976-2013)88 
 
                                                          
88 Left-wing parties who have aligned themselves with the oppositional Cypriotness camp are presented in lighter colours; UBP and DP (presented in darker colours) are the 
mainstream right-wing parties favouring Turkish nationalism; all election results available online at the ‘TRNC Supreme Electoral Council’ website: 
www.ysk.mahkemeler.net [Last accessed 10/09/14] 
89 The Communal Democracy Party (Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi or the TDP) was set up in 2009 to replace the earlier TKP and BDH. 
90 The DMP was set up in 1990 as an electoral alliance between the CTP, TKP and the now defunct YDP. 
 1976 1981 1985 1990 1993 1998 2003 2005 2009 2013 
Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % 
CTP 2 12.9 6 15.1 12 21.4   13 24.2 6 13.4 19 35.2 24 44.5 15 29.2 21 38.4 
TKP 6 20.2 13 28.5 10 15.8   16 13.3 7 15.4   - 2.4     
UBP 30 53.7 18 42.5 24 36.7 34 54.7 ? 29.8 24 40.3 18 32.9 19 31.7 26 44.1 14 27.3 
DP         5 29.2 13 22.6 7 12.9 6 13.5 5 10.7 12 23.2 
DHP 2 11.7 2 8.1 ? 7.4               
TBP   1 5.5                 
TDP89                 2 6.9 3 7.4 
YDP     4 8.8               
BDH             6 13.2 1 5.8     
CABP               - 1.97     
KAP               - 0.6     
YP               - 1.6     
DMP90       16 44.5             
MAP               - 0.5     
ORP                 2 6.2   
BKP                 - 2.4 - 3.1 
HISP                 - 0.5   
Other  1.5  0.7  12.6  0.8  3.5  8.3        0.6 
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4.3. The framing of immigration and citizenship on the eve of the (anticipated)  
EU accession 
 
 For most part of the pre-1995 period, the political agendas in northern Cyprus were 
dominated by domestic disputes relating little to international developments or the settlement 
of the ‘Cyprus Problem’; in the 1980s, land distribution and rehousing policies in what came to 
be known as the ‘refugee issue’ dominated the political debates and set the electoral platforms 
as thousands of Turkish-Cypriot refugees who had left their homes in the south, fled into the 
Turkish-controlled areas.91 Among other internal disputes during this time was the introduction 
of Turkish Lira (TL) in 1983 to replace the Cyprus Pounds (CYP) as prime currency. While the 
pound, in real exchange terms, was almost sixty times higher than the Turkish Lira (I CYP=60 TL), 
Turkish-Cypriot banks were allowed to depreciate the value of the pound by almost as much as 
50 percent (1 CYP = 36 TL) resulting in many Turkish-Cypriots who had Cyprus Pounds accounts 
losing half of their assets overnight.92  
 
As the UBP became particularly vulnerable on these issues following its poor electoral 
performance in 198193, the Party together with President Denktash stepped up its rhetoric 
against the left by exploiting the ‘national cause’94 and declaring any disapproval of the official 
                                                          
91 For an extensive account of the Turkish-Cypriot refugee experience, see Bryant (2012). 
92 Figures cited in Mehmetcik (2008). 
93 These economic and social issues would turn voters away from the ruling UBP in 1981 general elections; its share 
of the votes declined from 53 percent in 1976 to only 40 percent in 1981 whilst the left (the CTP and the TKP) which 
fought a campaign based on the charges of impotence of the government in tackling the ‘refugee issue’, and of 
nepotism, secured almost 44 percent of the votes.  
94 Or milli dava in Turkish, a nationalist reference to the ‘Cyprus Problem’ and the upholding of Turkish-Cypriot 
state, or the TRNC. 
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positions on the Cyprus issue an act of national sacrilege; indeed, both the CTP and the TKP  
frequently came under heavy attack with such accusations during this time and were simply 
labelled ‘traitors’ when they expressed discontent or challenged the Turkish nationalist 
hegemony (Milliyet: 1985a, 1985b).  
 
Yet, it was also during this period that a new cleavage began to make a bold appearance 
in political debates that would provide the left with an opportunity to challenge the 
establishment. Following the leadership change which saw Özker Özgür becoming the new 
chairman of the Party in 1976, the CTP was the first to take the centre-stage in voicing radical 
views on Turkish immigration and the naturalisation of Turkish settlers by the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership. The CTP’s arguments, under Özgür, explicitly linked immigration from mainland 
Turkey and the granting of citizenship rights to Turkish settlers onto wider debates on identity 
and societal security. In a more political vein, for Özgür and the CTP which he led, the granting of 
citizenship status to Turkish nationals amounted to the manipulation of electoral demography in 
favour of President Denktash and the ruling UBP in order to consolidate Turkish tutelage in 
Turkish-Cypriot affairs.  
 
The settler controversy would first blow up on the eve of the leadership elections in 1985 
when the CTP candidate Özgür openly accused Denktash, during live broadcast, of buying out 
voters and ‘importing’ additional ones from mainland Turkey (Ortam, 1985). As Özgür recounted 
a year later in an interview published in the Party’s mouthpiece Yenidüzen newspaper: ‘the size 
of the electorate, in the period between the [constitutional] referendum and the parliamentary 
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elections [48 days], had gone up by 4,000. These 4,000 people did not suddenly fall from the sky. 
They were brought in from Turkey for this purpose […] they are actually implanted voters’ 
(Yenidüzen, 1986b). As Özker continued: ‘those who were imported from Turkey […] got off the 
ferryboats […] and were able to vote just by using their Turkish national ID cards’ (Yenidüzen, 
1986b). On the same day, another high-ranking CTP official, Ferdi Soyer (who would later become 
the vice-president of the party and serve a term as Prime Minister) was also calling for a halt to 
what he described as an ‘invasion’ by the ‘so-called tourists […] with a passport and merely [some 
pocket money] coming here to find work […] for rock-bottom wages […] and taking jobs away […]  
from our young people’ (Soyer, 1986). His article, penned mainly as a reaction to the rape of an 
8-year-old boy by a Turkish national, argued that it was now time to solve this ‘cancerous problem 
of unauthorised workers’ entering the country on tourist visas, which not only meant lack of jobs 
for the local people but an ultimate social meltdown. 95 
 
From the late-1980s onwards, growing international attention would also maintain the 
issue of Turkish migration on the political agenda (see also section 3.2 in Chapter 3).  In 1992, the 
so-called ‘Cuco Report’ was published by the Council of Europe urging the Turkish-Cypriot and 
Turkish authorities to limit the new arrivals and to conduct a ‘viable census’. The Cuco Report 
also provided an account of the divergent Turkish and Greek-Cypriot positions on Turkish settlers. 
The ‘Republican Turkish Party’ (CTP), for its part, argued in Cuco’s report that Turkish immigration 
into northern Cyprus had begun on the pretext of economic necessity but “drastically altered” 
                                                          
95 Fast-track ‘tourist’ visas are granted to Turkish nationals who then can stay up to 90 days in northern Cyprus 
though without any rights to hold employment or use ‘public funds’. It is claimed that many then overstay their 
visas and take-up jobs as unauthorised workers. 
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the Turkish-Cypriot cultural identity. The report also quoted the CTP chairman, Ferdi Soyer, for 
claiming that large-scale naturalisation of Turkish immigrants would take place almost invariably 
before elections and that such arbitrary naturalisations was the main reason behind the CTP’s 
decision to boycott the Parliament after the elections in 1990.96 In relation to the ‘Cyprus 
problem’, the CTP also claimed that Turkish immigration into northern Cyprus was yet another 
obstacle to brokering a peace deal (Cuco, 1992). 
  
Another opposition heavyweight and the leader of the social-democratic TKP at the time, 
Mustafa Akıncı, also reiterated similar claims in the ‘Cuco report’. Akıncı argued that the new 
wave of immigration which began in the aftermath of the ‘settler recruitment programme’ (see 
section 3.3 in Chapter 3) had caused a drop in local wages for the ‘indigenous’ Turkish Cypriots 
which meant that young Turkish-Cypriots were now forced to emigrate into other countries at 
worrying numbers in search of better economic prospects. Akıncı also argued that an earlier 
decision of the authorities to lift the passport requirement for Turkish nationals while travelling 
to northern Cyprus (see section 3.3 in Chapter 3) would further accelerate the ‘transfer of 
population’ from mainland Turkey. Indeed, such prospects of ‘being swamped’ by Turkish 
immigrants deeply troubled the TKP and the CTP who both believed that this would only further 
undermine Turkish-Cypriot autonomy but also endanger their cultural identity.  
                                                          
96 In 1990, the CTP entered the elections together with the TKP and the YDP under the ‘Democratic Struggle Party’ 
(DMP) largely as a response to a controversial change in the electoral system that was designed arguably to 
exclude smaller parties from the Turkish-Cypriot assembly, Kıbrıs Postası, 1990a; both the CTP and the TKP then 
refused to take up their seats at the end of the elections claiming that the elections were not only undemocratic 
but also rigged. Their allegations were later backed by a Parliamentary Committee set up to direct the inquiry, for 




It was against this backdrop that Cyprus’s EU membership process would soon act as a 
new dynamic and have an intriguing effect on how the Turkish-Cypriot political parties conceived 
immigration-settlement from Turkey and mobilized collective identity in the Turkish-Cypriot 
community in particular.  
 
From the start, the Turkish-Cypriot left overwhelmingly supported EU membership for 
Turkish-Cypriots in a reunited, federal Cyprus.97 This support was primarily based on the belief 
that EU membership would bring about the international recognition of the community and 
foster economic growth, thus stemming the worrisome flight of Turkish-Cypriots from the island. 
An additional subtext, more remarkably, was that the latter would safeguard the Turkish-Cypriot 
community and its ‘authentic’ identity against political and demographic assimilation from 
Turkey. Put differently, the Turkish-Cypriot opposition believed that EU membership would end 
northern Cyprus’s economic reliance on Turkey, curtail the interference of Ankara in Turkish-
Cypriot affairs (by fortifying the latter’s autonomy within a federal sovereignty) and stem not only 
the outflow of ‘native’ Turkish-Cypriots but also the much-resented influx of Turkish immigrants 
and their ‘wholesale’ naturalisation. These latent worries however, were progressively contained 
within the oppositional articulation of demands for greater democracy and peace that EU 
membership came to signify.98  
 
                                                          
97 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (1994); see also Le Monde (1998) 
98 This is further elaborated in section 4.5 in this chapter. 
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The right-wing parties (the DP and the UBP), on the other hand, aligned themselves with 
the official line of President Denktash and the Turkish government, opposing vehemently 
towards any such moves by the EU to extend membership to the Republic of Cyprus which the 
Turkish-Cypriot side considered ‘illegal’ (Joint Declaration, 1995). Both DP and the UBP also 
retaliated by adapting a bolder nationalist rhetoric, claiming that EU membership would only 
create renewed conditions for enosis (see section 3.2 in Chapter 3). Indeed, as Diez (2002: 146) 
noted, when the EU membership entered into the political agenda in the 1990s, it was portrayed 
‘as an existential threat to the Turkish-Cypriot community’s identity’.  
 
The impact of the EU on oppositional discourses began to appear in the run up to the 
legislative elections in 1998. Indeed, the ‘Cyprus issue’ dominated the election campaigns of the 
Turkish-Cypriot political parties, reflecting to a large extent international developments in 
relation to the country’s EU accession (see section 3.4 in Chapter 3). While the CTP’s Party 
Programme clearly stated that ‘the inflow of foreigners hinders the shaping of a Turkish Cypriot 
will and threatens their existence’ (1998: 13), the ‘settler issue’ was largely omitted from 
electoral debates. The CTP under its new leader Mehmet Ali Talat99 emphasised instead that 
Cyprus’s EU membership process had indirectly imposed a timetable for the peace negotiations 
which could be turned into an opportunity for both sides to reach a settlement. The CTP also 
continued to stress that settling the ‘Cyprus problem’ had an existential importance for the 
                                                          
99 Following a fierce leadership battle between Özker Özgür and Mehmet Ali Talat, the 1996 (extraordinary) Party 
Congress announced Talat as the new CTP leader. A year later, the party organised another historic conference and 
replaced its infamous manifesto clause “mass party of the proletariat” with the title “socialist”. These developments 
would culminate in the dramatic exile of Özgür from the party in 1998. Özgür went on to set up the ‘Patriotic Union 




Turkish-Cypriot community to overcome the ‘structural problems’ such as the struggling 
economy and to halt the drastic shrinking of its population through Turkish-Cypriot emigration.100 
For its part, the social-democratic TKP also warned during this time that EU membership of a still-
divided Cyprus would dramatically escalate the scale of Turkish-Cypriot emigration from the 
island (Kıbrıs, 1997). It also continued to argue that Turkish-Cypriots were now ‘outnumbered’ as 
a result of the outflow of Turkish Cypriots and the influx of Turkish immigrants who now replaced 
them. Rather paradoxically however, and in a similar strategy to that of the CTP’s, immigration-
settlement did not feature prominently in TKP’s electoral campaign either. Instead, the party 
chose to make ‘sovereign statehood’ its campaign focus reflected in its slogan, ‘We will succeed 
together [Birlikte başaracağız]’.101  
 
Nationalist parties like the UBP and the DP, for their part, also largely omitted 
immigration-related matters from their rhetoric.102 The UBP maintained its hawkish rhetoric on 
                                                          
100 Talat speech from the 1997 Conference ‘Geleceğimiz Çözüm ve AB’dedir [Our future lies in a solution and EU 
Membership]’ in Halkın Sesi (1997a) . 
101 Throughout its campaign, the party lamented that not enough effort was expended by either the Turkish-Cypriot 
authorities or Turkey to acquire international recognition for the TRNC. In this vein, the TKP argued for ‘a stronger 
TRNC’ that could act independently of Turkey together with a separate currency. As Akıncı put it: ‘The currency we 
use is one of the most important indicators of the level of integration. We’ve been using the Turkish Lira [TL] in the 
past twenty-one years. We declared the KTFD [Turkish-Cypriot Federated State], then we proclaimed the KKTC 
[Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus] in the name of sovereign statehood. But somehow we’ve not managed act in 
the name of our sovereignty. We continue to rely on the TL […] and on Turkish funds. Not a single step has been 
taken to uphold the sovereign identity of the TRNC’ (Akıncı, 1995); nonetheless, the party maintained a pro-solution 
stance in 1998 elections favouring a bizonal and bicommunal federation based on political equality” (Kıbrıs, 10 
November 1998) adding however, that Turkish-Cypriots had an alternative in the form of TRNC should the Greek-
Cypriots fail to compromise (Cyprus PIO, 1998). 
102 Domestically, the UBP focused instead on the economic problems which they promised to tackle with financial 
assistance from Turkey. In particular, the party emphasised its pro-Ankara credentials in implying that it was in a 
more favourable position to secure much-needed Turkish aid to facilitate economic recovery; it also attacked the 
CTP for its mishandling of the economy and with charges of incompetency whilst in government (1994–96). Indeed, 




the ‘Cyprus problem’ and EU membership while clearly espousing closer integration with Turkey. 
Indeed, as Kızılyürek notes, Eroğlu during this time ‘became even more hawkish than Denktash 
and vehemently opposed not only the federal solution but also the Cypriot negotiations’ 
(Kızılyürek, 2012: 178). While echoing much of President Denktash’s nationalist rhetoric on the 
Cyprus issue, the DP also omitted immigration and the citizenship status of Turkish nationals from 
its electoral rhetoric (DP, 1998). 
 
In the following years, the ‘Cyprus problem’ and the EU accession process would continue 
to dominate the political agendas. More remarkably, the unravelling of the ‘government crisis’103 
shortly followed by a ‘banking crisis’104 would cause an unprecedented explosion of anger in the 
Turkish-Cypriot community and galvanise into the remarkable social movement organised 
around reunification and EU membership.105 In the ferment of rage, the opposition CTP and TKP 
joined forces with other initiatives organised by the oppositional civil society (see section 5.2 in 
Chapter 5) and framed the twin political and financial crises in terms of the wholesale failure of 
                                                          
knowledge in how to run a state during its first stint in government. Most of the reforms the CTP had promised to 
carry out were not realized, or else failed during implementation’. 
103 The ‘government crisis’ was sparked when the Deputy Prime Minister Akıncı called for a constitutional 
amendment to bring the local police force under the jurisdiction of the interior ministry rather than the Turkish-
Cypriot armed forces, run by a Turkish general who is appointed by Ankara. The Turkish general and then head of 
the armed forces responded by publicly accusing Akıncı of ‘treason’ (The Economist, 2000a) The tensions 
continued to run high when several journalists from the left-wing Avrupa newspaper who had written in support of 
Akıncı were detained on charges of espionage (Hurriyet Daily News, 2000a) 
104 For a detailed account of the ‘banking crisis’ which hit northern Cyprus in early 2000, see Sonan (2007). As Sonan 
notes, critical here was also the role of the Turkish government in Ankara. The Bülent Ecevit government in Turkey 
(1999-2002), in a radical departure from its earlier financial aid packages, tied the release of the much-needed rescue 
funds to the endorsement of an IMF-style austerity package. The tactical manoeuvring by Ankara to also frame the 
banking crisis in political terms as the ultimate failure of the ruling UBP in order to side-line Derviş Eroğlu and ensure 
another victory for Denktash would further fuel the public furore (see also section 6.3 in Chapter 6). The aid package 
was vehemently rejected in the Assembly by the opposition parties CTP and TKP with many MPs denouncing the 
stringent austerity measures in the package as the seeds of the community’s economic destruction. 




the status quo within a pro-solution and pro-EU discourse to mobilise against the nationalist UBP-
Denktash leadership. They ratcheted up the pressure on the establishment by holding general 
strikes, public rallies (see section 5.2 in Chapter 5, in particular) and even occupying the 
Parliament building for a brief period.106  
 
 In the run up to the elections in 2003, the CTP continued to emphasise its overarching 
commitment to a federal solution and EU membership107, once again muting its earlier appeal to 
Turkish immigration in its official campaign rhetoric. Underpinning such change at the discursive 
level was the introduction of the EU into party’s rhetoric as a ‘nodal point’ (see 2.3 in Chapter 2) 
to articulate in tandem with other elements its vision of the political community and the 
collective identity attached to it (this is elaborated in detail below, see also 4.5 and 4.6 in Chapter 
4). In this context, the newly adopted party manifesto emphasised that the development and 
prosperity of the Turkish-Cypriot community was inextricably linked to the adoption of EU norms 
and values (CTP, 2003). In addition, the party decided to modernise and re-brand itself in its bid 
for electoral success. To this end, a new manifesto was adopted together with a new prefix – 
United Forces (Birleşik Güçler), to enable the party embrace its allies from the civil society on a 
                                                          
106 “Hurriyet Daily News (2000c); With the bailout plans in disarray, in June 2000, Turkish-Cypriot authorities finally 
defaulted on their payment of public sector salaries, pensions as well as the payment of compensation to depositors, 
causing unprecedented acrimony against the political establishment. Similar to those scenes which ensued in the 
aftermath of the recent EU bail-out protests held in the southern part of the island in 2013 scores of Turkish-Cypriot 
depositors and their supporters demonstrated outside the assembly in July 2000 with abuse (and eggs!) being hurled 
at politicians widely blamed for the financial meltdown and the ensuing austerity measures many believed would 
devastate the Turkish-Cypriot community. The tension reached its peak when a group of protesters and trade union 
representatives broke the police barricade and entered into the assembly building. The brief but spectacular 
occupation of the Parliament ended when the police reacted with tear gas and swooped on dozens of protesters; 
Hurriyet Daily News (2000b) 
107As the party famously declared: ‘A solution is at our doorstep, Europe is at our doorstep; the CTP […], will fully 






A clear indication of the CTP’s discursive shift towards emphasising a more inclusive 
political community with an overarching reference to the EU was also evident in renewed efforts 
to form alliances with politicians and civil society organisations of Turkish mainland background. 
To this end, Nuri Çevikel, an academic and the founder of the now defunct ‘TRNC Migrants 
Association’ (KKTC Göçmenler Derneği) was approached. As the head of that association, Çevikel 
had spoken in the Turkish media as a staunch supporter of a Cyprus settlement based on the 
Annan Plan. He was also anti-establishment. 109 Çevikel was later approached to join the 
Republican Turkish Party in 2003 and subsequently elected as an MP for Famagusta in 
December.110  
 
 For its part, the TKP formed an alliance with the smaller leftist parties and transformed 
itself into the ‘Peace and Democracy Movement’ (BDH). The BDH’s manifesto was also marked 
by a clear emphasis on the importance of EU membership for the future prospects of the Turkish-
Cypriot community. It made an explicit link between EU membership and Turkish-Cypriot 
                                                          
108The party’s new name, approved at the party conference in November 2003, was intended to highlight that it 
now transcended the classical left-right dichotomy but also that it was ‘united’ in solidarity and thus stronger to 
strive towards ‘a new Cyprus’ and the defining goal of EU membership (interview no.6) 
109 As he described in an interview: ‘We have been exploited for the last 29 years. We have been used and abused 
by the authorities […] those who got into power with our support [if allowed] will exploit us again [during the 
elections] before throwing us back into the dustbin. As TRNC citizens of Turkish origin, we don’t want to be 
exploited anymore. All we ask for is the observation of basic human rights and for the authorities to ensure that 
the rule of law is upheld’ (Çevikel, 2003) 
110 By the time the new CTP-DP coalition government sworn in by early 2004, he was at odds with the party’s 
leadership. He eventually resigned from the CTP in May 2004 and sat a full-term as an Independent MP. He later 
set up the ‘New Party’ (Yeni Parti) in 2005 but this party failed to secure enough votes to reach the 5 percent 
threshold for a parliamentary seat. He later retired from politics altogether and returned to his academic career. 
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identity, claiming that: ‘[A solution to the Cyprus problem and subsequent EU membership] is 
essential to ensure Turkish-Cypriot self-rule and for the Turkish-Cypriot community’s survival on 
the island in upholding its well-defined identity’ (BDH, 2003). Once again, explicit anxieties 
related to immigration were largely downplayed in official campaign rhetorics.  
 
Nevertheless, the ongoing naturalisation of Turkish immigrants in the run up to 
December’s elections would maintain the issue of immigration-settlement on the political 
agenda. Indeed, while the introduction of the EU into CTP’s identity discourse would serve to 
articulate a more inclusive notion of belonging on the basis of citizenship status at a rhetorical 
level, it would fall short of a complete overhaul of the Party’s particularly securitised conception 
of citizenship in which the latter is chiefly associated with the autonomy of the ethno-culturally 
defined Turkish-Cypriot community.  
  
At the heart of the citizenship dispute during this time was the fear of the Turkish-Cypriot 
opposition that their chances of ousting the nationalist leadership at December’s elections were 
being undermined by the large-scale granting of citizenship rights to Turkish immigrants (AFP, 
2003) In other words, Turkish settlers who had been given citizenship by the UBP-DP coalition 
government, the opposition feared, would seemingly oppose the ‘Annan Plan’ and torpedo 
Turkish-Cypriot prospects of joining the EU. To this end, in March 2003, the CTP set in motion a  
‘citizenship-stripping’ battle by applying for a Supreme Court order to overturn 1600 citizenships 
granted since the last local elections held in June 2002. In parallel, the BDH (that now replaced 
TKP) sent a letter to the Council of Europe and asked for swift implementation of a recently 
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adopted resolution following the publication of another report on the demographic situation in 
northern Cyprus.111 In October, the BDH submitted another application to the Supreme Court 
against the Ministry of Inferior for an order to strike out all citizenships granted after 12 March 
2003.112  
 
Although there are no available figures on the numbers of settlers with ‘TRNC’ citizenship 
to establish with certainty the extent of the settler influence on the outcome of the elections in 
2003, the poll results at the end of the race nonetheless showed that many had indeed supported 
the opposition, as some did indeed expect.113 The poll results also showed that the Turkish-
Cypriot electorate was, for the first time, virtually split down the middle (Kathimerini, 2003b). 
The CTP emerged as the first party, winning 19 seats out of 50. BDH that ran on a slightly more 
radical platform came third and secured 6 seats. The right-wing parties collectively won the 
remainder 25 seats in the Assembly (see Fig.7). 
 
                                                          
111 Laakso Report (named after the Finish Rapporteur Jaakko Laakso), officially entitled the ‘Colonisation of Turkish 
settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus’ was a radical departure from its predecessors. From the outset, the Report’s 
title itself was a source of controversy, resulting in Turkish-Cypriot authorities’ and politicians’ refusal to be 
interviewed. Throughout the report, much in line with the official Greek-Cypriot discourse on the issue, Laakso 
argued that the Turkish-Cypriot policy of naturalisation constituted ‘hidden colonisation’ and that indigenous 
Turkish-Cypriots (87,000 in total by 2001, the Report claimed) were now outnumbered by 115,000 Turkish settlers 
who had been arriving into northern Cyprus since 1974. Laakso’s findings were adopted by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the CoE the same year which urged the Turkish-Cypriot authorities to immediately conduct a ‘reliable 
census’. Endorsement of the Laakso Report was extensively covered by the Turkish-Cypriot newspapers and further 
fuelled the debates on Turkish immigrants and their citizenship rights (see Chapter 6). 
112 Kıbrıs, 2003b; For their part, government officials downplayed the number of naturalisations and brushed aside 
allegations of any wrong-doing (Kıbrıs, 2003a). In addition, PM Eroğlu argued that his ‘National Unity Party’ (UBP) 
did not need new citizens for electoral support since his party was already supported by the majority of the 
electorate (Kıbrıs, 2003c). 
113 For some estimates, see Kathimerini (in English), 2003a; this was suggested earlier by the chairman of the 




On the international front, the temporary deadlock in the peace talks ended when the 
rather ‘precarious’114  coalition government, formed in January 2004 between the pro-Annan and 
pro-EU CTP and the nationalist (and sceptical of the ‘Annan Plan’) the DP decided to return to the 
negotiating table (Kıbrıs, 2004a). This was swiftly endorsed by Ankara, followed by assurances of 
Turkey’s own commitment to a ‘rapid settlement’ (AFP, 2004). Talks were once again resumed in 
Nicosia and the process culminated in the submission of the Plan to simultaneous referenda in 
May 2004. 
 
4.4. Identity politics in the post-2004 period 
  
 While the ‘Annan Plan’ failed to secure the approval of both communities to resolve the 
long-standing ‘Cyprus Problem’115, it nonetheless signified an important victory for the CTP, the 
BDH and others116 who had campaigned for a ‘yes’ vote and ousted their nationalist leadership 
along the way.117  
                                                          
114 This was in violation of the protocol CTP signed with the BDH and the CABP in which the parties declared that 
they would refuse to enter a coalition with either the DP or the UBP (Cyprus Mail, 2003); according to some 
observers, the coalition government was instigated by Ankara, in Cyprus Action Network (2004) 
115 In a turnout of almost 90 percent, 64 percent of the Turkish-Cypriot electorate voted in favour of reunification 
but the Plan was rejected by a remarkable majority of 75 percent in the Greek-Cypriot community; for many, the 
‘Annan Plan’ was doomed to failure when the socialist AKEL, the largest Greek-Cypriot political party announced its 
opposition on the basis that it lacked necessary guarantees from the UN Security Council on post-reunification 
security; The Guardian (2004); for a more detailed analysis of the Greek-Cypriot ‘no’ vote at the societal level, see 
also Lordos (2005). 
116 Left-leaning BKP (‘United Cyprus Party’) and YKP (‘New Cyprus Party’); but also CABP (‘Solution and EU Party’) 
set up by a group of liberal businessmen that had previously led the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce. 
117 In 2005, the nationalist DP was voted out of the office as the centre-left CTP increased its votes at the early 
elections (to 44.5 percent from 38 percent in 2003) and formed a coalition government with the newly-created 
‘Independence and Reform Party’ (the ORP hereinafter). In the same year, staunch nationalist and the veteran 
Turkish-Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash was also replaced by the CTP leader Mehmet Ali Talat. The presidential 
elections were held on 17 April 2005, Talat won 55 percent of the votes and the UBP candidate Eroğlu, endorsed 




To some extent, the ‘Cyprus problem’ continued to dominate the discussions in the post-
referendum period, though with less intensity. The UBP despite its rejection of the UN Plan, 
continued to make references to it throughout the 2005 electoral campaign. Perhaps more 
remarkably, the Party adopted a somewhat milder tone which supported a compromise solution. 
This was mainly conceived as a move towards rekindling the Party’s relationship with Turkey that 
had come under particular strain during the referendum period when it led a ‘no’ campaign 
despite the clear support of the Turkish government in favour of the ‘Annan Plan’.118 In the run 
up to the election, the UBP continued to express support for the resumption of the peace 
negotiations and  for a solution that would be reached on ‘Turkish-Cypriot terms’ but also 
emphasising that Turkish-Cypriots had an alternative in the form of TRNC should there be no 
progress.119 Earlier slandering of the ‘Annan Plan’ and the EU as existential threats were also 
largely omitted from the party’s rhetoric. 
  
As it is elaborated further below (section 4.5 in this chapter), such discursive shifts were 
also facilitated to an important extent by the inability of the ‘EU Project’ that could consolidate 
the oppositional Cypriotness discourse. Indeed, as it is elaborated below, the dislocatory 
experience of the aborted reunification which left the Turkish-Cypriot community on the margins 
of the EU would gradually diminish the prominence of the latter as an oppositional narrative and 
lead to a reconfiguration of the partisan identity discourses, organised once again around the 
                                                          
118As such, Eroğlu would claim: ‘[…] we said “no” to it [the ‘Annan Plan’] because the changes we’d asked were not 
made. This is now a new era. Our search for a solution in Cyprus continues. It was our duty towards the people to 
inform them of the content of the Plan. Nonetheless, it was a “yes” vote backed by 65 percent [of the electorate]. 
We respect the decision of the [Turkish-Cypriot] people’ (Yenisafak, 2005). 
119 Indeed, this was articulated during the 2005 electoral campaign with the slogan ‘You are not without an 
alternative’, see also Sozen, 2005. 
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issues of immigration from Turkey and the citizenship status of Turkish nationals. Moreover, the 
dislocation also meant that ‘EU integration’ which was progressively articulated within the 
oppositional Cypriotness discourse soon became an equally integral part of the right-wing 
rhetoric. As such, the DP, which remained in the third place, also moved towards a somewhat 
moderate position.120  In the 2005 election campaign, the DP did not shy from instrumentalising 
the EU within its political rhetoric and used the slogan ‘Yes to DP will integrate the Turkish 
Cypriots with the world’, which was eerily similar to the CTP/BG slogan during the 2004 
referendum: ‘A Yes will connect Turkish Cypriots to the world’ (also cited in Sozen, 2005: 469).  
 
While immigration related anxieties would gradually take over the political agenda in the 
coming years (see below), there was yet considerable optimism in northern Cyprus in the 
immediate aftermath of the April referendum and in the run up to the elections in 2005 that 
despite the failure of the ‘Annan Plan', the Turkish-Cypriot commitment to reunification and EU 
membership would ease the Turkish-Cypriot ostracisation and that the international community 
would act to bring the Turkish-Cypriot community ‘in from the cold’.121  Such perceptions would 
serve well the CTP whose strategy during this time involved seeking domestic legitimacy with 
reference to the seemingly improving international image of the Turkish-Cypriot community. The 
pledge of ‘integration’ thus became a focal point of the Party’s discourse and the Party did not 
                                                          
120 The party frequently appealed to the electorate on grounds of ‘pragmatism’ it claimed to have displayed in the 
run up to the 2004 referendum, focusing not only on the merits but also the flaws and weaknesses of the ‘Annan 
Plan’. It also capitalised on its referendum decision to allow a free vote which seemingly demonstrated its ‘honest’ 
efforts to explain both the pros and the cons of the Plan that other parties allegedly failed in doing so (Milliyet, 
2004). 




shy from making the bold claim that it was due to its policies that the Turkish-Cypriot profile was 
being raised globally.122 In this sense, the CTP’s EU rhetoric during this time also came to signify 
a notion of legitimacy for the Turkish-Cypriot identity articulated in terms of the somewhat 
improving external relations of the Turkish-Cypriot administration.123 CTP’s campaign slogan ‘We 
have a pledge, to Europe and to Cyprus [Sozumuz Var, Avrupa’ya, Kıbrıs’a]’ also underscored the 
pledge of ‘full integration’ which promised to improve the living conditions of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community by overcoming international isolation (Kıbrıs, 2005b). Other issues that had been 
traditionally salient in the Party identity rhetoric, immigration and citizenship in particular, 
remained muffled and overshadowed by the Party’s emphasis on EU integration.124  
 
For its part, the moderate BDH campaigned along similar lines with a renewed 
commitment to a solution on the basis of the ‘Annan Plan’ and subsequent EU membership. 
Nonetheless, the BDH was the only party that began to openly articulate fresh identity related 
anxieties in this period. For the Party, the new period marked by the rejection of the ‘Annan Plan’ 
and the accession of a still-divided Cyprus into the EU brought with it the danger of further 
marginalisation of the Turkish-Cypriot community, threatening its very identity (Cyprus PIO, 
2005b). Indeed, the BDH during this time suggested a number of radical steps including a 
                                                          
122 Kıbrıs, 2005c; Several high-profile meetings held between the PM Talat and the likes of EU Commission 
President Barosso and the US Secretary of State Colin Powell also served to articulate the notion of a ‘global 
leader’ that could facilitate the integration of the Turkish-Cypriot community into the international community, 
Cyprus PIO (2005a) but also Hastürer (2004a).  
123 This is elaborated further in Section 4.5 in this chapter. 
124 And it was a strategy that would prove largely successful. At the end of the electoral race, the CTP won 45 
percent of the votes in the legislative elections (Fig.4) and its leader Mehmet Ali Talat was later elected as the 




‘normalization process’ whereby Turkish-Cypriots would reassume their governmental positions 
in the Republic of Cyprus but also the unilateral adoption of the ‘Annan Plan’ by the Turkish-
Cypriot authorities together with a series of confident-building measures to facilitate a new 
round of negotiations.125  As the Party would declare in a joint statement with a group of NGOs 
a year later, in 2005: ‘We are being pushed to the position where there is no characteristic of a 
community, even with no minority rights within a unitary Cypriot State’ (BDH, 2006).   
 
 Indeed, the BDH was not without reason to worry about the marginal position of the 
Turkish-Cypriot community in the post-referendum period. The accession of a still-divided Cyprus 
had changed the parameters of the Cyprus conflict in the sense that it had placed the Turkish-
Cypriot community between a rock and a hard place: the Greek-Cypriot leadership under 
hardliner Tassos Papadopoulos (2003-2008) on the one hand, and a somewhat reluctant Turkey 
on the other. Despite UN intervention in 2006 which brokered a ‘set of principles’ aimed at re-
launching the talks, no substantive negotiations were held (CRS Report of Congress, 2007). 
Disappointment would also quickly set in when the much anticipated ‘Direct Trade Regulations’ 
that had been formulated by the EU to ease trade restrictions on northern Cyprus was torpedoed 
                                                          
125 Cyprus PIO, 2005c; In this regard, the BDH’s rhetoric conceived the Turkish-Cypriot identity with reference to 
the collective rights based on the consociational arrangements enshrined in the 1960 Constitution. This was a 
radical departure from the party’s earlier arguments in the context of the ‘Annan Plan’ in which the provisions of 
the 1960 Constitution were depicted as ‘minority rights’ that would be enforced on the Turkish-Cypriots by the 
Greek-Cypriot controlled RoC should there be no solution to the Cyprus Problem; indeed, soon after the referenda, 
the BDH leader Akıncı claimed that ‘if Turkey recognizes the Republic of Cyprus [with this situation], then Turkish 
Cypriots will have minority status falling back of the 1960 rights(Cyprus PIO, 2004). In the post-referendum period, 
however, the same rights were articulated as ‘communal rights’ that came to construe a political identity for the 
Turkish-Cypriot community that was now put at risk of further “deterioration” by the lingering Cyprus Problem and 




by Greek-Cypriot opposition in Brussels.126 Similarly, new regulations that had been adopted a 
year earlier, in 2004 which aimed at liberalizing the movement of goods and persons across the 
Green-Line were also watered-down.127  
 
 Under these conditions, Turkish-Cypriot politics was gradually marked by ambiguity but 
also disdain towards the EU. The CTP, still in government, continued professing commitment to 
a federal solution based on the UN blueprint and consequent EU membership but this was 
articulated together with a ‘robust assertion of Turkish-Cypriot interests’ that chimed not only 
with the general anti-Greek sentiment but with the nationalist rhetoric of the UBP (also in 
Kaymak, 2008). Although the Party also introduced a number of changes aimed at 
reconciliation,128 such progressive changes were largely overshadowed by the overall 
disillusionment which had begun marking that period. Although the election of AKEL’s leader 
Dimitris Christofias as the new President of the RoC in 2008 would reignite hopes of a new 
momentum129, there was little progress on the negotiating table also indicating that no tangible 
results would be produced by the time for the forthcoming Turkish-Cypriot elections the 
following year. As a result, the Cyprus issue was downplayed by virtually all of the four political 
parties in 2009, focusing instead on domestic politics.  
                                                          
126 For a detailed discussion, see Faustmann (2011, pp.156-159); for the initial Turkish-Cypriot reaction to the 
adoption of the regulations see also, Financial Times (2004). 
127  See Faustmann (2011); for a discussion of the ‘Green Line Regulations’; see Gokcekus, O. et al. (2012). 
128 Most remarkably, history textbooks were written to this end to promote a less biased, less nationalist view of 
history and a more inclusionary notion of collective identity based on shared cultural heritage; see Vural and 
Ozuyanik (2008); for a comparative analysis see also Papadakis (2008).  
129After all, both Talat and Christofias were from socialist backgrounds and their parties had long championed the 




 Accordingly, the stagnating Turkish-Cypriot economy became a central focus of the 
electoral campaigns. The centre-left CTP tried hard to defend its performance at the office by 
emphasising the growth the Turkish-Cypriot economy went through in the immediate aftermath 
of the referendum.130 It also centred its rhetoric on a rather ambiguous notion of ‘progress’ which 
seemed to imply that the reverse meant rolling the UBP — the sole culprit of all ills — back into 
the office.131 The party also continued to promise to ‘push the EU door fully open’ and promote 
the full integration of the Turkish-Cypriot community into the EU (Kıbrıs, 2009a). More 
remarkably, such rhetoric promoting EU integration (in the absence of a solution) while elusive 
in practice, involved the articulation of the EU within a ‘reformist’ narrative in the context of 
implementing the self-induced EU harmonisation programme, that is voluntary adoption of 
European policies and directives into the Turkish-Cypriot legislative framework. Immigration 
related issues, on the other hand, remained largely omitted from the party’s electoral rhetoric.     
 
 The TDP which had replaced the earlier BDH in 2007 also maintained its pro-EU 
orientation and its commitment to reunification. In contrast to the CTP however, it articulated a 
more vocal identity discourse by adopting the rather ambiguous ‘we are from here’ narrative for 
                                                          
130 The referendum on the Annan Plan was followed by a massive construction boom in northern Cyprus, closely 
related to the unresolved status of the property issue an on an interpretation of the ‘Annan Plan’ that substantial 
investment on Greek-Cypriot land would enable entitlement to receive the title deed once the original owner 
would be paid the value of the land alone. The construction boom would fuel an unprecedented economic growth 
of the Turkish-Cypriot economy; in 2003 and in 2005, growth rates of 11.4 and 10.6 percent were recorded, and 
the GDP per capita almost doubled in the same period, reaching USD11,837 in 2006, World Bank (2007); 
subsequent lawsuits brought by Greek-Cypriot refugees to reclaim land however, would lead to a near-collapse of 
the construction sector and its effects would converge with the global financial crisis to lead to a drastic downturn 
in economic growth from 2009 onwards. 
131 Such return implied undoing the ‘progress’ claimed to have been achieved by the CTP government whether 
internationally in terms recovering the image of the Turkish-Cypriot community or in northern Cyprus, by ending 
the crippling nepotism of the ‘old guard’, Kıbrıs (2014a). 
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its electoral campaign. The party claimed to be the “only real option” for the Turkish-Cypriot 
community that would, among others, stop uncontrolled Turkish immigration, reassert Turkish-
Cypriot autonomy and safeguard the community’s referendum pledge (Kıbrıs Postası, 2009a). 
This narrative also included autochthonous undertones which appealed to ‘ordinary’ Turkish-
Cypriots by promising them that BDH’s policies would ensure ordinary Turkish-Cypriots ‘could 
raise their children and grow old in their homeland’ (Kıbrıs Postası, 2009a). While the TDP’s 
narrative did not explicitly differentiate between naturalised Turkish immigrants/settlers and 
‘native’ Turkish-Cypriots, the overwhelming emphasis on the ‘native’ with often banal references 
to ‘local’ and ‘authentic’ appealed to a securitised Cypriotness sentiment underpinned by the 
existential threat that was arguably posed by the perpetual influx of mainland Turks. 
 
 For their part, the DP and the UBP continued to pay occasional lip-service to EU 
membership but attacked the CTP for failing to realise its mandate to overcome the international 
isolations on northern Cyprus. Most notably, the UBP also reintroduced its traditional rhetoric on 
identity and on Turkish settlers during these elections which was framed in explicitly Turkish 
nationalist terms. To this end, the Party claimed that there was no distinct cultural or national 
identity in Cyprus but that Turkishness was the common thread: ‘We all know our true origin, we 
all know where we came from. We all came from motherland Turkey. So it doesn’t matter 
whether one is from Famagusta, Adana, Turkey or Cyprus for that matter; we are all kneaded out 
of the same dough [Turkish proverb]’ (Kıbrıs, 2009d).  
 
 The Democratic Party, in comparison, maintained a more moderate stance on 
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reunification. In its 2009 manifesto, the party claimed that it supported a bi-communal and bi-
zonal solution based on political equality that would also maintain Turkish guarantees (DP, 2009). 
Yet, it did not mince its words on the EU in general and its ‘biased relationship’ with the Greek-
Cypriot leadership in particular. Throughout its campaign, the DP ranted about the ‘unfulfilled EU 
promises’ and accused the latter of surrendering to Greek-Cypriot interests who aimed at settling 
a score with Turkey by torpedoing its EU accession process (Kıbrıs Postası, 2009b). It also framed 
Turkish-Cypriot relations with the EU in the context of these ‘unfulfilled promises’, relating in 
general to the lifting of isolations but more specifically the ‘Direct Trade Regulations’ that had 




 It is generally understood that the legislative elections held in 2009 reflected the overall 
dissatisfaction with the CTP’s performance domestically but also a clear disillusionment with such 
promises of international and European integration and a rebuke of the EU by the majority of the 
Turkish-Cypriot electorate for its disappointing performance in mitigating the crippling isolations 
on their community.132 As posited above, the disappointment would set to gradually diminish the 
prominence of the EU as an oppositional narrative and lead to a reconfiguration of the partisan 
identity discourses organised once again around the issue of immigration and the naturalisation 
                                                          
132 BBC News (2010a); The National Unity Party (UBP) came out with a clear victory from the 2009 legislative elections 
by winning 44 percent of the vote. The CTP, on the other hand, suffered a major defeat winning only 29 percent of 
the vote from 44 percent in the previous elections in 2005. DP’s support also dropped from 13 percent in 2005 to 
under 11 percent in 2009 (see Fig.8). Social-democratic TDP won 7 percent of the votes which translated to 2 seats 
in the Turkish-Cypriot assembly. CTP would receive a further blow in 2010 when Mehmet Ali Talat lost the 
presidential race to UBP’s Dervişh Eroğlu in the first round (BBC News, 2010b)   
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of Turkish settlers. The key issue which facilitated the discursive shift was the austerity measures 
orchestrated by Ankara. As noted previously in Chapter 3, Turkish-Cypriot economy is buoyed by 
financial help from mainland Turkey (TRNC State Planning Organisation, 2007). In this somewhat 
IMF-style relationship, Turkish-Cypriot macroeconomic policy is also formulated and directed by 
Turkey in the form of bilateral economic protocols. The latest protocol was signed in December 
2012 and included controversial austerity measures envisaging a drastic reduction in the size of 
the public sector but also the privatisation of key Turkish-Cypriot assets including electricity, 
telecommunications and harbours.133 The Turkish-Cypriot left, including opposition parties the 
CTP and the TDP but also trade unions (see Chapter 5) opposed the protocol from the outset and 
claimed that the Protocol was a mere pretext to facilitate the transfer of strategic state-owned 
assets to the so-called Islamic ‘green capital’ (yeşil sermaye) in Turkey that has aligned itself with 
the ruling AKP. Perhaps more importantly, such austerity measures were also articulated 
together with prevalent fears related to losing of Turkish-Cypriot identity. In this sense, 
privatisation of public assets was seen as threatening Turkish-Cypriot autonomy by further 
consolidating Ankara’s control in its domestic affairs. To this end, ‘Communal Survival’ rallies 
were held in 2011 and 2012 which saw thousands of Turkish-Cypriots taking to the streets to 
reassert their Turkish-Cypriot identity, protest against Turkish-imposed austerity measures and 
tell Ankara to keep its ‘hands-off the Turkish-Cypriot community’ (Kathimerini, 2011, Deutsche 
Welle, 2011, sendika.org, 2011).  
                                                          
133 The Protocol stipulated that the Turkish-Cypriot government had agreed to implement the bilateral economic 
programme entitled “Towards a Sustainable Economy 2013-2015” in order to reduce its balance deficit to 315 ml 
Turkish Lira(TL); controversial policy measures included the privatisation of the harbours and the electricity 
authority (Articles 5.2.4.2.1 and 5.2.5.2 respectively) and market liberalisation in telecommunications;  (5.2.4.2.3), 
TRNC Prime Minister’s Office (2013). 
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 The centre-left CTP instrumentalised on the anti-austerity sentiment by adopting a more 
assertive rhetoric on identity in general and bilateral relations with mainland Turkey, in 
particular. To this end, the notion of tutelage (vesayet) appeared frequently in the party’s 
campaign narratives (Kıbrıs Postası, 2013f; Yenidüzen, 2013a). This was articulated together with 
a renewed emphasis on Turkish-Cypriot identity that was conceived once again within an 
explicitly securitised framework (Chapters 2 and 3). In this sense, Turkish-Cypriot identity was 
defined in ‘existential’ terms as the fundamental stumbling block of the political community and 
its autonomy that was threatened by Turkey — not only through its positioning within an 
asymmetrical relationship that ‘excluded mutual respect’ but also through the large-scale 
naturalisation of Turkish nationals that altered the domestic political balance, further 
consolidating Turkish domination and tutelage on Turkish-Cypriot affairs. The party thus once 
again began asserting that identity was ‘the main concern of the Turkish-Cypriot community’ and 
that Turkish-Cypriots feared of losing their identity but also of not being able ‘to reflect their own 
political will on the ballot box’ (Kıbrıs Postası, 2013f). The CTP began claiming that the native 
population risked being a minority in the face of perpetual migration from Turkey and that it 
would end such concerns by introducing a new citizenship policy (CTP, 2013). The new and 
certainly stricter citizenship policy would end the controversial procedure of granting 
discretionary citizenship through the Council of Ministers but also the automatic eligibility for jus 
soli citizenship, allowing foreign nationals to be considered for TRNC citizenship only after ten 
years of uninterrupted residency in northern Cyprus and within a quota that would be based on 
the demographic rate of natural increase. As such, the new policy reserved the right to refuse 
citizenships even if all necessary residency conditions were met. The CTP also promised new 
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measures that would suspend voting rights for new citizens until the consecutive legislative 
elections following the granting of their citizenship. The party’s rhetoric on the EU, on the other 
hand, was ‘toned down’ and depoliticised to fit within a ‘reformist’ narrative that championed 
pro-active EU convergence i.e. voluntary harmonization of Turkish-Cypriot legislative framework 
with the EU acquis communitaire.134 
 
 For its part, the social-democratic TDP also adopted a similar narrative of ‘change and 
transformation’ (Kıbrıs Postası, 2013c, 2013h). Its manifesto for the elections ‘It’s time [for 
change] (‘Zamanı geldi’, in Turkish)’ was also dominated by domestic issues and included a 
number of policy positions on the economy, health, local government, education and the 
environment (TDP, 2013). TDP opposed all privatisations envisaged in the economic protocol 
signed with Turkey, and emphasised its commitment to creating a ‘viable and self-sufficient’ 
Turkish-Cypriot economy based on social justice in which ultimate authority and autonomy would 
rest on the Turkish-Cypriot community (TDP, 2013). TDP also continued to articulate its well-
known concerns on demographic change by accusing the UBP government for distributing 
citizenships in return for electoral gain but also linking mounting crime rates and pressures on 
health and education services to rising numbers (Kıbrıs Postası, 2013b). The Party also heavily 
attacked the CTP for maintaining a lax citizenship regime during previous government (Kıbrıs 
Postası, 2013c). While the party remained committed to finding a solution to the ‘Cyprus 
Problem’ based on federalism and simultaneous EU membership, these issues featured relatively 
                                                          
134 In this vein, the party argued that serious reforms based on EU norms were urgently needed to address the 
wide-ranging structural problems of the Turkish-Cypriot state, but also to foster democratic governance, 
accountability, and a viable (read ‘less-dependent’) Turkish-Cypriot economy (Kıbrıs Postasi,2013d) 
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little in its electoral campaign.  
 
 The centre-right DP entered 2013 elections with a new name: ‘Democratic Party-National 
Forces’ (Demokrat Parti-Ulusal Gucler). The rebranded party largely maintained its ideological 
position on the Cyprus Problem and bilateral relations with Turkey by emphasising its 
commitment to TRNC which, for the DP, was the ultimate embodiment of Turkish-Cypriot 
political equality (Kıbrıs Postası, 2013e). It was also within this framework of state sovereignty 
that the DP continued support a solution to the ‘Cyprus Problem’ which would safeguard and 
endorse the Turkish-Cypriot state and ‘its flag’. In this sense, statehood for the DP was also the 
defining feature of an all-inclusive Turkish-Cypriot identity that did not discriminate between 
naturalised citizens or ‘indigenous’ Turkish-Cypriots in the national struggle ‘to forever uphold 
the Turkish-Cypriot State’ as not only they all had ‘common roots’ in Anatolia but they now 
represented ‘a unified, national community through citizenship bonds’ (Kıbrıs Postası, 2013g). 
While the ‘Democratic Party’ also devised a number of policy positions on ‘everyday’, domestic 
issues and published them in its blueprint entitled the ‘The Future of TRNC in 50 Questions’ to 
complement the party manifesto (DP, 2013), its rhetoric on Turkish-Cypriot identity articulated 
through the notions of ‘statehood’ and ‘civic citizenship’ developed in relation to Turkish settlers 
took pride of place in campaign discourses during the 2013 elections (Kıbrıs Postası, 2013a).   
 
 The ‘National Unity Party’, on the other hand, never really recovered from the internal 
wrangling that saw the party split down the middle and the resignation of a dissident group of 
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MPs that also brought about the collapse of the government.135 In any case, the UBP’s electoral 
campaign highlighted that it fully supported the controversial economic protocol in order to 
foster ‘prosperity’. In addition, the party publicly defended its position on the ongoing 
naturalisation of Turkish nationals in the run up to the elections by claiming that espousing a 
larger population was indeed a government policy that reflected the interests of the country in 
defence and economic matters (Kıbrıs, 2013). It also did not deviate from its nationalist position 
on the ‘national issue’ but the EU related matters were, to a large extent, muted during the 
electoral campaign. 
 
 At the end of the electoral race, the centre-left CTP won the most votes and enough seats 
to set up a coalition together with the DP.136 The CTP’s electoral gains are likely due to its vocal 
opposition to the austerity measures that caused widespread outcry earlier but also in parallel 
to a growing anti-Turkish and anti-immigration sentiment. This was also evident in the way the 
party instrumentalised such sentiment by adopting a ‘no tutelage / free-will’ (vesayet degil, özgür 
irade) narrative and the decision to take a tougher stance on immigration and citizenship when 
compared to previous years. Similarly, the DP’s eleventh-hour declaration that it opposed 
                                                          
135 The most recent legislative elections in northern Cyprus were held on 28 July 2013, a year earlier than expected 
following the collapse of the UBP government as a result of a ‘no-confidence vote’ brought forward by the 
opposition parties CTP, DP and the TDP. Perhaps more remarkably, the ‘no confidence’ vote was also supported by 
eight UBP dissidents. The internal wrangling for power within the UBP that had begun brewing earlier in 2012 blew 
up in the run up to the leadership challenge which saw the party split down the middle. When the leadership 
contest that was held for the second time (following a District Court Decision which declared the first round void) 
confirmed PM Irsen Kuchuk as the new head, 8 MPs that had challenged his leadership previously - on accusations 
of corruption and nepotism - resigned from the party and joined the ‘Democratic Party’. This was the greatest split 
the Party had experienced since 1992 when a similar splinter group of 9 MPs had resigned from the party and went 
ahead to establish the DP (see section 4.2 in this chapter). 
136 It won 38 percent of the votes and 21 seats (out of 50), a significant increase on its poor performance in the 




Turkey’s privatisation plans may explain the boost in its support which doubled since 2009.137 It 
is also interesting to note the impressive performance of the DP in such settler strongholds 
like Iskele and Famagusta winning 30 percent and 26 percent of the votes respectively (YSK, 
2013). This may be due to Party’s all-inclusive rhetoric on Turkish-Cypriot identity based on civic 
citizenship. The TDP also did relatively well by winning 7 percent of the vote and in return, 
securing an extra seat (that increased its seats to three) in the Turkish-Cypriot assembly. Perhaps 
more remarkably, for the purposes of this study, the 2013 legislative elections were dominated 
once again by domestic issues relating very little to the resolution of the Cyprus conflict or the 
issue of EU integration (see also Al Jazeera, 2013). Instead, the popular narratives on Turkish-
Cypriot identity and on immigration-settlement from mainland Turkey returned back to the 
agenda and took centre stage. The section that follows discusses the implications of this finding 
in assessing the overall impact of immigration-settlement on political party conceptions of 
collective identity in northern Cyprus. 
 
4.5. The impact of immigration across the political party narratives (1995-2013) 
 
 As discussed in detail in the previous chapter (section 3.3 in Chapter 3) and elaborated 
further above, the aftermath of the Turkish military intervention in 1974 saw the buttressing of 
the hegemonic Turkishness discourse which represented a new perception of order and security 
based on statehood and overarching Turkish identity. Turkish-Cypriot identity was effectively 
                                                          
137 DP (2013b); the DP received barely 11 percent of the votes in 2009. It’s share of the vote in 2013 was over 23 
percent (see Figure 8). 
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subsumed under this representation as a form of ethnic/local variation in which Turkishness took 
pride of place. The UBP as the most formidable nationalist party in northern Cyprus with an 
impressive electoral record in the pre-accession period (see Figures 7 and 8) invariably defined 
its notion of collective identity within this nationalist discourse as being an ‘indivisible part of the 
greater Turkish nation’. In this sense, the party did not differentiate in ethnic or cultural terms a 
Turkish-Cypriot from a Turkish national and the relationship between the two was characterised 
within the nationalist narrative with the bond of ethnic kinship.  
 
Another right-wing party, the DP has also framed its conception of collective identity 
along similar nationalist lines. Although expressed through different strategies, the DP’s narrative 
prioritises Turkishness by articulating it in a rather ambiguous notion of civic nationalism. In this 
sense, the ‘Turkish-Cypriot nationalism’ the party promotes is a form of civic nationalism in which 
the Turkish-Cypriot state (TRNC) represents the national community (i.e. the ‘Turkish Cypriot 
people’) in which membership is signified with the concept of ‘active citizenship’.138 The attempt 
to frame the controversial migration of Turkish nationals into northern Cyprus and their 
naturalisation onto this particular notion of civic citizenship has nonetheless sustained the 
nationalist principle of upholding Turkishness which erases the implied dividing line between the 
traditional notion of Turkish nationalism and the supposedly civic virtues of Turkish-Cypriot 
nationalism which the DP subscribes to. This is clearly manifest in the party’s efforts to utilise 
ethno-national myths such as common descent which claims that all Turkish-Cypriots had 
                                                          
138In the party’s own definition, ‘regardless of their formal citizenship status’ any person ‘who consider themselves 
Turkish-Cypriot, subscribe to TRNC’s political creed and to its shared set of values and practices’ are, for the DP, 
members of the Turkish-Cypriot community (interview no.4). 
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‘common roots in Anatolia’ in combination with other civic references (such as ‘active 
citizenship’) to sovereign statehood. This is an important finding since it highlights the 
deployment and articulation of a range of civic and ethnic elements within the hegemonic 
Turkishness discourse. From this perspective, the DP’s narrative can be regarded as an extension 
of a hegemonic project in constructing and stabilising a form of collective-identity by articulating 
as many available elements (i.e. ‘floating signifiers’, such as ‘active’/civic citizenship, ‘common 
descent’, etc.) as possible (Howarth et al., 2000: 15). This assertion is also in line with the 
hypothesis posited in Chapter 2 and elaborated within the historical context in Chapter 3 that:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Given the local history and in the context of the Cyprus conflict, Turkish-Cypriot 
identity was cultivated and subsumed within a hegemonic notion of Turkishness that did not 
distinguish between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish settlers.  
 
 As noted earlier in Chapter 2, the theory of discourse that is utilised in this study, based 
loosely on the poststructuralist Discourse Theory (DT), is predicated on the ultimate impossibility 
of a discursive closure, a condition that makes articulatory practices and political agency possible. 
Hegemonic practices therefore presuppose a context marked by antagonisms, and the 
availability of elements (‘floating signifiers’) that can be articulated by opposing political projects 
(Howarth et al., 2000: 15). Indeed, it was precisely within this context that the settler cleavage 
began to make a bold appearance in political debates from the 1980s onwards and provided the 
anti-establishment left with an opportunity to challenge the hegemony of the Turkishness 
discourse with an alternative notion of belonging which emphasised a distinct ‘Cypriot’ character. 
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Such a commitment to the indigenous character of the Turkish-Cypriot identity, often (though 
not exclusively, see below) within the framework of an overarching Cypriotness discourse was 
constructed against a ‘threat’ that conceived immigration-settlement from mainland Turkey as 
part of Ankara’s assimilationist project to ultimately undermine the distinct Turkish-Cypriot 
identity and its long-term autonomy. 
 
The CTP together with the social-democratic TKP explicitly linked immigration from 
Turkey and granting of citizenship status to Turkish settlers onto wider debates on identity, 
societal security and political autonomy. They argued that the new wave of immigration which 
began in the aftermath of the ‘settlement programme’ (see section 3.3 in Chapter 3) had 
undesirable effects on the Turkish-Cypriot economy (causing a drop in local wages for the ‘native’ 
Turkish Cypriots) but also blamed immigration from Turkey for instigating the flight of Turkish-
Cypriots onto other countries in search of better economic prospects. Above all, these parties 
argued that the lax immigration regime amounted to a ‘population transfer’ from Turkey that 
would in the long-term undermine Turkish-Cypriot autonomy but also endanger the ‘authentic’ 
Turkish-Cypriot identity through large-scale naturalisations.  
 
 Such ‘speech-acts’ (Buzan and Wæver, 2013) employed by the opposition parties, would 
construct a securitised discourse in which the presence of populations from Turkey were treated 
as an existential threat to the presumed ‘authority’, ‘authenticity’ and the ‘ways of living’ of the 
Turkish-Cypriot community. Within this discourse, moreover, Turkish ‘settlers’ were seen as a 
homogenous constituency that invariably supported the nationalist status quo and the Turkish 
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tutelage over Turkish-Cypriot affairs. Such claims were also articulated with an appeal to 
autonomy and a political project that would safeguard it.  
 
It was also during this time, in the early 1990s, that Cyprus’s EU accession process 
gradually came to be viewed by the Turkish-Cypriot left as a political project that could enhance 
their community’s security and consolidate its ethno-cultural Turkish-Cypriot identity. They 
sought to attain this goal by creating a ‘social imaginary’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) through 
discourse whereby they embedded the Turkish-Cypriot community in the global political 
consciousness as members of the international community but also a stronger collectivity (the 
European Union) beyond the control of Turkey. As such, the EU soon became a central element 
of the collective identity discourses invoked by political actors on the left of the political spectrum 
and played a critical role in galvanising support against the nationalist hegemony by legitimising 
the alternative conceptions of belonging, or Cypriotness, articulated by the opposition parties 
CTP and BDH (later, TDP).  
  
In this context, the Turkish-Cypriot left (CTP and TKP-BDH) overwhelmingly supported EU 
membership for Turkish-Cypriots in the run up to the referendum in 2004 that would allow a 
reunified, federal Cyprus to join the EU (see section 4.2 in this chapter). The economic lure of EU 
membership was important to the extent that it would stem the worrisome decline of the 
Turkish-Cypriot community numerically through emigration. But above all, such integration 
meant an endorsement of the Turkish-Cypriot community internationally and a recognition of its 
well-defined identity. In this political vein, the EU was framed within a popular struggle against 
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the Denktash-UBP establishment and came to signify such political notions of ‘democracy’, 
‘peace’ and ‘freedom’ and ultimately the upholding of ‘Turkish-Cypriotness’ that had been 
undermined by the nationalist policies of the Turkish-Cypriot regime not least through the large-
scale naturalisation of Turkish nationals.  
 
While the pro-EU rhetoric would, to a large extent, overshadow the immigration-related 
issues in the run up to the 2004 referendum as it became the focal point of identity narratives, 
the ongoing naturalisations on the eve of Cyprus accession into the EU would once again put the 
issue under spotlight as the Turkish-Cypriot left engaged in a citizenship-stripping battle in fear 
that Turkish settlers who had been given citizenship status by the UBP-DP coalition government 
would subsequently oppose the ‘Annan Plan’ and torpedo Turkish-Cypriot prospects of joining 
the EU (see 4.3 in this chapter). In sum, these findings confirm the hypothesis posited in Chapter 
2:  
 
Hypothesis 2: In the context of Cyprus’s accession into the EU and the anticipated Turkish-Cypriot 
integration into the European mainstream, Turkish settlers came to be perceived as a threat to 
Turkish-Cypriot identity. 
 
 The impact of the EU in seemingly transforming oppositional identity narratives began to 
decrease, however, once Cyprus was admitted to the EU as a divided island. The peculiar and 
rather ‘marginal’ positioning of the Turkish-Cypriot community within the post-accession context 
(see section 3.4 in Chapter 3) has meant that the ‘EU project’ was unable to consolidate itself 
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into a viable social, and perhaps a more inclusive imaginary. Instead, the Cypriotness discourse 
that brought together large segments of the Turkish-Cypriot society under the EU banner and led 
simultaneously a political sea-change in the run up to Cyprus’s accession became progressively 
disorientated. Such a dislocation can similarly be explained by the inability of the ‘EU project’ to 
integrate the Turkish-Cypriot community into the European mainstream which obstructed the 
continuity of the common ‘social imaginary’ and thwarted the emergence of a stable hegemonic 
formation in Turkish-Cypriot politics during this period. Moreover, the dislocatory experience of 
the aborted EU-membership has led to a new reconfiguration of the pre-existing elements 
articulated within the oppositional Cypriotness discourse in which immigration/settler related 
antagonisms took centre stage. This argument was hypothesised in Chapter 2:  
 
Hypothesis 3: With the failure of the ‘Annan Plan’, the pro-EU Cypriotness discourse is 
disorientated and settler antagonisms take centre-stage 
 
 While CTP remained committed towards reunification, its strategy during this time 
involved articulating its EU-related aspirations with reference to the ongoing isolations over the 
Turkish-Cypriot community; in this sense the EU became a focal point of the party’s identity 
discourse to the extent that it sought international legitimacy to embedded the Turkish-Cypriot 
community in the global political consciousness as a distinct collectivity with the moral upper-
hand in the Cyprus imbroglio. Yet, in the years following Cyprus’s EU accession, the lack of 
tangible benefits for the Turkish-Cypriot community that would emanate from EU integration led 
to the reconceptualisation of the latter once again, rather ‘toned down’ and depoliticised to fit 
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within a ‘reformist’ narrative that championed pro-active EU convergence for the TRNC, that is 
voluntary harmonization of Turkish-Cypriot (or, the “TRNC”) legislative framework with the EU 
acquis communitaire. While this emphasis on EU integration in the immediate aftermath of the 
referendum temporarily surpassed existential anxieties related to the presence of Turkish 
settlers, immigration from mainland Turkey would return to the agenda once again following the 
party’s defeat in 2009 and in the run up to the 2013 elections.  
 
For its part, the TDP also instrumentalised the EU in championing its own version of 
‘Turkish-Cypriotness’ which emphasised the ‘autonomous’ and the ‘indigenous’ element of such 
belonging. The normative value of the EU was articulated within this discourse in terms of 
‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ and with a vocal stance against direct Turkish interference in 
domestic Turkish-Cypriot affairs. In this sense, the party saw Cyprus’s reunification and EU 
membership as part of a wider goal of consolidating democracy in the Turkish-Cypriot 
community. While EU-related aspirations also overshadowed TDP’s anti-immigration, anti-
settlement rhetoric in the run up to the referendum, the TDP was the only mainstream political 
party that maintained explicit identity concerns during much of the post-referendum period. 
Unlike the CTP which muted its earlier emphasis on immigration-settlement, the TDP continued 
its call to stop uncontrolled Turkish immigration and reassert Turkish-Cypriot autonomy. This may 
also explain the limited appeal of the party and its rather poor electoral performance. 
  
 In any case, an important indication that the aborted solution to the ‘Cyprus Problem’ had 
a profound impact on the pro-EU Cypriotness discourse, was the displacement it caused when 
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the ‘EU integration’ which was progressively articulated in oppositional Cypriotness discourse 
soon became an equally integral part of the right-wing rhetoric on identity. The DP began paying 
lip-service to EU membership and emphasising the merits of its legal framework while it ranted 
about the ‘unfulfilled EU promises’ and accused the latter of surrendering to Greek-Cypriot 
interests in maintaining the isolations over the Turkish-Cypriot state or the TRNC. The UBP in the 
post-accession period also continued to invariably and ferociously champion independent 
Turkish-Cypriot statehood; while the party did tune down its earlier intransigent rhetoric, it 
continued to claim that the unrecognised status of the TRNC as an ‘unjust treatment of the 
Turkish-Cypriot people’ by the EU and the latter’s denial of the Turkish-Cypriot identity.  
 
 Turning onto the second part of the hypothesis posited above (hyp.3), this period has also 
seen a significantly more vocal anti-Turkish rhetoric on the part of the Cypriotness camp that 
surpassed its distinct pro-EU stance. To this end, the centre-left CTP drew on the anti-austerity 
sentiment from 2009 onwards by adopting a more assertive rhetoric on Turkish-Cypriot identity 
in general and the bilateral relations with mainland Turkey in particular. Such notions of 
domination (tahakkum) and tutelage (vesayet) appeared frequently in party’s campaign 
narratives. This was articulated together with a renewed emphasis on Turkish-Cypriot identity 
which was conceived once again within an explicitly securitised framework and in relation to 
immigration from mainland Turkey (see Chapters 2 and 3). In this sense, Turkish-Cypriot identity 
was defined in ‘existential’ terms, not only through its positioning within an asymmetrical 
relationship with Turkey but also through the large-scale naturalisation of Turkish nationals that 
altered the domestic political balance, further consolidating Turkish domination and tutelage on 
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Turkish-Cypriot affairs. Identity thus once again became a key focus of the party articulated in 
securitised terms as the fear of losing cultural identity but also ‘autonomy’, of not being able to 
reflect own political will on the ballot box. In line with much of the insights garnered from the 
immigration literature discussed in Chapter 2, the CTP’s securitised discourse also consisted of 
tougher measures on immigration and a stricter citizenship policy.  
 
For its part, the social-democratic TDP also continued to articulate its well-known 
concerns on demographic change by accusing the UBP government of distributing citizenships in 
return for electoral gain but also linking mounting crime rates and pressures on health and 
education services to rising numbers.  The party also heavily attacked the CTP for presumably 
maintaining a lax citizenship regime during previous government. While TDP remained 
committed to finding a solution to the ‘Cyprus Problem’ based on federalism and simultaneous 
EU membership, these issues were overshadowed by the settler-related anxieties that took 




 This chapter has examined the representation of immigration and the citizenship status 
of Turkish nationals in party-political discourses of collective identity in the period 1995-2013. 
The issue as it stood in the mid-1990s was characterised by the left within a securitised discourse 
of collective identity in which the presence of populations from Turkey were treated as an 
existential threat to the presumed ‘authority’ as well as the ‘authenticity’ of the Turkish-Cypriot 
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community. The securitised Cypriotness discourse regarded Turkish settlers as a homogenous 
constituency that invariably supported the nationalist status quo and the Turkish tutelage over 
Turkish-Cypriot affairs. The right, on the other hand, which has conceived its version of identity 
along nationalist lines, has traditionally articulated the ‘settler issue’ largely within this nationalist 
Turkishness discourse thus appealing to a number of ethno-national myths such as common 
descent in combination with other civic references to sovereign statehood.  
 
The introduction of the ‘EU’ into the political agendas of the Turkish-Cypriot community 
from the mid-1990s onwards had an important effect in the representation of the ‘settler issue’ 
especially by the left in the sense that it was largely downplayed within a new ‘imaginary’ in which 
EU membership came to signify. As the EU became the focal aspect of identity narratives, 
immigration related worries were largely muted or omitted altogether from the left-wing 
rhetoric. There was also a discursive shift toward a more positive reorientation to immigration 
and the citizenship rights of Turkish settlers from early 2000s onwards. This was only a partial 
discursive shift however as the settler issue continued to lurk in the background as evidenced in 
the citizenship-stripping cases brought by the opposition on the eve of Cyprus’s EU accession.  
 
It was further argued that the partial nature of this discursive shift and the absence of a 
complete paradigm shift in terms of the continuities over how the settler issue was presented by 
the left-wing parties, can be explained by the structural and historical features of the settler issue 
(particularly its linkage to the bilateral relations with Turkey) as well as the contingent nature of 
the ‘window of opportunity’ represented by EU membership that was made available. Indeed, 
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the impact of the EU in seemingly transforming oppositional identity narratives began to diminish 
once Cyprus was admitted to the EU as a divided island. The peculiar and rather ‘marginal’ 
positioning of the Turkish-Cypriot community within the post-accession context meant that the 
‘EU project’ was unable to consolidate itself into a viable social, and perhaps a more inclusive 
imaginary in relation to the ‘settler question’. In this case, this was evidenced by the 
reintroduction of the immigration-related anxieties into oppositional rhetoric from mid-2000s 
onwards to, in effect, take centre stage in organising Cypriotness centred identity discourses in 
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 This chapter examines the civil society responses to the experience of immigration from 
Turkey with a particular focus on the framing of the issue within wider discourses on Turkish-
Cypriot identity. Civil society is understood here as the associational space for political 
contestation that is outside of state or market structures (Habermas, 1991 but also Fleming, 
2000). In northern Cyprus, this means trade unions, associations but also smaller activist groups 
and grass-roots organisations. In line with the conceptual framework of the thesis provided 
earlier (2.5), this chapter discusses the identity politics of civil society in northern Cyprus by 
accounting for continuity and change in the extent to which ‘settlers’, immigration and other 
closely related issues, most notably the citizenship status of Turkish nationals are represented 
and instrumentalised within identity narratives. As such, it presents a highly politicised space, 
coloured with the history and politics of Cyprus in which multiple actors compete and strive for 
influence. Once again, diverse and competing conceptualisations of ‘immigration’ and 
‘citizenship’ produced and/or articulated by the civil society actors selected as part of the 
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research are delineated here in tandem with other contextual (discursive) elements such as 
‘solution [to the Cyprus Problem], ‘statehood’, ‘EU integration’ and ‘(Turkish) 
tutelage/assimilation’ wherein multiple interpretations of the ‘Cyprus problem’ and Turkish-
Cypriot relations with Turkey are also explored throughout.  
 
 The chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section (5.2) sets the scene by 
providing a brief overview of the development of the Turkish-Cypriot civil society and outlining 
its defining features. The remainder of the chapter is then organised around a typology of civil 
society based on the organisational identity of the NGOs in order to focus on different actors in 
assessing the impact of Turkish immigration-settlement on civil society narratives; section 5.3 
and 5.4 thus examine conceptions of immigration and identity espoused by the nationalist 
‘fighters’ associations’ and look at the immigration debate at the trade union level respectively, 
followed by a discussion of the responses from ‘immigrant community organisations’ (ICOs) 
themselves (5.5). Section 5.6 accounts for alternative conceptualisations of immigration-
settlement offered by those grass-root organisations who subscribe to other critical, counter-
cultural perspectives. The final section (5.7) links the empirical findings of the preceding sections 
to the conceptual framework developed earlier in Chapter 2 and addresses the working 
hypotheses. As with the rest of the thesis, the discourses are presented diachronically across the 






5.2. Civil society in northern Cyprus: An Overview 
 
 Civil society organisations existed in the Turkish-Cypriot community long before the 
partition of the island in 1974. As noted previously (2.2), during the British colonial period 
Turkish-Cypriot groups organised successfully both to fend off enosis but also to propagate 
Turkish nationalism based on the policy of taksim. In a more radical vein, the bi-communal labour 
movement also attracted Turkish-Cypriots in its struggle for workers’ rights under the communist 
party umbrella (and its close associate, PEO) though the involvement of Turkish-Cypriots in this 
movement was thwarted by historical and political factors, not least the repressive and violent 
policies of the nationalist Turkish-Cypriot leadership (2.2). In this sense, an important aspect of 
the Turkish-Cypriot civil society, as Gurel and Demetriou also suggest, has been its enduring 
relationship to nationalism, ethnic identification and more specifically with the ‘Cyprus Problem’ 
(Demetriou and Gurel, 2008). 
 
As others have also noted, the impact of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ on the formation and the 
development of civil society on the island (and within the Turkish-Cypriot community in 
particular) has been profound (Lonnqvist,2008; Gillespie et al.,2011; Reed, 2013). Even though 
most Turkish-Cypriot civil society organisations do not hold explicit party political agendas, 
political and ideological outlooks are in many cases at the core of their organisational identity. At 
the same time, the liberal conception of civil society as a metaphor for pluralism and 
accountability is a relatively new notion in the Cypriot political lexicon (Demetriou and Gurel, 
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2008). In this sense, many civil society actors in the north in particular, have not refrained from 
forging close alliances with political parties and blurring the organisational boundaries through 
cross-sectional membership and activism.  Indeed, the post-1974 period has seen the Turkish-
Cypriot civil society divide along ideological lines with the left-leaning civil society actors critical 
of the nationalist leadership and of the partition on the one hand and the traditionally privileged 
nationalist groups aligning themselves with the hardliner policies of the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership on the other (Fig.9)  
 
Indeed, the latter group did not deviate from the official discourse of the nationalist 
leadership and the political elite which dominated the Turkish-Cypriot political scene until the 
early 2000s (see sections 3.3 and 3.4 in Chapter 3). Within it, the ‘Cyprus Problem’ was framed 
as the Turkish-Cypriot ‘oppression’ at the hands of the Greek-Cypriot majority; the Turkish 
military intervention that ensued following a coup attempt against President Makarios in 1974 
was seen in this context as the ‘liberation’ of the Turkish-Cypriot community which put an end to 
‘Greek atrocities’ and settled the Cyprus Problem by bringing about bizonality in which Turkish-
Cypriots could now lead ‘peaceful’ lives in the safety of their own state, away from Greek 
hegemony. As the new statelet that was established in the immediate aftermath of the partition 
began to organise the new political, economic and social space for the Turkish-Cypriot 
community, these groups who had aligned themselves with the nationalist leadership often 




Figure 9. Typology of the Turkish-Cypriot civil society 
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 The oppositional groups, on the other hand, and the left-leaning trade unions such as the 
‘Teachers’ Union’ (KTÖS) and the ‘Public Servants’ Union’ (KTAMS) in particular, which represent 
the eldest segments of the civil-societal opposition (see below), turned progressively against 
what they saw as the chipping away of democracy and above all, political autonomy by an 
authoritarian leadership in favour of forging ever-closer links with Turkey under the banner of 
Turkish nationalism. Though reluctant contributors to the early state-building efforts of the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership through participation in the constitutional assemblies of the Turkish 
Federated State (KTFD) and that of the TRNC (1983) (see section 4.2 in Chapter 4), these actors 
would continue to voice forceful criticisms of the oppressive leadership and its official nationalist 
rhetoric on the ‘Cyprus Problem’ , the promotion of Turkish-Cypriot statehood in this context as 
well as the regular (and often explicit) meddling of the Turkish embassy/military in the Turkish-
Cypriot affairs. 
 
 While raising concerns over the future prospects of the Turkish-Cypriot community as a 
self-ruling entity and the overall viability of Turkish-Cypriot statehood as an alternative to federal 
solution, the oppositional Turkish-Cypriot civil society actors were also instrumental in initiating 
and promoting bi-communal contacts with the Greek-Cypriot civil society aimed at 
rapprochement between the two communities. In this context, several meetings were held from 
the early 1980s onwards, often abroad due to travel restrictions that were put in place across the 
‘Green Line’, to facilitate dialogue and to coordinate civil-society efforts in parallel to formal 
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negotiations towards reaching a solution.139 The 1990s saw the intensification of such efforts to 
widen the scope and impact of civil-society involvement in the peace process in parallel to 
Cyprus’s EU accession and in the context of the renewed diplomatic efforts to resolve the ‘Cyprus 
Problem’.140  
 
 More remarkable, nonetheless, is the turbulent atmosphere which ensued in the 
aftermath of the murder of Turkish-Cypriot journalist Kutlu Adalı in 1996 (see section 6.3 in 
Chapter 6), the diplomatic crisis  which saw open confrontation of the coalition government with 
a Turkish general (2001), the banking crisis that saw the near-collapse of the Turkish-Cypriot 
banking sector (2000-2001) and finally, with the publication of a UN-sponsored peace plan (or 
the so-called ‘Annan Plan’) in view of Cyprus’s imminent accession into the EU (2002), that really 
set the scene for the further political and verbal militancy of the Turkish-Cypriot oppositional civil 
society to then take centre-stage and orchestrate (together with opposition parties) the 
unprecedented societal opposition  against the nationalist leadership and in favour of a federal 
solution and EU membership. Against this backdrop, the oppositional civil society began to 
organise under the umbrella platforms ‘This Country is Ours’ and the ‘Common Vision’ and 
                                                          
139 The challenges that confronted the bicommunal effort from its inception in the early 1990s is described 
succinctly by Anastasiou (2008: 38): ‘Restrained by an unsympathetic and reluctant nationalist portion of the GC 
culture, and obstructed by a separatist and often directly intrusive nationalist TC administration, managing to 
organise and sustain bicommunal meetings was always a struggle. Innumerable meetings between TCs and GCs 
scheduled to take place in the buffer zone were cancelled by the TC authorities only moments before they were 
due to commence. The authorities often frustrated the efforts of the citizen peace-builders as though the objective 
was to break their spirit—the spirit of rapprochement’. 
140 Funded mostly by international donors such as the UN and USAID, this resulted in activities ranging from training 
on conflict resolution for citizens, academics, politicians, business leaders and other civil society actors across the 
political spectrum to conferences, youth camps, meetings of former co-villagers, the set-up of bicommunal choir and 
dance groups, women’s groups and regular meetings of experts (Wolleh, 2002; Loizos, 2006; Anastasiou, 2008).  
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launched an unprecedented series of demonstrations/peace rallies in the north. Despite the fact 
that such efforts to reunify the island before its EU accession did not yield the desired outcome 
following the rejection of the ‘Annan Plan’ by the Greek-Cypriot community in a referendum, the 
post-2004 period nonetheless marked the emergence of a relatively more diverse Turkish-Cypriot 
civil society, a phenomenon which was certainly boosted by EU support and a more conductive 
political climate.  
 
 Indeed, as recently noted by Kyris (2015), the Turkish-Cypriot civil society became the 
main beneficiary of the EU assistance that has been provided to the Turkish-Cypriot community 
by the EU.141 While the EU support, broadly aimed at peace and reconciliation, has enabled a 
number of existing NGOs to acquire not only funding but also significant ‘technical support’142 in 
implementing a number of community projects, it has also facilitated (though indirectly) the 
creation of new NGOs that later became beneficiaries of the EU funding schemes.143  
 
                                                          
141 The main EU instrument related to the TC civil society is the ‘Financial Aid Regulation’ (European Council, 2006). 
For the most recent and overarching Aid programme provided by the EU to the Turkish-Cypriot civil society, see 
‘Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot community’;  
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/themes/turkish-cypriot-community/ [Last accessed: 12 April 2015] 
142 A ‘Civil Society Support Team’ was established in April 2008 to engage in capacity-building for the Turkish-
Cypriot civil society and to address its low familiarisation with internationally-recognised practises; for a detailed 
discussion of the EU’s engagement with the Turkish-Cypriot civil society, see Kyris (2015) 
143It is important to note, however, that besides several existing civil-society actors, the EU’s sphere of influence in 
relation to the Turkish-Cypriot civil society has remained limited. A particularly relevant argument in this context has 
been made by Kyris (2013: 198) who have usefully highlighted the rather ‘unenthusiastic stance’ of Brussels in 
supporting those ‘politicised’ civil society actors. Those long-established and politicised NGOs on the other hand, 
have also shown a similarly low-levels of enthusiasm toward the EU (see below). In any case, the EU’s impact on the 
Turkish-Cypriot civil society has been fragmented to the extent that the highly EU-orientated actors represent only 
a small ‘professionalised’ and highly-depoliticised segment of the wider Turkish-Cypriot civil society.     
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 Perhaps more remarkably, the Turkish-Cypriot civil society since 2004 has also benefited 
greatly from the ending of the relatively hostile political climate. Indeed, one of the most 
significant outcomes of the socio-political turmoil that the Turkish-Cypriot community 
experienced during the ‘Annan Peace Process’ leading up to the historic referendum in 2004 was 
the opening up of the discursive space following the ‘implosion of the hegemonic Turkish 
nationalism’ (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005) manifest in the overwhelming victory of the left-leaning 
CTP at the legislative elections (see section 4.3 in Chapter 4). It can be argued that Turkish-Cypriot 
civil society actors have since been able to organise more effectively and freely to articulate a 
number of demands; this can also be seen in the emergence of new and more radical actors 
promoting social agendas inspired by a wide range of ideologies and critical perspectives (Fig.9). 
These actors are distinguished from traditional civil society for endorsing counter-cultural 
discourses and promoting alternative identities in order to challenge the existing order. In this 
sense, they offer important sites which expand participatory possibility by re-imagining inclusive 
identities, constitute a voice for the ‘excluded’ and challenge existing public/hegemonic 
discourses (Cohen and Arato, 1994; Lewis, 2013). Their framings of ‘Turkish settlers’, immigration 
but also the citizenship status of Turkish nationals are thus elaborated below. 
    
 Lastly, given the focus of the thesis, a further group of NGOs that is put under further 
scrutiny here is the ‘immigrant community organisations’ (ICOs) representing the large 
immigrant/settler population from mainland Turkey. These organisations represent an important 
though often unrecognised form of engagement aimed at promoting a sense of community 
conceived in the place of origin (region, hometown, etc.) and promotion of the group’s rights and 
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interests within the host society. Due to the voluntary nature of groups and the working-class 
profiles of their members, the activities of these organisations are often limited to fundraising 
and promotion of cultural events and educational activities. These organisations also engage in 
fundraising for special occasions, such as organising a religious celebration or to build places of 
worship (see below). Such activities and projects are often carried out in liaison with the local 
authorities in terms of support or indeed, authorisation. The lack of financing (sometimes due to 
structural difficulties in relation to staffing, time, non-profit status but also inadequate or 
complete lack of governmental financing) mean that they also often heavily rely on securing 
corporate sponsorship to carry out their activities and implement projects (interview no.11). It is 
perhaps for these organisational and structural restraints that they generally represent low-levels 
of politicisation. While this can present a serious challenge with respect to interest promotion 
and voicing demands, the organisations that have been chosen here have nonetheless engaged 
in the political debate on identity and/or expressed concern over immigration-related issues that 
are relevant for this research.  
 
5.3. Nationalist responses 
 
 Given the pervasiveness of the ‘Cyprus problem’ in public and political discourse and the 
profound impact of ‘conflicting-nationalisms’ (see Chapter 2) in defining identities in relation to 
the conflict, it is perhaps not surprising that a number of organisations do exist on each side of 
the island who subscribe to nationalist rhetoric. As Demetriou and Gurel (2008), in their 
comparative study of the Cypriot civil society have noted, these actors can be categorised as 
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‘nationalist’ in a dual sense: in conceiving identity in ethno-national terms whilst articulating a 
narrative of victimhood in relation to the ‘Cyprus Problem’ and the respective community in 
order to securitize that particular conception in an essentialist perspective. In the north, these 
groups represent the strongest nationalist factions who tend to regard Greek-Cypriots as the 
‘bastions of Hellenism’ thus the historic arch-enemy of the ‘greater Turkish nation’. In this vein, 
the Greek-Cypriot community is framed as the ‘sole culprit’ of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ which 
continues to pose an existential threat to the Turkish-Cypriot community by maintaining their 
national goal of enosis; to ‘add insult to injury’ for these groups, the Greek-Cypriot community 
and the Republic of Cyprus they control is ‘unjustly’ recognised as the sole legal authority by the 
international community. Similar to the situation in the south, the various ‘fighters’ associations’ 
which represent those who took part in the inter-communal fighting (1956-1963-1974) endorse 
this nationalist perspective. In the north, these organisations also favour pursuing ever-closer 
relations with Turkey and promote a positive view in relation to the immigration-settlement of 
Turkish nationals on the island.  
 
 One such nationalist organisation is the ‘Association of Martyrs’ Families and Disabled 
Veterans’ (Şehit Aileleri ve Malul Gaziler Derneği, the ‘Veterans’ Association’ hereinafter).  The 
association was established in 1975 and self-reports to have over four-thousand members (Şehit 
Aileleri, 2016a). It is also remarkably active in organising several high-profile commemorations, 
celebration and festivities throughout the year as well as publishing material about the 
‘atrocities’ committed against Turkish-Cypriots by the Greek-Cypriot paramilitary organisations 
prior to 1974 (Şehit Aileleri, 2016b). It is a well-known fact that the association in the past was 
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closely allied to the politics of Rauf Denktash and continues to support the nationalist politics of 
the Turkish-Cypriot right, represented by the ‘Nationalist Unity Party’ (UBP) and to a lesser 
extent, by the ‘Democratic Party’ (see section 4.2 in Chapter 4). In a similar vein, it has, over the 
years, forged closer relations with the shady ‘Grey Wolves’ (or the Ülkü Ocakları Derneği), an 
extreme nationalist group who was suspected of organising intimidation campaigns toward 
Turkish-Cypriots during the ‘Annan Peace Process’ (Bryant,2010: 120). 
 
 As indicated above, a central feature of the nationalist discourse which the ‘Veterans’ 
Association’ subscribes to is the representation of Greek-Cypriots as the ‘aggressors’. In the 
association’s narrative, it was the Greek-Cypriot side who ‘destroyed’ in December 1963 the 
bicommunal Republic and ‘ejected the Turkish-Cypriot community by force of arms from the 
partnership government’ (cited in Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2005). From then on, 
Turkish-Cypriots were subjected to a violent campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’ which, according to 
the Association, amounted to no less than ‘genocide’ (Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
2005). The rhetoric adopted by the Association also continues to utilise an ‘ever-present threat 
of attack’ from Greek-Cypriots, ‘who have always been the attacking side’, which the Turkish 
army currently protects Turkish-Cypriots against. While the Association made a reference to the 
notion of a ‘negotiated solution’ and opted for a less-hostile tone toward the EU, its emphasis 
remained on the restoring of the rights of the ‘Turkish Cypriot people’ that had been ‘violated’ 
and to end the ‘inhuman embargoes’ (Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2005). Moreover, 
these ‘human rights’ claims are made in reference to Turkish-Cypriot statehood (the TRNC), 
which serves to antagonise the Greek side and maintain the perpetuation of the conflict. Perhaps 
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more remarkably, the same, insular ‘human-rights discourse’ is extended onto the 
representation of ‘Turkish settlers’ and immigration from Turkey: 
Turkish migrants came to the North because manpower was needed. They started a new life in 
Cyprus, had children and grandchildren who know nowhere else but Cyprus as home. Majority of 
these people have been living in Cyprus for over twenty or thirty years. Don't they have the same 
right as all other migrants who have become and are accepted as the citizens of the countries 
they settled in after 5-10 years in Europe? Does [sic] human rights and freedoms ask for their 
punishment simply because they settled in a conflict island? We don't think so and hope that the 
EU will not allow Greek Cypriots to cause new problems in pursuit of their unjust demands (Select 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2005). 
 
 The ‘TMT Fighters Association’ (Kıbrıs TMT Mücahitler Derneği, the ‘Fighter’s Association 
hereinafter)144 is yet another Turkish-Cypriot civil society actor who has fiercely promoted a 
nationalist understanding of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ and an unabashedly primordialist vision of 
‘Turkish-Cypriotness’ in which the latter is subsumed under a Turkish national identity with 
Ankara as its national centre. For its part, the organisation has not refrained in the past from 
branding those on the left and in favour of reconciliation (such as those who organised under the 
‘This Country is ours’ Platform, see below) as ‘traitors’. Indeed, in the run up to the UN-sponsored 
referendum, the ‘Fighters’ Association’ played a critical role in organising the ‘no’ camp within 
the Turkish-Cypriot community to oppose the purported ‘ploy against Turkey and the TRNC with 
the help of the EU dream’ and to ensure that ‘TRNC’ would ‘live forever as part of the honourable 
Turkish world with the help of the power and inspiration it draws from the Ataturkist [sic.] 
thought’ (Cyprus PIO, 2001). Over the years, the organisation has not deviated from its 
nationalist-line despite occasional reference to a ‘long-lasting’ and ‘just’ solution’; as it declared 
                                                          
144 Essentially a veterans’ league of all those who were members of the TMT and supporters of the ‘liberation 
struggle’, the Cyprus TMT Association was established in 2012 with the merger of the earlier ‘TMT Association’ 
(TMT Mücahitler Derneği) and the ‘Turkish-Cypriot Fighters’ Association’ (Kıbrıs Türk Mücahitler Derneği). 
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more recently: ‘We trusted them [Greek-Cypriots] in 1960 and we were deceived, we trusted 
them again in 2004 and yet again we were deceived. Let’s not be deceived for another time. Let’s 
focus altogether to a realistic solution which is based on our sovereign state’ (Cyprus PIO, 2014).  
  
More recently, the organisation has also taken a more vocal stance on the issues of 
immigration or the naturalisation of Turkish settlers. The two issues are considered within an 
explicitly nationalist framework characterised by the ‘much-cherished’ Turkish-Cypriot 
relationship with Turkey and on the basis of ethnic kinship. Accordingly, the Association has 
fiercely criticised the recent attempts of the CTP-DP coalition government to introduce stricter 
requirements for the acquisition of citizenship for Turkish immigrants (see section 3.5 in Chapter 
3) claiming the latter to be issues of humanitarian nature and with significant repercussions for 
the Turkish-Cypriot economy (Kıbrıs Postası, 2013k). In itself, this would be a progressive position 
from a human rights perspective. Yet in couching this in a wider frame of bilateral relations with 
Turkey and claiming the necessary continuity of Turkish tutelage and protection for Turkish-
Cypriot survival and for a stronger position on the negotiating table vis-à-vis Greek-Cypriots 
numerically, it ends up offering an insular interpretation of human rights, primarily aimed at 
promoting Turkish-Cypriot interests. In this sense, the citizenship rights of the Turkish immigrants 
are justified on the basis of ethnic-kinship, level of contribution to the economy, their importance 
to bilateral relations with Turkey and on the merit of their numerical strength in ‘boosting the 
numbers’ to maintain a stronger position in securing gains regarding future consociational 




In conclusion, it could be said that the major characteristic of the discourse subscribed 
and dispersed by the nationalist civil society actors is that it promotes an overwhelmingly 
ethnocentric understanding of immigration which submerges the presence of Turkish nationals 
with insular interpretations of human rights to fit within the prevailing narrative on the ‘Cyprus 
Problem’. This finding is further elaborated in Chapter 7. 
 
5.4. ‘This Country is Ours’: Trade unions and the immigration-settlement debate 
 
Trade unions145 are among the eldest and most influential civil-society associations in 
northern Cyprus. This is even more remarkable considering their ideological positioning to the 
left of the political spectrum together with a consistently moderate profile with relation to the 
‘Cyprus Problem’ and also the fact that, for years, they were overpowered by the nationalist 
regime. The ‘Turkish Cypriot Teachers’ Union’ (KTÖS, Kıbrıs Türk Öğretmentler Sendikası) is one 
of the oldest and most-organised and it was among the first to declare its support for a federation 
before the partition of the island in 1974 (KTÖS, 1971). Likewise, it has also been highly-critical of 
what it sees as the extensive interference of the Turkey in Turkish-Cypriot affairs (KTÖS, 2013).  
As such, the union, in the past, had an uneasy relationship with the political leadership and faced 
fierce responses to its alleged ‘communist’ agenda including libel charges and imprisonment of 
its leadership.146  
                                                          
145 Both KTÖS and KTAMS selected for investigation are public sector unions; private sector unionisation (though 
recognised by the constitution) is negligible, at around 0.5 percent of the total working population (Yenidüzen, 
2015) The state, on the other hand, continues to be the biggest employer with public sector employment stood at 
around 30 percent Guven-Lisaniler, F. and Ugural, S. (2010).  
146 For a detailed account, see former union leader Arif H. Tahsin’s interview with HaberKıbrıs (2011) and his 




 Significantly, the union was also among the few in the immediate aftermath of the 
partition to criticise immigration from Turkey, framing the naturalisation of Turkish nationals as 
the consolidation of Turkish control over the community. As the union’s 1988 declaration put it: 
‘it is now common-knowledge that the political will of the Turkish-Cypriot community has been 
impaired with the arrival of those imported vote[r]s since 1976’ (KTÖS, 1988). This view falls 
squarely with the ‘fifth column’ thesis which suggests a ‘settler constituency’ acting as a voting 
bloc in line with the Turkish national interests to ensure electoral success for those candidates 
supported by Turkey. In an identitarian vein, the Teachers’ Union has also seen the presence of 
large numbers of Turkish immigrants/settlers as a form of cultural assimilation which puts the 
distinct identity of the Turkish-Cypriot community at perpetual risk (see below).  
 
 Another trade union, the KTAMS (Kıbrıs Türk Amme Memurları Sendikası, or the ‘Turkish-
Cypriot Public Servants’ Union’) also promotes similar views. From its founding in 1973, the 
Union, together with its counterpart KTÖS, has mounted fierce opposition with a particular focus 
on workers’ rights that are said to be under systemic attack in the shape of bilateral protocols 
the Turkish-Cypriot authorities have signed with Turkey over the years in order to acquire much-
needed financing. In this sense, the Union, representing a significant fraction of the largest social 
group in northern Cyprus has stood firmly opposed to what it considers as ‘austerity policies’ that 
would by design impoverish the Turkish-Cypriot community and escalate their outward migration 




 In parallel to the decision of the European Union to begin accession negotiations with 
Cyprus in the 1990s and the reaction to that decision on the Turkish-Cypriot side to pursue ever-
closer ‘integration’ with Turkey, these influential organisations would become more vocal in their 
criticism of the Turkish/Turkish-Cypriot leadership and the integrationist policies that, the Unions 
argued, would seriously harm Turkish-Cypriot interests (Yenidüzen, 1997a). Indeed, the Teachers’ 
Union argued earlier that following a path of integration with Turkey in reality meant ‘[…] loss of 
all hard-earned [labour rights] creating a ‘free for all’ country by removing passport procedures 
for travel from Turkey […] crippling trade unionism through illegal workers [and] estrangement 
of the Turkish Cypriot community and their emigration from Cyprus’ (Cyprus PIO, 1996). 
 
 Significantly, it was such efforts of the trade unions in early 2000s to oppose integrationist 
policies in general and the implementation of austerity measures tabled by Ankara, in particular, 
that truly placed them at the forefront of an unprecedented societal upheaval. And the financial 
meltdown and the diplomatic crisis which ensued in parallel (see section 4.4 in Chapter 4) was to 
prove conducive for the anti-systemic discourse to be voiced louder than ever, now organised 
under the ‘This Country is ours’ platform. The project was largely led by the KTÖS and the KTAMS 
and included under its roof a wide range of NGOs and two left parties, the ‘Republican Turkish 
Party’ (CTP) and the ‘Patriotic Unity Movement’ (YBH).  
 
 Initially, the platform’s discourse was marked by its emphasis on the worsening economic 
situation in the north and on bilateral relations with Turkey which was articulated in relation to 
Turkish-Cypriot autonomy. As such, it attacked the ‘reform package’ tabled by the Turkish 
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government as part of the ‘Financial Protocol’ signed with the Turkish-Cypriot authorities (it was 
dubbed the ‘economic destruction package’) and called for total autonomy from Turkey on 
domestic matters including political and economic issues as well as the separation of the police 
from military control [headed by a Turkish General] and the transfer of its command to civilian 
Turkish-Cypriot authorities (The Economist, 2000a).  At the same time, it was also characterised 
by a distinct anti-Turkish rhetoric which framed Turkish-Cypriot identity in existential terms, 
threatened by assimilationist policies which Turkey and its allies in northern Cyprus had tried 
putting in place. In a particularly fiery statement, indirectly addressed to the late Turkish-Cypriot 
leader Denktash also known for his notoriously nationalist views on identity and Turkishness, the 
Platform would declare that: 
The One who sits at the [Presidential] Palace is claiming that there is no such thing as a distinct 
Cypriot culture. He wants us to dance [to Turkish folkloric songs] and eat ‘Lahmacun’147 Let us all 
speak in one voice and let the Palace know: ‘We are Cypriots […] we have a distinct culture and 
people of this country have the right to govern themselves […] Above all, this country is ours 
(Yenidüzen, 2003a). 
 
 In the months ahead, such fiery rhetoric was largely maintained and the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership came under daily attack from the oppositional civil society actors on the worsening 
economic situation. As pointed earlier however, the resolution of the Cyprus problem together 
with the integration of the Turkish-Cypriot community into the EU became, for a brief period of 
time, the focal aspect of the anti-establishment discourse and earlier references to immigration 
were temporarily muted not only in party political discourse (Chapter 4) but also in oppositional 
civil society rhetoric; the clear benefits emanating from Cyprus’s imminent EU membership 
coupled with the coming to the power of the AKP government in Turkey in 2002 which had 
                                                          
147 A popular Turkish/Middle-eastern flatbread 
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indicated a shift in favour of a moderate policy toward a solution can explain this change at the 
discursive level.  
 
 The controversy over the large-scale granting of citizenship rights to Turkish immigrants 
nonetheless, which blew up in late 2003 would reignite the issue and place it under the spotlight 
once again. Following the legal ‘citizenship-stripping’ court battles that was launched by the 
opposition parties (see section 4.4 in Chapter 4), this period also saw the civil society platform 
staging a general strike and several mass rallies to protest the new citizenships granted on the 
eve of the much-anticipated legislative elections. In a statement, the platform described the 
naturalisations as ‘illegal’ and the move by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities to fast-track citizenship 
applications was condemned as an ‘obstruction of the reflections of the people’s will in the ballot’ 
(Cyprus News Agency, 2003).  
 
 The aftermath of the aborted reunification and the accession of the still-divided island 
into the EU in 2004 would see a further reconfiguration of the oppositional Cypriotness discourse 
in which the prominence of EU as the key signifier of popular demands diminished and the trade 
union narratives were organised once again around the issues of immigration and the citizenship 
status of Turkish nationals. The key issue which facilitated the discursive shift was the new set of 
‘austerity’ measures tabled by Ankara in early 2008. The KTAMS and the Teachers’ Union 
opposed the proposals from the outset and claimed that they presented a mere pretext to 
facilitate the outflow of Turkish-Cypriots from Cyprus, hence dubbing it the ‘emigration law’. In 
this sense, such austerity measures were articulated together with prevalent fears related to 
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losing of Turkish-Cypriot identity. In other words, the austerity measures, for the unions 
represented a threat to Turkish-Cypriot autonomy by further consolidating Ankara’s control in its 
domestic affairs through systematic impoverishment of their community (interview no.9). To this 
end, ‘Communal Survival’ rallies were organised by the KTÖS, KTAMS and others between 2010 
and 2012 which saw thousands of Turkish-Cypriots taking to the streets to reassert their Turkish-
Cypriot identity, protest against Turkish-imposed austerity measures and tell Ankara to keep its 
‘hands-off the Turkish-Cypriot community’.  
 
 A securitised notion of citizenship and the framing of the ongoing naturalisation of Turkish 
immigrants as a threat to the autonomy of the Turkish-Cypriot community also continued to 
feature heavily within this reinvented anti-austerity discourse. In this sense, the twin issues of 
immigration and citizenship are framed as a calculated Turkish policy of hegemony toward the 
Turkish-Cypriot community through the assimilation of its distinct cultural, religious and linguistic 
character that make up its authentic identity (interview no. 9 and no. 10). From this perspective, 
the immigration and citizenship policies Turkish-Cypriot authorities pursue in northern Cyprus 
are dictated by Turkey to maintain a ‘truly Turkish’ and recently a ‘more Muslim’ population to 
consolidate its control and hegemony in a strategically important territory (interview no.9). It is 
nonetheless important to note that other immigration-related issues are viewed in distinction to 
this and within a pluralist and inclusive human rights framework (interview no.10). This is 
especially evident in the education policy of the teacher’s union, KTÖS, which calls for a 
multicultural approach to address cultural diversity at schools and ensure the successful 
orientation of immigrant pupils (interview no.9). To that end, the union has promoted a rather 
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important distinction between a ‘state crime’ (regarding Turkish policy towards northern Cyprus) 
and the individual human rights, at least in rhetoric. 
 
 A clear continuity also emerges in the ways in which the ‘Public Servants’ Union’ (KTAMS) 
has conceived of the twin issues of immigration from Turkey and the citizenship status of Turkish 
settlers. Though the union has not campaigned on these issues directly until the early 2000s, it 
has since then consistently opposed the large-scale naturalisation of Turkish immigrants as a 
form of ‘demographic erosion’ and the usurpation of the Turkish-Cypriot political will through 
the manipulation of the electorate. For KTAMS too, such worrying changes have accelerated 
since 2009 with the change in Turkish-Cypriot leadership and the replacement of moderate 
Mehmet Ali Talat with the right-wing Derviş Eroğlu (interview no.10). Similar to that of the 
‘Teacher’s Union’, the KTAMS’ discourse also pointed out to a calculated Turkish policy of 
hegemony toward the Turkish-Cypriot community and direct inference with the ‘distinct ways of 
living’ that make up its cultural identity (interview no.10). The important repercussions of a 
blanket framing of Turkish immigrants or naturalised Turkish-Cypriots as mere ‘tools’ of a 
hegemonic project and subsequent ‘demonization’ of Turkish immigrants/settlers is emphasised 
even more by the KTAMS who has claimed that such discourse has led to ethnic discrimination 
but also a ‘two-way segregation’ in recent years (interview no.10). The labour union has 
nonetheless continued to stand opposed to large-scale naturalisations especially ahead of 
elections which it considers a form of manipulation directed by Turkey to maintain its control on 




5.5. Immigrant Civil Society Organisations 
 
 Immigrant civil society organisations (ICSOs) play an important role in the preservation of 
ethno-cultural identity and in mobilising support over issues of concern in relation to the welfare 
and the settlement processes of their members. The most common and generalised aims 
pursued by such associations are to achieve concrete integration policies (most notably, attaining 
citizenship rights for the immigrant populations) and recognition of the specific needs (linguistic, 
religious, etc.) of their group. In this sense, these organisations are instrumental in the 
construction of identity narratives which distinguish the immigrants from the host society whist 
also mirroring the perceptions of the latter often as a rallying point for collective action.  
 
 Though a relatively recent feature of the Turkish-Cypriot civil society, proliferating 
particularly in the post-referendum period, numerous ICSOs now operate in northern Cyprus. 
The rapid growth of these groups both in size and in scope during the last ten years and their 
activism is, to a large extent, due to the growth of the immigrant/settler population along with 
the further politicisation of immigration and citizenship policies that has ushered in tighter 
naturalisation procedures. Ever-growing antagonism moreover, and lack of substantive steps to 
alleviate long-standing concerns of certain immigrant groups also serve as a motivation for the 
organisations representing immigrants to turn to political lobbying. At the same time, recent 
years have also seen immigrant associations forming or indeed consolidating their ties with 
established Turkish-Cypriot actors (political parties and other civil-societal bodies) to represent 
and promote their interests (see below).  
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 One such immigrant/settler association which has engaged in lobbying governments in 
conjunction with others, to demand legal recognition for its congregation and improved religious 
freedoms is the ‘Pir Sultan Abdal Association’ (Kıbrıs Pir Sultan Abdal Derneği), which represents 
the several-thousand strong Alevi community in northern Cyprus.148 A central grievance of the 
Alevis is the lack of a suitable place of worship or a Cemevi (Alevi house of worship). As Dayıoğlu 
has recently pointed out, while the Turkish Embassy’s ‘Aid Committee’ (yardım kurulu) provides 
significant financial aid for the construction of Sunni mosques, no funds are provided to Alevis 
for the construction of a Cemevi because they are not officially recognised as a religious 
community (Dayıoğlu, 2014). To address these grievances, in 2006 the CTP-ORP coalition 
government allocated land to the Alevi community to build a Cemevi. While the building work on 
the allocated plot for a Cemevi began the same year, the Alevi community has since argued that 
the right-wing ‘National Unity Party’ which came to power in 2009 stopped financing the 
project.149 As a result, the Alevi community has tried to raise the funds needed for the 
construction of the Cemevi through donations or proceeds from various social events (interview 
no.11). Representatives from the Alevi community, moreover, lamented that ‘state’ funding was 
spent exclusively on building mosques and that the Turkish-Cypriot authorities dragged their feet 
on the Cemevi project to avoid antagonising the AKP government in Ankara which is affiliated 
                                                          
148 Alevis are a non-Sunni religious/cultural group who follow the teachings of the Alevi saint and sufi Master, 
Bektasi Veli; according to US Department of State’s ‘Religious Freedom Report’ for 2013, an estimated 10,000 
immigrant workers and 8,000 settlers from Turkey of Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab origin are Alevis. (US DoS, 2013) 
149 Ankara’s policy toward its own Kurdish population is an important factor which has shaped the attitudes of 
successive Turkish-Cypriot governments toward the Alevis in northern Cyprus. With the relative improvement of 
the situation in Turkey in mid-2000s as part of Turkey’s EU membership bid (some recognition of cultural rights 
such as broadcasting in Kurdish) has allowed the Turkish-Cypriot authorities greater flexibility and increased 
interaction with the Alevi community. The ceasefire which was declared between the Turkish forces and the PKK in 
2013 was also met with great enthusiasm in Cyprus symbolised with the nationalist UBP government taking part in 
the traditional Newroz celebrations for the first time. Ankara’s reluctance, however, to take substantial steps on 
the issue has translated to tentative progress in Nicosia.  
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with the Hanafi-Sunni doctrine of Islam (interview no.11). Alevis, together with leftist political 
parties and other associations including the ‘Teachers’ Union’, have also stood firmly against the 
state sponsored summer religious courses (including Qur’an lessons) that were put in practice in 
2009. For the Alevis and others, such classes perpetuate the Hanafi-Sunni doctrine of Islam and 
violate the principle of laicism (Kıbrıs Postası, 2011).  In a similar vein, the same associations also 
opposed the opening in 2013 of the ‘Hala Sultan Divinity College’ (Hala Sultan Ilahiyat Koleji), 
arguing that pressure from the AKP in Turkey was behind the project and that it was an explicit 
attack on the distinct Turkish-Cypriot secularism and part of systematic attempts to replace it 
with a more religious community. In this sense, the Alevi discourse on identity shows a 
remarkable convergence in interests and rhetoric particularly in relation to Turkey but also on 
other features of the oppositional Turkish-Cypriot narratives which often antagonise 
immigration, as discussed above.  With such interactions taking place and the influence of the 
‘context’ in negotiating identity strategies, organisations such as the ‘Pir Sultan Association’ may 
indeed be considered a ‘third-space’ of belonging (Bhabha, 1994) that represents hyphenated-
identities, articulating in this case an Alevi-Cypriot amalgamation.  
 
 Other cases of convergence or borrowing of discursive components can also be seen 
across different immigrant associations. A particularly telling example is provided by the 
comments of an association leader shortly after the first ‘Communal Survival Rally’ which had 
been organised by several trade unions including the Teachers’ Union and the KTAMS in January 
2011.  In the words of the leader of the ‘Öz Hataylılar Association’, representing immigrants and 
settlers from the Turkish region of Hatay, the underlying reason for the Turkish-Cypriot hostility 
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towards new naturalisations in particular and towards the Turkish immigrants in general, is the 
lax immigration regime:  
Anyone can enter TRNC using a [Turkish] id card and without being subjected to any checks […]  
This then leads to all those unemployed people and ex-convicts piling up here […] The real losers 
of course are those who’ve been living here for the past ten-twenty years, those who’ve never 
committed a single crime in their lives and meet the conditions of citizenship but can’t obtain one 
because of this piling-up […] Past governments have also made the situation worse by granting 
citizenship status only to those who’d vote for them in the elections instead of the ones who really 
deserve it (Açık Gazete, 2011). 
 
 The spokesperson for the immigrant association also lamented of the enormous strain 
placed on social and welfare services including health and education as a result of uncontrolled 
immigration from Turkey. More specifically, he claimed that the infrastructure for such services 
was already ‘beyond stretch’ and that the financial support Turkish-Cypriot authorities received 
from Turkey was ‘barely enough to cover the needs of the native population’ was not sufficient 
to address the needs of the Turkish immigrants (Açık Gazete, 2011). 
 
 Such views, however, are by no means universal. In fact, the discourse promoted by 
another group, namely the ‘TRNC Hataylılar Culture and Solidarity Association’ (Kıbrıs Türk  Hatay 
Kültür Dayanışma Derneği150) which also claims to represent those immigrants and settlers from 
Hatay, displays a stark contrast to those views ascribed above with a defensive, nationalist 
narrative that has received significant public/media attention over the years. More recently, the 
tighter citizenship provisions introduced by the CTP government in 2013 (see section 4.5 in 
                                                          
150 The ‘TRNC Hataylılar Association’ (KKTC Hataylılar Derneği), was first set up in 2002 and renamed in 2014 after 
bringing under its roof two sister organisations, ‘Reyhanlılar Culture and Solidarity Association’ (Reyhanlılar Kültür 
ve Dayanışma Derneği) and Hataylılar Culture and Solidarity Association (Hataylılar Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği). 
It currently boosts 8,000 members mainly immigrants and naturalised Turkish nationals from the region of Hatay. 
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Chapter 4) have been key in providing the strong imagery for the association to describe the new 
policy as ‘arbitrary’ but also ‘a grave injustice’ which ‘amounts to a blanket refusal of extending 
citizenship status to Turkish immigrants’ (Milliyet, 2013). The association also argued that the 
decision of the government to reform its citizenship policy was part of a sinister plot to 
discriminate but also antagonise Turkish immigrants (Milliyet, 2013). During this time, the 
association organised a series of high-profile protests which were reported widely in the media 
together with a number of fiery statements threatening to pursue legal action against the 
government’s alleged blanket suspension of all citizenship applications (Kıbrıs Postası; 2013k). In 
discursive terms, the association’s rhetoric on the citizenship rights of Turkish nationals 
perpetuates a certain victimisation of Turkish immigrants by framing tighter citizenship 
provisions as an ‘ideologically motivated denial’ of ‘just’ and ‘democratic demands’ and with 
reference to ‘human rights’ (Kıbrıs Postası, 2013k). The diversification of the association in form 
and aims from other ICSOs is emphasised even more in its narrative of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ 
which reveals an unmistakable nationalist image based on primordial Turkishness and 
distinguishes it from other Immigrant associations that have generally maintained rather low-
profiles on this particular issue (Kıbrıs Postası, 2013i). 
 
5.6. Radical Perspectives 
 
 As outlined above, an important feature of the Turkish-Cypriot civil society in the post 
‘Annan Plan’ period has been the emergence of a number of radical civil society actors. Such civil 
society actors have since been able to take advantage of the opening-up of the political space to 
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organise more effectively and articulate a radical social agenda inspired by a wide range of 
ideologies and critical perspectives such as the New Left, Marxism, Feminism, Environmentalism 
and LGBTQ activism. In northern Cyprus, however, the focus of such civil society actors have not 
yet been able to construct (the much-anticipated) holistic discourse, which has meant that their 
concern with issues of immigration and the citizenship rights of Turkish immigrants in particular 
vary greatly both in form and scope across different organisations. 
 
Two such notable organisations which have, nonetheless, focused extensively on Turkish 
immigrants is the Baraka and the Feminist Atelier (FEMA hereinafter). Set up in 2003, Baraka is 
primarily concerned with the exploitation of the immigration issue from a Marxist perspective. 
Baraka is diametrically opposed to the discourse employed by the Turkish nationalists and critical 
of the traditional oppositional discourses promoted by the mainstream left (that of the CTP in 
particular, see below). From this perspective, the presence of Turkish immigrants in northern 
Cyprus is framed in terms of a systematic attempt by Turkey to assimilate or ‘Turkify’ the Turkish-
Cypriot community through demographic manipulation (interview no.12). In this vein, the 
association has fervently criticised the lax immigration regime which it claims has facilitated the 
large influx of Turkish immigrants into northern Cyprus since the partition of the island in 1974 
(interview no.12). More cynically, Baraka also points out that the recent attempts by the CTP 
governments (2005-09 and 2013) in particular to regularise unauthorised workers through the 
issuing of work permits is an extension of the systematic ‘population transfer’ which paves the 
way for the regularised newcomers to qualify for citizenship later on (interview no. 12).  
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 At the same time, transcending the immigrant-native dichotomy that is central to ethno-
nationalist discourses, Baraka has argued that the interaction between the two groups over the 
years amalgamated a new Turkish-Cypriot identity that now presents an opportunity to galvanise 
into a common, revolutionary struggle against the assimilationist policies of Turkey but also the 
‘xenophobia’ that is fuelled by the ‘traditional left’ (Şahin, 2014). For Baraka, the anti-
assimilationist discourse of the ‘traditional left’, represented by the leftist parties such as the 
CTP, the YKP but also the BKP, promote exclusivist, ethno-nationalist understandings of 
Cypriotness and ‘assimilation’ which in return, demonises Turkish immigrants/settlers. Such 
‘animosity’, for the Association is counter-productive for the anti-assimilationist struggle since it 
alienates these groups who are then forced to seek support from the right which is represented 
as the pawn which furthers Turkish assimilationist plans (Şahin, 2014: 223). From this 
perspective, moreover, reaching out and forming alliances with Turkish immigrants/settlers is 
essential for the “revolutionary class struggle” to oppose Turkish hegemony and foster an 
inclusive notion of Cypriotness that could then reunify the island in order to stage ‘a common 
struggle against imperialism’ (Şahin, 2014: 227). 
    
 From a radical feminist perspective, FEMA promotes the view that such phenomena of 
peace, conflict or indeed immigration are all gendered. FEMA’s discourse on identity is equally 
centred on a critical view of the recent history of Cyprus’s relations with Turkey (Derya: 2009a, 
2009b; FEMA, 2011). It thus promotes ideas of reconciliation which includes acknowledging 
aspects of the other community’s positions as legitimate, as for example the fact that human 
rights violations had been perpetrated by both sides during the inter-communal violence (FEMA, 
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2014). Indeed, the group recently made the headlines when one of its founding members (also 
an MP), Doğus Derya, asserted during a speech at the Turkish-Cypriot Parliament that many 
Greek-Cypriot women were (also) raped by the Turkish army in 1974 (Cyprus Mail, 2014). Perhaps 
more remarkably, the feminist group which describes itself as ‘anti-capitalist’, ‘anti-militarist’ and 
‘anti-racist’ has played an important role in articulating a number of grievances experienced by 
Turkish immigrants and women in particular (workers’ rights, welfare entitlements, domestic 
violence, etc.) which often go unnoticed within the hegemonic patriarchal system that 
perpetuates the nationalist and xenophobic frames. In this respect, FEMA has highlighted the 
class-based xenophobia which accentuates cultural differences displayed by Turkish immigrants 
to marginalise and demonise the latter (Türkoğlu, 2012). It is important to note, however, that 
while FEMA distinctly avoids engaging in a discourse of ‘demographic manipulation’, it has not 
been concerned with the citizenship issue either; this is an important omission which obscures 
as much as it distinguishes FEMA’s position from other oppositional civil-society actors’ who have 
used securitised frames to articulate the naturalisation of Turkish immigrants. 
 
5.7. Evaluating civil society narratives 
 
 As discussed in detail in the previous chapters and outlined further above, the aftermath 
of the Turkish military intervention in 1974 saw the further consolidation of the hegemonic 
Turkishness discourse now signifying a new perception of order and security based on statehood 
as well as an overarching belonging to the Turkish nation. Turkish-Cypriot identity was effectively 
subsumed under this representation as a form of ethnic/local variation. The various ‘fighters’ 
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associations’ which currently represent those who fought against the Greek-Cypriots when the 
intercommunal fighting broke in 1963 and again in 1974 have invariably defended this 
conceptualisation of identity as being an ‘indivisible part of the larger Turkish nation’. In this 
sense, these associations consider the presence of Turkish immigrants and their citizenship status 
within an explicitly nationalist framework characterised by a much-cherished Turkish-Cypriot 
relationship with Turkey and on the basis of ethnic-kinship. In a more remarkable vein, recent 
attempts to introduce stricter requirements for the acquisition of citizenship for Turkish 
immigrants are further criticised as breaching of immigrants’ human rights and with negative 
repercussions for the economy. Though the latter framing of immigrants’ citizenship status may 
seem a progressive position from a human rights perspective, the study has shown that such 
reference to human rights are couched in a distinctly ethno-nationalist framing of the Turkish-
Cypriot relationship with Turkey which favours continuity of Turkish tutelage for Turkish-Cypriot 
survival. In this sense, the citizenship rights of the Turkish immigrants are justified on the basis 
of ethnic-kinship, level of contribution to the economy, their importance to bilateral relations 
with Turkey but also on the merit of their contribution in boosting the Turkish-Cypriot population 
numerically to maintain a stronger position in relation to the Greek-Cypriot community. As such, 
they are devoid of any democratic concerns.  
  
This is an important finding since it highlights the deployment and articulation of a range 
of civic and ethnic elements within the hegemonic Turkishness discourse. From this perspective, 
the nationalist civil-society narrative can indeed be regarded as an extension of a hegemonic 
struggle in constructing and consolidating a form of identity by articulating as many available 
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elements (i.e. ‘floating signifiers’, such as the economy and ‘human rights’, see Chapter 2) as 
possible. This assertion is also in line with the hypothesis posited in Chapter 2 and elaborated 
within the historical context in Chapter 3 that:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Given the local history and in the context of the Cyprus conflict, Turkish-Cypriot 
identity was cultivated and subsumed within a hegemonic notion of Turkishness that did not 
distinguish between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish settlers.  
 
 As the conceptual discussion in Chapter 2 noted earlier, the discourse-analytical 
framework on identity is premised on the ultimate impossibility of a total closure’ that makes a 
range of articulatory practices and political agency possible. This is further predicated on a social 
field criss-crossed by antagonisms, and the presence of elements (‘floating signifiers’) that can 
be instrumentalised by opposed political projects in the construction and articulation of political 
identities. Indeed, it was precisely within this context that the Turkish-Cypriot left capitalised on 
the ‘settlers’ cleavage from the 1980s onwards to challenge the hegemonic Turkishness discourse 
with an alternative notion of belonging which emphasised a distinct ‘Cypriot’ character. The 
Cypriotness discourse was constructed against a ‘threat’ that conceived immigration-settlement 
from mainland Turkey as part of Ankara’s assimilationist project to ultimately undermine the 
distinct Turkish-Cypriot identity and the community’s autonomy. 
 
In this respect, the leftist trade unions such as the KTAMS and the Teachers’ Union 
(together with the opposition political parties, see Chapter 4) explicitly linked immigration from 
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Turkey and granting of citizenship rights to Turkish immigrants onto the issues of identity, societal 
security and political autonomy. In this vein, immigration from Turkey was criticised for 
instigating the outflow of Turkish-Cypriots onto other countries and that the lax immigration 
regime facilitated the ‘transfer of population’ from mainland Turkey would, in the long-term, 
undermine Turkish-Cypriot autonomy but also endanger the distinct Turkish-Cypriot identity 
through ‘demographic manipulation’. Such ‘speech-acts’ (Buzan and Wæver, 1998) employed by 
the trade unions constructed a securitised discourse in which the presence of populations from 
Turkey were treated as an existential threat to the presumed ‘authority’, ‘authenticity’ and ‘ways 
of living’ of the Turkish-Cypriot society. Within this discourse, moreover, Turkish settlers were 
seen as a homogenous constituency that invariably supported the nationalist status quo and the 
Turkish tutelage over Turkish-Cypriot affairs. These claims were also articulated with an appeal 
to autonomy and a political project that would safeguard it.  
 
Significantly, such demands were at the heart of the anti-systemic discourse which the 
trade unions, now organised under the ‘This Country is Ours’ platform, promoted from the late 
1990s onwards. In this connection, the platform overwhelmingly supported EU membership for 
Turkish-Cypriots in the run up to the referendum in 2004 that would allow a reunified, federal 
Cyprus to join the EU (see also section 4.2 in Chapter 4). The economic benefits from EU 
membership were articulated together with the worrisome, numerical decline of the Turkish-
Cypriot community with large numbers emigrating elsewhere for better employment prospects. 
But above all, such integration meant an endorsement of the Turkish-Cypriot community 
internationally and a recognition of its well-defined identity.   
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 While the pro-EU rhetoric would, to a large extent, overshadow the settler-related issues 
in the run up to the 2004 referendum as it became the focal point of identity narratives, the 
granting of ‘fresh citizenships’ by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities on the eve of Cyprus accession 
into the EU would once again put the issue under spotlight with the ‘This Country is Ours 
Platform’ and the trade unions within it organising strikes and public rallies in fear that Turkish 
settlers who had been given citizenship by the UBP-DP coalition government would oppose the 
‘Annan Plan’ and torpedo Turkish-Cypriot prospects of joining the EU (see section 4.3 in Chapter 
4). In sum, these findings confirm the hypothesis posited in Chapter 2 that:  
 
Hypothesis 2: In the context of Cyprus’s accession into the EU and the anticipated Turkish-Cypriot 
integration into the European mainstream, Turkish settlers came to be perceived as a threat to 
Turkish-Cypriot identity. 
 
The impact of the EU in seemingly transforming oppositional identity narratives began to 
decrease, however, once Cyprus was admitted to the EU as a divided island. The peculiar and 
rather ‘marginal’ positioning of the Turkish-Cypriot community within the post-accession context 
(see section 3.4 in Chapter 3) meant that the ‘EU project’ was unable to consolidate itself into a 
viable social, and perhaps a more inclusive imaginary. Instead, the pro-EU Cypriotness discourse 
that brought together large segments of the Turkish-Cypriot society and led simultaneously a 
political sea-change in the run up to Cyprus’s EU accession became progressively disorientated. 
In discourse theoretical terms, the ‘dislocation’ that occurred following the referendum 
obstructed the continuity of the common ‘social imaginary’ represented by the prospects of EU 
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membership and thwarted the emergence of a stable hegemonic formation (based on a 
‘European’ discourse) in Turkish-Cypriot politics during this period. Moreover, the dislocatory 
experience of the aborted EU membership has led to a new reconfiguration of the pre-existing 
elements articulated within the oppositional Cypriotness discourse promoted by the KTÖS and 
the KTAMS in which settler antagonisms took centre stage. This argument was hypothesised in 
Chapter 2:  
 
Hypothesis 3: With the failure of the ‘Annan Plan’, the pro-EU Cypriotness discourse is 
disorientated and settler antagonisms take centre-stage. 
  
While the leading trade unions such as the KTAMS and the Teachers’ Union remained 
committed towards reunification and EU membership, the post-referendum period has seen a 
vocal anti-Turkish rhetoric that surpassed the all-empowering pro-EU trend. To this end, these 
organisations instrumentalised on the austerity policies which were gradually introduced from 
2009 onwards, by adopting a more defensive rhetoric on Turkish-Cypriot identity in general and 
the bilateral relations with mainland Turkey, in particular. During this time, Turkish-Cypriot 
identity was conceived once again within an explicitly securitised framework and in relation to 
immigration from mainland Turkey.  
  
In this vein, the unions argued that the Turkish-Cypriot identity was put at risk not only 
through its positioning in relation to Turkey which excluded ‘mutual respect’ but also through 
the large-scale naturalisation of Turkish nationals that altered the domestic political balance, 
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further consolidating Ankara’s grip over Turkish-Cypriot affairs. To this end, ‘Communal Survival’ 
rallies were organised by the KTÖS, KTAMS and others in 2011 and 2012 which saw thousands of 
Turkish-Cypriots taking to the streets to reassert their Turkish-Cypriot identity, protest against 
Turkish-imposed austerity measures and tell Ankara to keep its ‘hands-off the Turkish-Cypriot 
community’. The unions also once again began asserting that the naturalisation of Turkish 
immigrants, especially during election times was a form of gerrymandering to manipulate results 
of those parties (UBP and the DP in particular, see sections 4.2 and 4.3 in Chapter 4) who aligned 
themselves with Turkey.  
 
The proliferation of immigration associations both in size and in scope in the post-
referendum period also confirms the arguments formulated in Hypotheses 2 and 3. Ever-growing 
schism and hostility on the part of the Turkish-Cypriot community (Chapter 6) and lack of 
substantive steps to alleviate the long-standing concerns of certain immigrant groups indeed 
served as a motivation for the organisations representing Turkish immigrants and settlers to turn 
to political lobbying in order to demand the enlargement of citizenship status confront other 
political actors that have traditionally dominated the discussion on immigration and citizenship. 
At the same time, recent years have also seen immigrant associations forming or indeed 
consolidating their ties with established Turkish-Cypriot actors (political parties and other civil-
societal bodies) to represent and promote their interests. One major finding in this section was 
the nature and scope of the diversification which characterised the narratives of these 
associations borrowing heavily from the two counter discourses, Turkishness and Cypriotness. In 
respect to citizenship status, for example, it needs to be stressed that some organisations 
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borrowed heavily from oppositional Turkish-Cypriot discourses and sought to articulate their 
claims as part of ‘common grievances’ (‘assimilationist policies’ of Turkey in particular) while 
others were largely defensive and couched their claims in nationalist terms based on an 
‘immigrant/settler vs native’ dichotomy whereby leftist groups within the Turkish-Cypriot 
community are presented as ‘others’ who antagonise the presence of Turkish immigrants and 
deny them basic human rights and against whom ‘national’ interests (‘impeccable relations’ with 
Turkey above all) need to be defended. 
 
 Finally, the chapter also considered different interpretations of immigration and 
citizenship articulated by organisations who promote alternative political identities and social 
agendas formulated within critical and radical discourses. In line with much of the conceptual 
insights provided by the literature, the analysis undertaken in this section has shown that these 
actors are instrumental in widening the discursive space which expand participatory possibility 
by challenging existing public discourses and constituting inclusive identities (see section 2.5 in 
Chapter 2). One major finding here, however, points to the difficulty in framing immigration from 
Turkey in ways other than already prescribed by the meta-narratives especially on the ‘Cyprus 
Problem’. Such organisations have thus focussed on the symptoms of the ‘Cyprus Problem’, 
above all the prospects of becoming a Turkish protectorate, which pre-determines the terms of 
the debate on immigration and citizenship. This, in turn, points to the pervasiveness of the Cyprus 
conflict as a key reference-point in the organisation of political discourses including those that 
aim to challenge the existing symbolic order. The concluding chapter (Chapter 7) further reflects 





 This chapter has examined the civil society responses to immigration from mainland 
Turkey and the citizenship status of Turkish settlers. The issue as it stood in the mid-1990s was 
framed by the left-leaning labour unions as an existential threat to the presumed ‘authority’ as 
well as the ‘authenticity’ of the Turkish-Cypriot community. The securitised Cypriotness discourse 
regarded Turkish settlers as a homogenous constituency which invariably supported the 
nationalist regime, hence the Turkish tutelage over Turkish-Cypriot affairs. The fighters’ 
organisations linked to the Turkish-Cypriot right, on the other hand, have traditionally articulated 
the ‘settlers issue’ largely within a nationalist Turkishness discourse thus appealing to a number 
of ethno-national myths such as common descent in combination with other civic references to 
‘human rights’.  
 
The introduction of EU membership into the political agendas of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community from the mid-1990s onwards had an important effect in the framing of immigration 
from Turkey especially within the labour union narratives in the sense that it was largely 
downplayed within a new ‘imaginary’ in which EU membership came to signify. As the EU became 
the focal aspect of identity narratives, immigration related anxieties were largely muted or 
omitted altogether from the oppositional rhetoric. This was only a partial discursive shift however 
as the ‘settler issue’ continued to lurk in the background as evidenced in the protests and strikes 




As asserted in the previous chapter (Chapter 4), the partial nature of this discursive shift 
and the absence of a complete paradigmatic change in terms of how immigration was presented 
by the labour unions, can be explained by the structural and historical features of the issue 
(particularly its linkage to the bilateral relations with Turkey) as well as the contingent nature of 
the ‘window of opportunity’ represented by EU membership that was made available. Indeed, 
the impact of the EU in seemingly transforming oppositional identity narratives began to diminish 
once Cyprus was admitted to the EU as a still-divided island. The peculiar and rather ‘marginal’ 
positioning of the Turkish-Cypriot community within the post-accession context meant that the 
‘EU project’ was unable to consolidate itself into a viable social, and perhaps a more inclusive 
imaginary in relation to the ‘settler question’. In this case, this was evidenced by the 
reintroduction of the immigration-related anxieties into oppositional rhetoric from mid-2000s 
onwards to, in effect, take centre stage in organising Cypriotness centred identity discourses in 
the post-referendum period. Such discursive structuring of immigration and the citizenship rights 
of Turkish settlers within prevalent perceptions toward Turkey point out to the pervasiveness of 
the conflict in all spheres of life. Unsurprisingly, this is also implicated in alternative discourses as 
a major stumbling block to construct inclusive identities for collective action and political 
struggle. Building on these findings, the following chapter explores the ways in which immigration 
from mainland Turkey has been represented in the major Turkish-Cypriot newspapers. 
 





CHAPTER 6. FRAMING OF IDENTITY, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE PRINT MEDIA 
 
6.1. Introduction 
6.2. Turkish-Cypriot print media: A Brief overview 
6.3. Media discourses on ‘settlers’ on the eve of anticipated European integration 
6.4. The framing of immigration and ‘settlers’ in the post-2004 period 
6.5. Identity (re)construction and the immigration-settlement debate in the Turkish-





Much scholarship has focused on the spread of nationalism and identity (re)construction 
in media discourse (see Chapter 1). The following chapter examines how the print media in 
northern Cyprus and the Turkish-Cypriot newspapers in particular have framed the twin issues of 
immigration from Turkey and the citizenship status of Turkish settlers in ways that articulate 
competing discourses on Turkish-Cypriot identity. To that end, the chapter begins by providing a 
brief overview of the Turkish-Cypriot newspapers and their enduring relationship with the 
domestic politics of the island, namely nationalism and the Cyprus problem (6.2). This is followed 
by a critical discourse analysis of a selection of political events significant to the immigration 
debate and their framing by various mainstream newspapers and their columnists with different 
ideological orientations. In order to gain a good understanding of the nature of this environment 
and in line with the conceptual framework developed earlier (Chapter 1), the analysis 
concentrates less on the linguistic (de)construction of particular texts than on the change and 
continuity in the articulation of core concepts that have been important to particular discourses 
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on Turkish ‘settlers’ and on identity. Accordingly, in the subsequent sections (6.3 and 6.4) the 
framing of Turkish-Cypriot identity in the Turkish-Cypriot newspapers in relation to immigration 
from Turkey is analysed diachronically across two distinct time periods distinguished by Cyprus’s 
accession into the EU i.e. pre-2004 and post-2004 era respectively. Section 6.5 provides a 
summarising account which further evaluates the interplay between various framings of 
immigration, the Turkish ‘settlers’ and the competing narratives on identity, linking the empirical 
findings to the conceptual framework developed earlier in Chapter 2. 
 
6.2. Turkish-Cypriot print media: A Brief overview 
 
The news media are thought of as an integral part of any political system, informing, 
prioritizing, shaping and controlling events, opinions and society itself (Fairclough, 2003; Wodak, 
2001). Cyprus, and the northern part of the island more specifically, is no exception to this. On a 
closer look, discourses articulated in the Turkish-Cypriot media closely reflect those of the 
mainstream narratives that dominate the political field, that is those preferred by politicians and 
the political parties (see Chapter 4.) This overriding feature of the media in northern Cyprus as a 
highly-politicised domain and a conduit of political discourse is captured well by the “polarized 
pluralist model” developed by Hallin and Mancini (2004, see also Papathanassopoulos, 2007). In 
their influential work on media systems across Europe, the authors outline the main 
characteristics of this model as consisting of a politically oriented press, high political resonance 
in journalism, prevalence of the State as an owner and regulator and a high degree of ideological 
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diversity and conflict that is ‘atypical in a Mediterranean society with a strong role for the state 
and the political parties’ (2004, pp. 68-73).  
 
Indeed, the Turkish-Cypriot media (but also its Greek-Cypriot counterpart in the south, 
see Avraamidou and Kyriakides, 2015; Christophorou, 2010; Christophorou, Sahin and Pavlou, 
2010) is enmeshed in pervasive contemporary political economic, social and cultural dynamics 
marked by the ongoing conflict, also known as the ‘Cyprus Problem’. It is in this sense placed at 
the heart of the (re)production of that conflict, either promoting the status quo to signify 
Turkishness based on independent statehood and suspicion toward the ‘other’, that is the Greek-
Cypriot community — or, to the contrary, an oppositional discourse contesting the dominant 
ethno-national notions of peace (marked by independent statehood in the form of the TRNC) and 
belonging grounded on Turkishness. In this context, the media is also part of a complex public 
sphere that forms and redefines collective identity.  
 
Though implicated in it, the enduring relationship of the Turkish-Cypriot newspapers with 
the Cyprus conflict predates the outbreak of the bi-communal violence of the mid-1950s and 
1960s and that of the inter-communal fighting which served as a prelude to the de-facto partition 
of the island in 1974. In fact, from their inception toward the end of the nineteenth century,151 
the early Turkish-Cypriot newspapers were critical not only in fending off Greek-Cypriot demands 
for enosis (the unification of the island with Greece) but also in promoting nationalist ideals that 
                                                          
151 The first newspaper, Umid (‘Hope’) written in Ottoman Turkish was published in 1879. There were in total 24 
newspapers published in the old vernacular until modern Turkish i.e. the phonetic writing system based on the 
Latin alphabet was adopted gradually from 1928 onwards (KTGB, 2012: 22; Yurdakul, 2002: 56-72) 
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would later find embodiment in Turkishness as the national identity of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community (see Chapter 3). As in other parts of the world, newspapers in Cyprus served to 
standardise vernacular languages and to reinforce the perceived homogeneity of ethnic groups. 
Perhaps more remarkably, early newspapers also connected the Cypriot intellectuals and civil 
society to Greece and Turkey, allowing the entrenchment of two distinct imagined communities 
in the image of their respective ‘motherlands’. As in Turkey, nationalism in the Turkish-Cypriot 
community was initially an elite-driven project rather than a popular movement. Newspapers 
thus played a significant role in the dissemination of nationalist ideology to the Turkish-Cypriot 
community especially during the ‘Turkish War of Liberation’ and with the founding of the new 
Turkish Republic in 1923 when nationalist fervour was at its peak. Turkish language newspapers, 
including the Vatan (‘Homeland’) and the Doğru Yol (‘Right Path’), praised the military victories 
and Kemalist reforms and promoted the ethnic kinship of the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot 
populations (see section 3.2 in Chapter 3). With the gradual spread of nationalist sentiment in 
Cyprus, the introduction by the colonial administration of repressive laws restricting public 
assembly and because of a lack of an elected national chamber between 1931 and 1960, the 
newspapers became major platforms for the dissemination of opinion and nationalist 
propaganda. In the following years, major newspapers continued to echo the nationalist rhetoric, 
endorsing secession (or the policy of Taksim), but also turned increasingly into mouthpieces for 
different organisations and as means to challenge political rivals. It is noteworthy in this context 
that the two key figures of the Turkish-Cypriot nationalist movement, Dr Fazıl Kuchuk and Rauf 
Denktash were also proprietors of the influential Turkish language newspapers, Halkın Sesi 
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(‘Voice of the People’ and the Nacak (‘The Hatchet’152), respectively. While the Halkın Sesi, 
represented the dominant ethno-nationalist position, Nacak adopted a more severe form of 
ethno-nationalism and though the latter were initially supportive of Dr Kuchuk’s leadership, the 
newspaper would serve as a critical platform for his owner, Denktash, to later challenge his rival 
and catapult him into power.  
 
The emergence of party politics in the early 1970s was an important factor which further 
politicised the newspapers with the entering of political parties on the scene. One direct outcome 
of party politics was the setting up of newspapers to serve as mouthpieces for the emerging 
parties. But a more indirect impact here also relates to a certain opening-up of Turkish-Cypriot 
politics during this period that had previously been inhibited by the so-called ‘BEY’ regime which 
tightly controlled the affairs of the Turkish-Cypriot community (sometimes with recourse to 
violence) during the period which large numbers of Turkish-Cypriots lived in ethnic enclaves (see 
section 3.3 in Chapter 3). Though not entirely free from harassment, violence and above all, the 
authoritarian grip of the Denktash regime (see below), the emerging of new political parties 
which represented (to some degree) diverse agendas and a broad spectrum of opinions also led 
to a certain diversification of editorial policies of the Turkish-Cypriot newspapers from then 
onwards.   
 
                                                          
152 As Sahin (2011) has also noted, the newspaper’s motto that ‘every Turk should keep a Nacak at home’ in case of 
an armed conflict, reflected the violent conception of Turkishness it espoused. Nacak consistently associated the 




More recently, there has been a further improving of the political climate with the 
election of the moderate CTP into office in 2003 when the new government worked together 
with the ‘Turkish Cypriot Journalists Association’ (Kıbrıs Türk Gazeteciler Birliği) to ease the 
previous restrictions on freedom of access, movement and coverage (Kahvecioglu, 2008). The 
improving of press freedoms but also a number of other developments further elaborated below, 
have in the last decade allowed for an active independent media landscape, regarded as “free” 
by the latest Freedom House report (2015) with both leftist and rightist newspapers, (some 
openly critical of the establishment) able to report on issues that was once considered ‘taboo’ 
(the role of the Turkish military, for instance). As indicated earlier however, the specific Cypriot 
context can open major ideological contradictions with reference to ‘right’ and ‘left’ labels so it 
is worth reflecting on the similarities and differences in their approaches to the Cyprus Problem 
(Fig. 10).  
 
The Yenidüzen (‘New Order’), for instance, began circulating in 1975 as a mouthpiece for 
the leftist CTP (‘Republican Turkish Party’) and has consistently promoted a bi-zonal, bi-
communal federation. The Afrika (2000) too promotes the reunification of Cyprus but one 
resulting from a return to the 1960 constitutional order and is also the only Turkish-Cypriot daily 
newspaper that sees Turkey as an ‘occupier’. The Kıbrıs (‘Cyprus’), on the other hand, is a 
commercial newspaper owned by the ex-convict and businessman Asil Nadir, with the highest 
circulation in the ‘TRNC’ and is regarded as the most influential. During the period under study, 




Figure 10. Newspaper positions on immigration-settlement 
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moderate, pro-solution and pro-EU stance. The Halkın Sesi is a centre-right newspaper and the 
longest-surviving Turkish-Cypriot daily, having begun publication in 1942. As underlined above, 
the newspaper played a key role in the promotion of Turkish nationalism and has been a 
consistent supporter of nationalist policies. Yeni Volkan (‘New Volcano’) is on the extreme right 
of the political spectrum, a highly nationalistic newspaper favouring the status quo (or a ‘two-
state solution’) and ever closer ties with Turkey.153 
 
The apparent diversity and differing ideological standpoints notwithstanding, the role of 
the State and its intervention in the functioning of news reporting through its centralised news 
agency, the TAK (Türk Ajansı Kıbrıs, or the ‘Turkish Agency Cyprus’.) is an important dimension of 
news reporting which mediates further the relationship between the media and politics in 
northern Cyprus. Since its founding in 1975, the TAK has served for most outlets as the primary 
source of information, enabling the state to disseminate news often reflecting its ideological and 
political bias. According to Azgin and Baillie (2011: 693), this is a direct outcome of the unique 
political economy of the Cypriot media where, among others, ‘relatively small newspapers 
cannot […] afford the luxury of independent, investigative journalism’. This, in turn, has meant 
that newspapers in the north tend to report heavily on what has been selected from among the 
press releases provided by the TAK, resulting in a certain uniformity of news across media outlets 
‘with minor changes often made “in-house” by editing the text or the headline of the agency 
stories’.154 
                                                          
153 Only the Yenidüzen, Afrika, Kıbrıs and Halkın Sesi are examined in this study. 
154 According to Kahvecioglu (2008), TAK produced bulletins account for as much as 85 percent of the content that 
appear in the Turkish-Cypriot newspapers. 
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It is primarily for this reason that the analysis below focuses on a selection of newspaper 
columns and interviews with columnists rather than exclusively on ‘hard news’ to examine the 
media discourses on identity in relation to immigration from Turkey. In this sense, the views 
articulated in commentaries are valuable sites to observe more explicit frames in relation to 
settlers, immigration and identity related discourses. it is also important to note, as Azgin and 
Baillie (2011, p.692) have suggested previously, that in the northern Cyprus news media (but also 
to some extent, in the RoC), political columnists play the dual roles of ‘opinion leader’ and 
‘ideological indicator’. Based on anecdotal evidence, it is also suggested that the Cypriot 
readership tend to overvalue the work of columnists as an objective and critical source of 
information over that of news reports.155 In this sense, the selection of columnists is based upon 
their high degrees of popularity (thus wider readership) and the crucial role they play in the 
Turkish-Cypriot society as shapers of public opinion especially in identity and immigration related 
issues that are relevant to this study.  
 
6.3. Media discourses on immigration on the eve of anticipated European integration 
 
For most of the pre-1995 period, the political agendas in northern Cyprus were dominated 
by domestic disputes relating little to international developments or the settlement of the 
‘Cyprus Problem’. The ‘refugee issue’, in particular, and the rather arbitrary and often clientelistic 
                                                          
155 In this sense, though the aforementioned authors do not elaborate on the concept of ‘opinion leadership’, it 
can be suggested that the orientation of newspapers with respect to opinion columns and journalists with respect 




process of land distribution and housing allocations for the Turkish-Cypriot refugees who had fled 
South during and in the aftermath of the partition, served as a hot topic of contention and 
dominated the pages especially of the opposition newspapers Ortam (‘Ethos’)156 and Yenidüzen, 
that had then served as the mouthpieces for the TKP and the CTP respectively (see Kurtuluş, for 
example, 1980, Ortam, 1980 and Yenidüzen, 1988). The nationalist leadership, for its part, stoked 
up its rhetoric against the left by exploiting the ‘national question’ and declaring all dissent an 
act of national sacrilege; such establishment newspapers as the Bozkurt157, the Birlik158 (‘Unity’) 
and the Zaman (The ‘Times’) that had begun circulating in the pre-1974 period praised 
government policies in their stories and largely with reference to the ‘national cause’.159 The so-
called ‘national cause’ (Milli Dava) embodied independent statehood conceived as the 
‘inseparable part of the motherland Turkey’ requiring perpetual protection against the Greek-
Cypriots framed here as the enemy (Bozkurt, 1975). In the aftermath of the partition, the Turkish-
Cypriot leadership continued to assert that the Greek-Cypriots still posed an existential threat 
and that any form of internal dissent would harm the ‘national cause’ by undermining ‘national 
unity’ and serving, in effect, the Greek-Cypriot cause of enosis, or unification with Greece (Zaman, 
1975). As such, the opposition newspapers came under heavy attack with such accusations and 
often labelled as ‘traitors’ when they appeared to take a critical line over the government’s 
handling of domestic problems, or on the broader issues of the ‘Cyprus problem’ and the bilateral 
relations with Turkey (see, for example, Zaman, 1976, Birlik, 1988 but also Küçük, 1976). 
                                                          
156 Ortam (1981) would replace the earlier Kurtuluş (‘Liberation’) which went out of print in February 1984.  
157  ‘The Gray Wolf’, a sacred animal in Turkish nationalist mythology 
158 Birlik would replace Ulus (‘Nation’) in 1980 which remained in circulation until 2004 when it was replaced by 
Güneş (‘The Sun’, also used as the party emblem). 
159  For a detailed discussion of the Turkish-Cypriot media in this period, see Hüdaoğlu (2011) and Eraslan (2015) 
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It was precisely within the context of this contestation that Turkishness was further 
politicised and identity became a central cleavage of Turkish-Cypriot politics, rendering the 
newspapers a key site where two competing visions of national/collective identity strived for 
hegemony. While the nationalist, establishment newspapers such as the Halkın Sesi and the Birlik 
(‘Unity’) promoted the Turkishness discourse which construed the Turkish-Cypriot community as 
part of the ‘greater Turkish nation’ and the Greek-Cypriots as the threatening ‘other', the 
newspapers of the leftist opposition such as the Yenidüzen and the Ortam increasingly promoted 
an alternative notion of identity characterised by a distinct ‘Cypriot’ character. The ongoing 
migration of Turkish mainlanders into northern Cyprus would, in this connection, serve as an 
important cleavage, or a ‘key signifier’ (see Chapter 2) for these competing identity discourses 
aimed at constructing distinct ‘imagined communities’. 
 
A critical development here was the leadership change within the leftist CTP which saw 
Özker Özgür becoming the new chairman of the party in 1976. Under Özgür, the CTP was the first 
to take the centre-stage in voicing radical views on Turkish immigrants and their naturalisation 
by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. The CTP’s arguments, during this time, explicitly linked 
immigration from mainland Turkey and granting of citizenship status to Turkish settlers onto 
wider debates on identity, societal security and political autonomy (for various citations, see 
Chapter 4). The seismic shift in the political discourse that occurred during this time in relation 
to immigration further exasperated the ongoing polarization of the media landscape but also 




For the oppositional, leftist newspapers, the dispute soon became the focal point of their 
identity discourse. The migration of Turkish nationals into Cyprus and their naturalisation was 
framed as a serious challenge and at times, an existential threat to the distinct identity of the 
Turkish-Cypriot community but also its autonomy. One of the most prominent features of the 
leftist media narratives on immigration during this time was therefore the production and 
amplification of a discourse of fear with reference to the scenarios of disorder, loss of sovereignty 
and political subjugation. Within it, the Turkish settlers/migrants who first began to arrive as part 
of a ‘facilitated settlement programme’ and as a ‘much-needed labour force’ (see sections 3.2 
and 3.3 in Chapter 3), were presented by and large as ‘troublemakers’, ‘unassimilable persons’ 
undermining cohesion and cultural authenticity, and as ‘cheap labour’ taking jobs away from the 
native Turkish-Cypriots (see below). These nativist anxieties also helped promoted the view that 
immigration from Turkey was harming the identity of the community by undermining the 
demographic equilibrium and diluting its autonomy through large-scale granting of citizenships, 
giving settlers the right to vote in the local and national elections. In fact, Turkish immigrants cum 
settlers would soon become the new `enemy', in much the same way the nationalist newspapers 
had often portrayed the Greek-Cypriots. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s numerous news stories 
and commentaries constructed along this identitarian axis associated migration with 
unemployment, urban environment deterioration, loss of sovereignty and autonomy, and a 
certain clash of civilization related to the perceived cultural differences and the supposed 
inability of the settlers to assimilate into the Turkish-Cypriot society (Ortam, 1985; Yenidüzen, 




The immigration controversy intensified following the proclamation of the ‘TRNC’ in 1983 
and in the run up to the first presidential and parliamentary elections for the new statelet. Only 
weeks before the parliamentary elections, in an article published in the Ortam, influential 
columnist Kutlu Adalı delivered the following observation:  
it was the settler160 votes which ensured that the new [TRNC] constitution was approved in the 
referendum. The next [target] is the parliamentary and presidential elections. In the same way 
they made sure the new constitution was passed, thousands of [settlers] will once again follow 
orders […] to determine the outcome of these elections. According to some sources […] several 
retired army men [Trojan horses], backed by shady financiers, are already organising [the settler 
constituency]. Without a doubt, thousands of these ‘Trojan Horse’ ballots […], will be enough to 
send 4 or 5 MPs to the Parliament who will then be able to exert Turkey’s sway on any [Turkish-
Cypriot] government (1985a).    
 
Adalı’s writings carried significant weight since he was privileged as a former ‘insider’ who 
had seen how immigration and citizenship policies were supposedly manipulated behind closed 
doors. Indeed, his high-profile but also his turbulent relationship with the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership placed him at the heart of the political debates. He began his early career in the 1960s 
as the private secretary to the late Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. After a well-known 
fallout with Denktash for turning down an offer to work for the TMT controlled Bayrak radio 
station, he was briefly imprisoned. He began working for Bayrak following his release until 1974 
when he was appointed as the Director of the ‘Identity Cards Department’ at the General 
Registration Office. In December 1979, he was removed from his position (then as the Director 
of that Office) by a ministerial decree. After a High Court battle, he returned back to his position 
but was then forced to take early retirement in 1987 at the age of 50. By that time, Adalı was an 
outspoken critic of the Turkish-Cypriot administration and a well-known advocate of an 
                                                          
160 Adalı uses the label ‘Türkiyeli’ i.e. of Turkish origin instead of settlers. 
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overarching ‘Cypriot’ identity. He used his political column in the Ortam and later in the 
Yenidüzen to promote the reunification of Cyprus. Perhaps more remarkably, for the purposes of 
this study, he argued that the very ‘Cypriot’ character of the Turkish-Cypriot community was 
under imminent threat by the perpetual influx of Turkish immigrants and their large-scale 
naturalisation.  
 
More specifically, Adalı argued that Turkish settlers and the ‘native’ Turkish-Cypriots were 
leading parallel, segregated lives: ‘Not only their [settlers’] villages are separate but also their […] 
traditions, worldviews and political parties. They don’t allow their children to get married with 
Cypriots […] clearly they are a conservative community’ (1985b). In his view, allowing Turkish-
mainland voters to organise separate political parties (referring to the ‘YDP’, see section 3.2 in 
Chapter 3) was also deepening the existing cleavages. Yet more importantly, Adalı argued that 
Turkish settlers were now the determinants of electoral races; his words would also underline, 
rather sarcastically, the fact that their precise number was unknown: ‘15,000 for some, 20-30,000 
for others; TRNC citizens of Turkish origin will decide who will form the government’ (1985b). A 
week later, Adalı made his views on the upcoming elections clear: ‘Turkish-Cypriots can appoint 
candidates [to run in the elections] against those backed by Turkey but they cannot govern 




Kutlu Adalı was murdered in 1996 near his home in Nicosia.161 In an article published only 
weeks before his murder, he wrote:  
it is claimed that the Turkish government sends trillions of lira each year, which goes straight into 
Turkish-Cypriot pockets and into Turkish-Cypriot bank accounts. It’s true that this was the case at 
the beginning […] and I mean in the period between 1960-64 and 1964-74. During that time, 
Turkish-Cypriots lived on bare subsistence and sustained their [national] struggle with [financial] 
support from Turkey. But, even though [we lived on handouts and] there was no investment, any 
[socio-economic] development or indeed any sign of a promising, secure future, we [the Turkish-
Cypriot community] were nonetheless a clean, pure, demographically undisturbed and uninflated 
community of around 100-120 thousand people […] After 1974 [however] Ankara made sure that 
the ‘door’ was fully open to all Turkish nationals. Our country was suddenly swamped by 
thousands of people of non-Cypriot origin […] So all that [financial] help from Turkey was rationed 
[…] Those trillions of lira which Turkey had channelled into Cyprus in the past 22 years hasn’t only 
fed Turkish-Cypriots but also thousands of Anatolian people transferred from Turkey […] What’s 
more, while Turkish-Cypriots emigrated elsewhere, the number of Turkish nationals transferred 
from Anatolia has grown considerably; [they are now] the dominant [ethnic] group, controlling  
almost all aspects of life. There are now hundreds of [settlers], employed at all levels of the public 
sector. Half of the police force […] is of Turkish-origin. It is now impossible for the 100-120,000 
Turkish-Cypriots to control their own affairs here. [They] no longer have the numerical strength 
to appoint their own MPs. If there was a referendum vote tomorrow [on Cyprus’s reunification], 
Turkish-Cypriots wouldn’t be able to get an outcome reflecting their decision (1996).    
  
 By the end of the 1990s and with Cyprus’s EU accession now imminent, fierce discussions 
regarding the future of Cyprus then began to spill over the issue of immigration. The opening of 
the border in April 2003, easing the restrictions on the movement of Cypriots across the ‘Green 
Line’ for the first time since 1974, generated further controversy around the citizenship status of 
Turkish settlers. This time, the controversy was based on the restriction introduced by the RoC 
authorities toward naturalised TRNC citizens of Turkish origin, long considered illegal, to cross to 
                                                          
161 Before his murder, Adalı took up the issue of an alleged armed raid to a St Barnabas monastery which involved 
the Turkish-Cypriot Civilian Defense Organisation (Kıbrıs Türk SIvil Savunma Teşkilati) and the head of that 
organisation, a Turkish army officer named Galip Mendi. It is widely believed that this led to his murder. Indeed, 
there are many indicators which have surfaced since that links the murder to other extrajudicial killings, 
kidnappings, bombings and criminal activities carried out by the Gladio in Turkey. Indeed, a series of trials in the 
1990s launched in the aftermath of the so-called ‘Susurluk Scandal’ linked several of the names with Cyprus and 




the South. More controversially, however, ‘second-generation settlers’, that is those born in 
Cyprus to parents of ‘settler’ origin, were also left out of the historic opening.  
 
The decision of the Greek-Cypriot authorities to exclude large numbers of TRNC passport 
holders, effectively preventing them from joining in the transitional period Cyprus was going 
through, would immediately turn citizenship into an open dispute between the two sides that 
had thus far been occupied largely with the numerical aspect of the issue in the context of the 
negotiations regarding consociational arrangements. The Turkish-Cypriot side argued that TRNC 
citizens of Turkish origin and their Cyprus-born children were part of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community and should thus face no discrimination. The diplomatic dispute was extensively 
covered by all major Turkish-Cypriot newspapers, publishing statements by the Turkish-Cypriot 
officials as well as from the opposition, criticizing the travel restrictions. Talks initiated by 
Mehmet Ali Talat (then the leader of the CTP) to discuss the issue with various Greek-Cypriot 
authorities during this time in order to lift the restrictions on Turkish ‘settlers’ also led to a flurry 
of news articles and similar statements from other political parties and moderate civil society 
groups (Kıbrıs, Halkın Sesi and Yenidüzen, 27-30 April 2003).  
 
This was a remarkable discursive shift within the political arena and also at the civil-
society level, and apart from tonal differences, the citizenship rhetoric utilised both by the 
opposition and the establishment now construed a civic notion of belonging to the political 
community hence categorizing Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish-born citizens, who were excluded by 
the Greek-Cypriot authorities, as members of the same group (see also sections 4.3 and 5.3 in 
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chapters 4 and 5 respectively). Unfortunately, however, in the Turkish-Cypriot newspapers, the 
view that regardless of their place of birth these Turkish-born passport holders were ‘our’ citizens 
and should be treated the same as those born in Cyprus, failed to gain adequate ground. In fact, 
by maintaining certain modes of exclusionary discourse, particularly in the categorical definitions 
and the use of pronouns, ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘them’, the newspapers continued to participate and 
propagate in an exclusionary rhetoric (Kıbrıs, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Yenidüzen, 2003a, 2003b).  As 
Sahin (2011) has previously pointed out, the settler/immigrant views were also omitted from 
much newspaper reporting. The newspapers reflected the opinions and efforts of the state 
authorities and the opposition parties concerning the restrictions adopted by the Greek-Cypriot 
authorities, but did not report on the views of immigrants or settlers in their news stories. Even 
the Yenidüzen, the only newspaper that brought the issue to its front page which read ‘Is it a 
crime to be from Turkey?’ (Yenidüzen, 2003c), omitted individual citizens’ experience of the 
restrictions or their interpretation of them. 
 
Meanwhile, the stark warning Adalı gave before his murder in relation to the influence of 
settler constituency on the political outlook of the Turkish-Cypriot community, more precisely 
that ‘the settler votes would be pivotal in a possible referendum’ (1996, op.cit.) would resonate 
deeply ahead of the looming referendum on Cyprus’s reunification on the eve of its EU accession.  
 
The controversy first blew up in the run up to the December 2003 legislative elections. At 
the heart of the citizenship dispute during this time was the fear on the part of the Turkish-
Cypriot opposition parties (and the pro-EU, pro-reunification civil society) that their chances of 
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ousting the nationalist leadership at December’s elections were being undermined by the large-
scale granting of citizenship rights to Turkish immigrants. In other words, Turkish settlers who 
had been given citizenship by the UBP-DP coalition government, the opposition feared, would 
seemingly oppose the ‘Annan Plan’ and torpedo Turkish-Cypriot prospects of joining the EU. To 
this end, both the CTP and BDH set in motion a ‘citizenship-stripping’ battle by applying for a 
Supreme Court order to overturn 1,600 citizenships granted since the last local elections held in 
June 2002 (see section 3.3 in Chapter 3) Whilst the citizenship suits, subsequent protests and a 
one-day strike held at the ‘immigration office’ were extensively covered by all outlets (Kıbrıs: 
2003e, 2003f, 2003g; Halkın Sesi, 2003a; Afrika, 2003a), some newspapers also sensationalised 
on the reports of ‘long queues’, Turkish immigrants ‘swamping the hospitals [for health 
certificates required for citizenship applications]’ and ‘violent brawls breaking out’ at various 
government departments describing the scenes as a ‘disgrace’ (Kıbrıs, 2003d). The Kıbrıs 
(‘Cyprus’) newspaper, that began to shift during this time toward a moderate standpoint, also 
took a more critical stance in its reporting on the citizenship case brought forward by the 
opposition BDH, charging government officials or ‘those in favour of the status quo’ with 
‘treachery’, by effectively ‘betraying the political will of the Turkish-Cypriot community’ through 
the granting of illegal citizenships (Kıbrıs, 2003e.) The Yenidüzen newspaper also lashed out on 
the Turkish-Cypriot authorities for the large-scale granting of citizenships ahead of the elections, 
charging that the arbitrary naturalisations were a direct policy of electoral manipulation which 
reflected the ‘panic’ at the level of the UBP-DP coalition government. The newspaper also used 
a picture on its front page comparing the long queues outside immigration and citizenship offices 
in the north and the south, with Turkish immigrants and Turkish-Cypriots waiting to acquire 
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passports and identity documents of the Republic and the ‘TRNC’ respectively, which visually 
symbolised according to the newspaper, ‘the status quo’ that is the unresolved ‘Cyprus Problem’ 
(2003d). 
Rather remarkably however, the issue became muted on the eve of the actual elections. 
This can be explained by the fact that all granting of citizenships was halted following the end of 
the official campaign period. It can also be suggested that virtually all parties, including those 
critical of fresh citizenships, tried to appeal to the ‘settler vote’ to secure seats (Kıbrıs, 2004b.) To 
that end, even the Yenidüzen, known with its close ties to the CTP, toned down its reporting on 
the issue – focusing instead on the ‘clandestine scaremongering tactics’ of the hardliners, what 
it called the ‘status quo powers’ to provoke the Turkish settlers/immigrants against the Annan 
Plan to sabotage the reunification of Cyprus (2003e).  
 
Although there are no reliable figures on the numbers of naturalised settlers with TRNC 
citizenship to establish with certainty the extent of their influence on the outcome of the 
elections in 2003, the poll results at the end of the race nonetheless showed that many had 
indeed supported the pro-EU, pro-reunification parties.162 The CTP emerged as the first party, 
winning 19 seats out of 50. The BDH that ran on a slightly more radical platform came third and 
secured 6 seats. The right-wing parties collectively won the remainder 25 seats in the Parliament 
(see Chapter 4). On the negotiations front, talks were once again resumed in Nicosia and the 
Turkish-Cypriot press geared toward the peace process which culminated in the submission of 
                                                          
162 For some estimates see Kathimerini (2003); this was suggested earlier by the Chairman of the ‘TRNC 
Immigrants’ Association’ in an interview with the Cyprus Weekly (2003). 
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the infamous ‘Annan Plan’ to simultaneous referenda in May 2004. 
 
6.4. The framing of Turkish migrants/settlers in the post-2004 period 
 
While the so-called ‘Annan Plan Referendum’ failed to secure a deal before the whole of 
Cyprus was admitted into the EU in May 2004, there was still considerable optimism in the 
northern part of the island that the Turkish-Cypriot commitment to reunification and EU 
membership would ease the community’s ostracisation and that the international actors would 
act to bring the Turkish-Cypriot community ‘in from the cold’.163 To that end, the ‘Cyprus 
problem’ continued to dominate news stories in the post-referendum period, though with less 
intensity. A number of EU-level initiatives toward the Turkish-Cypriot community, in relation to 
facilitating trade from and into northern Cyprus (‘Direct Trade Regulations’ and ‘Green Line 
Regulations’) were extensively covered by the newspapers within a positive frame though 
sometimes with nationalist undertones emphasising the ‘embargoes’ (Halkın Sesi, 2004b; Kıbrıs, 
2004d). Various statements from the UN officials (but also other international actors such as the 
US and Russia) reaffirming continuing efforts to find a deal were also widely reported in this 
context (Halkın Sesi: 2004b, c, d, e; Yenidüzen: 2004a, 2004c, 2004d; Kıbrıs: 2005c, 2005d).  In a 
similar vein, the somewhat improving external relations of the Turkish-Cypriot administration 
and the positive international image of the Turkish-Cypriot community following their ‘yes’ vote 
to the UN plan was also a key focus of media reports. Virtually all major newspapers reported on 
high-level meetings that took place, emphasising the new post-referendum context and a notion 
                                                          
163 For various statements see, section 3.5 in Chapter 3.  
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of legitimacy for the Turkish Cypriot identity tied to the expectations in relation to the lifting of 
the international isolations (Halkın Sesi: 2004a, 2004c; Yenidüzen, 2004b; Kıbrıs, 2004d).  
More importantly, the settler issue in the immediate aftermath of the referendum was 
largely downplayed and found substantial coverage only in the years following the referendum 
and primarily in the context of the new round of negotiations with the election of the moderate 
Demetris Christofias as the new President of the Republic in 2008.164 The focus during this time 
was on the citizenship status of Turkish settlers and the newspapers reported widely on the issue 
by publishing a number of statements made by Turkish-Cypriot leadership in relation to the 
dispute with Christofias. The Kıbrıs newspaper in particular, provided extensive coverage of the 
political discussions that took place in the southern part of the island on the settler issue (often 
using reports from the Greek-Cypriot media outlets; 2008a,2008b,2008c), and sometimes with 
headlines portraying an intolerant, uncompromising stance (2009b) going as far as charging the 
Greek-Cypriot politicians with ‘racism’ (2010b.)  
 
Yet, a number of developments toward the end of the decade, in relation to the ongoing 
Cyprus problem, but also in the context of bilateral relations with Turkey would once again place 
immigration-related anxieties on top of the public and political agendas of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community. As noted in Chapter 4 previously, the legislative elections held in 2009 reflected the 
overall dissatisfaction with the governing CTP’s performance domestically but also a clear 
disillusionment of Turkish-Cypriots with such promises of international and European 
                                                          
164  Demetris Christofias was elected on 24 February 2008 becoming the sixth President of the Republic. His 
election would reignite hopes for reunification in view of his socialist background as the leader of the island’s 
communist AKEL party which had long championed the idea of a federal Cyprus, see also Euractiv (2008). 
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integration. An important outcome of the disappointment in this sense was the gradually 
diminishing prominence of the EU as an oppositional narrative (see Chapters 4 and 5) and a 
reconfiguration of the partisan identity discourses organised once again around the settler issue, 
that is the ongoing migration from Turkey and the naturalisation of Turkish immigrants.  
 
This was foretold in the context of the fierce debates during and following the 
introduction of an amnesty by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities in 2008 to register unauthorised 
migrant workers. The 2008 amnesty to grant work permits to thousands of ‘illegal migrants’ 
immediately became a bone of contention between the coalition CTP-ORP government and the 
leftist opposition parties and civil society organisations, and newspapers were dominated by 
their charges that the policy was a pretext for a fresh wave of naturalisations (Kıbrıs: 2008d, e, 
2009c, see also below). The following year, with the return to office of the nationalist UBP, and 
the holding of a census shortly after in 2011, the controversy would escalate further.  
 
The Afrika newspaper during this time was particularly vocal in its criticism of the UBP 
government’s citizenship policy. In one particular headline, the newspaper claimed that the 
demographic outlook of the northern part of the island was undergoing a complete overhaul and 
that the process of “Turkification” was in full swing following the election of Derviş Eroğlu as the 
new Turkish-Cypriot leader (Afrika, 2010a). Its editorial also argued that Turkish-Cypriots were 
now a minority largely thanks to the opposition who had now embraced the settlers as the ‘new 
Cypriots’ and sponsored their citizenship rights (Afrika, 2010a). The census, which the newspaper 
described as a ‘hoax’, also led to calls for civil disobedience and minimum cooperation with the 
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Census (Afrika, 2011b). In one particularly fierce article, published the day after the census, a 
senior Afrika columnist mocked the authorities by telling them to ‘count him out’ (2011a). More 
specifically, the article amplified the settlers’ supposed cultural distinctness in relation to the 
‘Cypriot culture’ with reference to a number of famous Turkish-Cypriot personalities, thus 
construing a distinction between the ‘natives’ and the ‘settlers’ and ultimately suggesting that 
the authorities ‘don’t bother counting the natives’ (2011a). Not surprisingly, following the 
announcement of the results, the census was dismissed as ‘unreliable’ (2011b) and the same 
columnist would later claim that it was only a ‘cover-up’ since ‘Turkey would never reveal the 
true extent of its population transfer it’s carried out since 1974’ (2011c). 
 
The so-called ‘Survival Rallies’ organised during this time by a group of trade unions and 
opposition parties were key to bring further media attention onto the issue (Kıbrıs: 2010b, c). In 
its coverage of the second rally in March 2011, the Kıbrıs newspaper, which had limited its 
attention on the status of settlers in the context of the Cyprus talks in the post-referendum 
period, began to highlight the domestic controversy surrounding the issue (2011a.) Citing 
previous census data, the paper claimed that the number of people on the electoral roll had 
grown twofold between 1976 and 2005 and that ‘no one knows of the precise immigration 
figures’ (2011b). During this time, heated parliamentary debates on citizenship and a further 
amnesty for illegal migrants in 2011, which ensued in the context of the rallies, newspapers 
continued to report on parties’ and civil society’s positions — official responses were also 
extensively reported by the Kıbrıs and to a lesser extent the Afrika (Kıbrıs: 2011c, d, e, f, g, h; 
Afrika, 2011a). Following the victory of the CTP in the 2013 legislative elections and with a pledge 
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to introduce stricter criteria for the granting of new citizenships165, the debate would lessen in 
intensity though the newspapers continued to report on the issue, focusing in particular on the 
reaction from ‘immigrant civil society organisations’ (Kıbrıs, 24-30 October 2013, see also Chapter 
5). 
 
Another key issue which facilitated the discursive shift on part of the opposition toward 
a more critical stance on immigration and citizenship was the austerity measures orchestrated 
by Ankara. As noted previously in Chapter 3, the Turkish-Cypriot economy is buoyed by financial 
help from mainland Turkey (TRNC State Planning Organisation, 2007). In this somewhat IMF-style 
relationship, Turkish-Cypriot macroeconomic policy is also formulated and directed by Turkey in 
the form of bilateral economic protocols. The latest protocol was signed in December 2012 and 
included controversial austerity measures envisaging a drastic reduction in the size of the public 
sector, but also the privatisation of key Turkish-Cypriot assets including electricity, 
telecommunications and harbours.166 The Turkish-Cypriot left, including opposition parties the 
CTP and the TDP but also several trade unions (see Chapter 5) opposed the protocol from the 
outset and claimed that it was a mere pretext to facilitate the transfer of strategic state-owned 
                                                          
165The new and certainly stricter citizenship policy would end the controversial procedure of granting discretionary 
citizenship through the ‘Council of Ministers’ but also the automatic eligibility for jus soli citizenship, allowing foreign 
nationals to be considered for TRNC citizenship only after ten years of uninterrupted residency in northern Cyprus 
and within a quota that would be based on the demographic rate of natural increase. As such, the new policy 
reserved the right to refuse citizenships even if all necessary residency conditions were met. The CTP also promised 
new measures that would suspend voting rights for new citizens until the consecutive legislative elections following 
the granting of their citizenship. 
166 The Protocol stipulated that the Turkish-Cypriot government had agreed to implement the bilateral economic 
programme  entitled ‘Towards a Sustainable Economy 2013-2015’ in order to reduce its balance deficit to 315 ml 
Turkish Lira(TL); controversial policy measures included the privatisation of the harbours and the electricity 
authority (Articles 5.2.4.2.1 and 5.2.5.2 respectively) and market liberalisation in telecommunications;  (5.2.4.2.3), 
in TRNC Prime Minister’s Office, 2013.   
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assets to the so-called Islamic ‘green capital’ (yeşil sermaye) in Turkey that had sponsored the 
ruling AKP (Afrika: 2010b,c,d; Kıbrıs, 2010b). More importantly, such austerity measures were 
tied to prevalent fears related to loss of identity. In this sense, privatisation of public assets was 
seen as threatening Turkish-Cypriot autonomy by further consolidating Ankara’s control in its 
domestic affairs.  
 
These anxieties were employed by the Cypriotness discourse which conceived and 
emphasised identity once again within an explicitly securitised framework (see Chapters 2 and 
3). In other words, Turkish-Cypriot identity was defined here in ‘existential’ terms as the 
fundamental stumbling block of the political community and with reference to its precarious 
autonomy that was threatened by Turkey through a double whammy of austerity/privatisation 
policies and the large-scale naturalisation of Turkish nationals (Afrika, 2012a). While the fierce 
debates on the austerity measures were reported widely by all media outlets, identity-related 
frames the newspapers themselves employed in representing ‘the settler issue’ have been 
articulated predominantly in the editorials and in the views of the columnists. Their opinions 
illustrate further the two contrasting discourses on identity – Cypriotness framing settlers’ 
citizenship rights and immigration on the whole as a threat to identity, and Turkishness on the 
other side, more welcoming to Turkish immigrants, arguing that stricter immigration and 
citizenship laws would harm the Turkish-Cypriot economy, weaken Turkish-Cypriot negotiating 
position on the Cyprus talks but also jeopardise fundamental rights’ of the immigrants, further 






A particularly outspoken critic of the ‘occupation regime’ but also the presence of 
populations from Turkey, the Afrika newspaper criticised the ‘Survival Rallies’ for not taking an 
explicit stance on “Turkey’s occupation of northern Cyprus” (2012b, c; 2013a) Nonetheless, it’s 
narrative still tied  the austerity measures and the privatisation plans of the UBP government 
(envisaged in the latest protocol with Turkey) to the issues of identity and citizenship, arguing 
that the new privatisations would deliver the ‘fatal blow’ to the Turkish-Cypriot community 
(‘Editorial’, 23 March 2012).  According to one high-profile columnist of the newspaper, the 
privatisations was part of a ‘grand plan’ envisaging the ‘Turkification of the island’ that had gained 
momentum with the failed ratification of the ‘Annan Plan’ (interview no. 13). During the Annan 
Plan referendum, the attitudes toward the settlers and Turkish immigrants were much more 
positive, describing them as ‘New Cypriots’. In other words, the issue was ‘massaged through’ to 
ensure a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum. But the ‘new Cypriots’ rhetoric was dropped in the post-
referendum period (interview no. 13). In his view, Turkey had transferred twice as many settlers 
into the island since 2004 and that with the takeover of the key assets such as electricity and 
water, the colonization of the northern part of the island would be virtually complete. Taking a 
step further, an article published in the Afrika newspaper further claimed that as a result of the 
numerical superiority of the settler constituency, all MPs in the future would be of Turkish origin 
(Levent, 2012a). A year later, echoing further the newspaper’s view on the ‘Survival Rallies’, the 
same columnist criticised the trade unions and the leftist parties for their ‘cowardly ignorance’ 
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on the involvement of Turkey who is ‘the real culprit’ (and not the Turkish-Cypriot government) 
imposing the new naturalisations (2013a). 
 
Another columnist of the Afrika newspaper, who writes regularly on identity and 
immigration-related issues including the citizenship status of Turkish settlers also insists that the 
current government in the north is only a puppet of Turkey which has occupied Cyprus since 
1974. In his view, the ongoing migration of Turkish nationals into northern Cyprus is part of 
systematic attempts of ‘Turkification’ and thus a ‘war crime’; the socio-economic problems facing 
the Turkish-Cypriot community also stem to a large extent from the transfer of population from 
Turkey (interview no. 14). For the columnist, large-scale naturalisations, granting of residency 
rights and allowing large numbers of settlers/immigrants to stay in the north undermines the 
Turkish-Cypriot identity and its Cypriot character above all:  
Even a first-generation settler [who had arrived on the island in 1975] shows no respect toward 
the Cypriot identity; they choose to emphasise their Turkishness instead. In fact, they see 
Cypriotness as a threat. These sorts of views were promoted by [the late Turkish-Cypriot leader] 
Denktash who claimed that the only true Cypriots were the donkeys of the Karpas peninsula. 
Denktash did not believe in his country, in his homeland or in his people; he chose instead to 
dedicate his political career for the promotion of Turkishness and Turkey’s interests on the island. 
Cypriotness is also seen as a threat because it could reunify the island in the true sense and the 
settlers feel they would be excluded under this scenario. They [also] have vested material 
interests in the status quo which benefited them tremendously: especially those who arrived in 
1975 —  they were given land and allocated housing which many sold later for huge sums of 
money, becoming ‘sterling millionaires’ overnight. Neither do they have any shared experience 
with the [other communities of Cyprus] (interview no.14).  
 
The line of argument introduced here, in relation to resource distribution is particularly 
telling. From this perspective, the settlers are portrayed as ‘debilitating people’, standing outside 
of the natives, utilising the unjust gains provided by the system. By construing the settlers as 
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backward in socio-economic terms, the narrative here establishes an axis placing settlers 
between the two extreme categories of ‘sterling millionaires’ or ‘scroungers’, emphasising in 
either case that they have benefitted unjustly from the status quo, given tremendous advantages 
and benefits on the one hand, or as a drain on scarce sources on the other.  
 
The latter is further emphasised in the context of austerity and privatisation policies in 
which immigrants/settlers are blamed for imposing a high burden on the state’s distributive 
capacities. Indeed, similar views are articulated in an article on the planned privatisation of the 
‘public electricity authority’ (KIBTEK) in which the large numbers of immigrants/settlers are 
blamed for the shortfall in the electricity production, ultimately suggesting that the price hikes 
and privatisation plans were designed from the outset to sustain an artificially bloated and 
unnecessarily large population of immigrants/settlers (Kişmir, 2013). Echoing similar views to 
Kutlu Adalı, the article also asserts that the financial assistance from Turkey is targeted primarily 
‘toward its own people’, hence insufficient to benefit the native Turkish-Cypriots (Kişmir, 2013). 
 
The daily Yenidüzen too, has been a consistent critic of Turkish migration into northern 
Cyprus and the naturalisation of large numbers of Turkish immigrants. Though the paper differs 
significantly from its rival Afrika, in its negation of using the ‘occupier’ label against Turkey, it has 
nonetheless promoted an assertive rhetoric on autonomy which calls for less interference from 
Ankara in Turkish-Cypriot affairs. On the settler issue too, the paper features regular columns on 
the issues of identity, immigration and the citizenship but traditionally the focal point of its 
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narrative (especially on citizenship) has been the authorities in Nicosia and not the Turkish 
governments. According to a high-profile columnist of the daily: 
The citizenship issue in northern Cyprus can be traced back to the Cyprus Problem. We were trying 
to prove that we were not a ‘minority’ against the Greek-Cypriots so [they] followed a deliberate 
policy of increasing the Turkish population on the island […] The biggest wave was following the 
war in 1974. Families from Anatolia were encouraged to settle in Cyprus. In the later years, the 
biggest explosion happened toward the end of the 1980s. During the Ozal administration in 
Turkey, entry with ID cards created a new rush. Immigration or population transfer are not the 
same as citizenship. But the right-wing governments [in Cyprus] and the clique in charge of the 
‘Cyprus affairs’ [in Turkey] made sure that the numbers were boosted also on paper. UBP was the 
main actor which created the sloppy, lax citizenship regime (Özuslu, 2013b).  
 
In another article, praising the tighter citizenship laws introduced a year later by the CTP 
government, the columnist would claim once again that UBP was the main culprit and CTP had 
always been the party to ‘apply the brakes’ on new citizenships: 
Citizenship policy exemplifies the ideological divide between the two mass parties positioned on 
the opposite ends of the political spectrum. On the one hand, there is the UBP with its remnant 
of the 1950s, ‘head-counting’ population policy, guided by the ‘Turk comes, another Turk goes’ 
practice; on the other hand, there is the CTP which approaches the issue of population transfer 
from a humanitarian but also legalistic and identity perspective […] The Turkish-Cypriot 
community can no longer bear the burden of ‘citizenship’ created mostly by the UBP (Özuslu,  
2014a). 
 
Indeed, the ‘burden of citizenship’ appears to be a reflection of the greater existential 
anxiety of the Turkish-Cypriot community stemming from the unresolved ‘Cyprus Problem’ 
(interview no.15). From this perspective, the Cypriotness discourse is a certain reaction that 
flourished following the de facto partition of the island in 1974, only to intensify in the following 
years with the migration of the Turkish populations into the island, especially in the early 1990s 
with the introduction of a laxer immigration regime which lifted passport requirement for entry. 
According to the columnist, there was a certain ‘misfit’ and ‘incompatibility from the outset as 
those who had arrived displayed little resemblance with the natives in terms of their socio-
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cultural background and lifestyle […]’ explaining to large extent the strong nativist reaction 
(interview no. 15). In the same vein, many believe that significant numbers of settlers still do not 
consider themselves ‘Turkish-Cypriots’ despite holding ‘TRNC’ citizenship (interview no.14 and 
no. 15). But it is the years of uncertainty and instability in the context of the lingering conflict, 
and the dependency on Turkey that has encroached into all aspects of life, including demography 
has created an ‘extinction syndrome’; immigration should thus be seen in the context of the 
Cyprus problem, and more specifically the non-recognition of northern Cyprus and the crippling 
dependency it’s contested status as a state has created on Turkey, or as a columnist put more 
poetically: ‘not knowing the size of its population, unable to print its own currency or to have 
control over its police force, unable to obtain its international postal code — or empathy, neither 
from its ‘south’ [the Republic] nor its ‘north’ [Turkey]’ (Özuslu, 2013a).  
 
A similar view is also promoted by another senior columnist of the Yenidüzen newspaper. 
An outspoken critic of the granting of new citizenships to Turkish migrants, the senior columnist 
has consistently framed the issue with an existential understanding of autonomy in which 
naturalisation of Turkish migrants is construed a threat to the ‘political will’ of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community. In this understanding, the granting of citizenship rights to Turkish nationals is seen 
as part of a bigger project to maintain right-wing governments and subsequently to consolidate 
Ankara’s grip over the Turkish-Cypriot community. An interesting feature of this leftist narrative 
is the distinction it introduces between protecting the rights of the Turkish migrant workers and 
their children on the one hand, and obtaining of citizenship rights on the other. This is illustrated 
in the argument put forward by the columnist, that ‘no one should ignore the bureaucratic 
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discrimination they face [in obtaining work permits], their exploitation [at the hands of illegal 
‘gangmasters’] or denial of their human rights […] they can be granted long-term work permits, 
residency rights and further easing in setting up their own businesses’; granting them citizenship 
rights however, ‘is an entirely different matter, a different politics […] and if it’s part of a grander 
operation[sic] to manipulate the political will […] that’s when we have to say enough is enough’. 
(Mutluyakalı, 2013a) A similar concern is also expressed by the journalist in relation to the unique 
political context marked by the ‘Cyprus Problem’, in that ‘[northern Cyprus] is not like any other 
country, [the total number of settlers] those that have been naturalised through the Cabinet and 
the ones that have been transferred now outnumber the natural-born citizens […] we have to 
draw a line, [with certain exceptions] all fresh naturalisations should be terminated indefinitely’ 
(Mutluyakalı, 2013b).  
 
Notwithstanding the consistent commitment the leftist newspapers Afrika and the 
Yenidüzen display to the ‘immigration threat’ narrative, other outlets are divided on the issue 
and their columnists represent diverse viewpoints. The Kıbrıs newspaper, is a good example here. 
An influential daily with the highest circulation (2011i), the newspaper’s editorial policy has also 
undergone the most profound change during the ‘Annan Plan’ years from a nationalist to a 
moderate, pro-EU stance (interview no.13). The newspaper has, nonetheless, maintained a 
balanced and neutral position on the settler issue, allowing a good range of views to be expressed 
in its columns. In this context, the Kıbrıs columnists articulate diverse viewpoints on immigration 




In this context, according to one columnist, Cypriotness is once again considered ‘a 
reactionary emphasis’ triggered by a genuine fear of identity loss and even ‘extinction’ (interview 
no. 16). The use of such cultural markers in everyday contexts such as authentic restaurants 
named in the Cypriot dialect is a manifestation of this anxiety to protect a distinct identity. 
Indeed, a similar argument is advanced in a column, further asserting that the socio-cultural 
changes that have taken place in the northern part of the island since the partition, do not reflect 
a positive transformation, ‘something that the Turkish-Cypriots themselves have undertaken’ 
and that with the constant undermining of those cultural values, it is inevitable the community 
‘will soon be snubbed [by the newcomers] on their own land’ (Hastürer, 2014). Another column 
written by the same author, in the context of the ongoing peace negotiations is even more 
alarming. In it, the columnist predicts that failure to reach a deal in current talks would result in 
a ‘population boom’ in the north through new wave of naturalisations (Hastürer, 2016). More 
specifically, the commentary claims that the new naturalisations would almost inevitably be 
imposed from Turkey, using ‘labour market shortages’ and ‘economic growth’ as pretexts and 
that no Turkish-Cypriot government would be able to resist such pressure from Ankara to 
introduce the ‘laxest citizenship regime’ to pave the way for fresh citizenships. Should the Cyprus 
problem linger beyond 2017, the article also projected that the population of the north, over the 
next several decades would surpass that of the Republic (Hastürer, 2016).  
 
As indicated above however, another high-profile columnist of the same newspaper has 
consistently promoted a nationalist understanding of Turkish-Cypriot identity, echoing the 
essentialist Turkishness discourse. According to the columnist, there were no concerns over 
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identity among the Turkish-Cypriot community following the partition of the island in 1974; 
instead there was an overwhelming support for the view that the Turkish-Cypriot people had 
originated from the Turkish mainland which became even more popular with the proclamation 
of independent statehood in 1983 (interview no 17). It was during this time that the so-called 
Cypriotness discourse — contemplated initially, in the columnist’s view, by the Greek-Cypriot 
politicians and AKEL in particular to undermine the national consciousness amongst the Turkish-
Cypriots — would be taken up by a small number of dissident voices from within the Turkish-
Cypriot community that begun to take issue with the strong, bilateral relations with Turkey 
(interview no. 17). The teachers’ union KTÖS in particular, was at the forefront of this ‘campaign’ 
and would later seek to rewrite history to serve this ‘false ideology’ further by omitting the 
Turkish-Cypriot national struggle from the school textbooks. Such indoctrinations through 
education and other organised activities at the union level, the columnist believes, was to 
instigate the debates over identity culminating in a certain ‘identity crisis’ (interview no. 15).   
 
Indeed, what is at the heart of the identity crisis, according to one of the prominent 
columnists of the Kıbrıs newspaper is a “rejection of Turkish identity” and ‘a peculiar form of 
racism unique to the Turkish-Cypriot community’ (Tolgay, 2015a). As the columnist would 
elaborate further in a particularly telling op-ed on Cypriotness:  
As for the so-called ‘Greek-speaking’ and ‘Turkish-speaking Cypriots’. This is a utopic idea, forged 
in order to create a ‘Cypriot race’. It is a dangerous virus that is being spread by the Greek 
imperialist propaganda. It is very clear that those living in the South [Greek-Cypriots] never act in 
the spirit of Cypriotness. They are guided by the spirit of Hellenism. Yet they expect from us, in 
fact they insist that we cut off our ties with our roots, our history, our ethnic values, tradition and 
culture and with [our motherland] Turkey. The [so-called intellectuals among us] are trotting 




Perhaps more remarkably, the columnist’s views on Turkish settlers also tie the issue onto 
an insular understanding of ‘human rights’ thus displaying great similarity with the narrative 
utilised by the nationalist civil society actors (see section 5.3 in Chapter 5) further propped up 
with neo-liberal undertones that are evident in right-wing party narratives (Chapter 4). To that 
end, and in relation to the immigration reform167 planned by the CTP-DP coalition government, 
the columnist wrote:  
These [systematic] blows to our economy are also devoid of any human rights concerns. The flight 
of thousands of Turkish origin migrants, those that form the backbone of our human capital — 
and the labour crisis [their return back to Turkey] has triggered — is repeatedly ignored. Those 
who didn’t leave voluntarily are now being forced to leave through this cynical immigration ploy. 
There are numerous associations representing sectoral interests but we lack an organisation to 
resist such gross undermining of human rights (Tolgay, 2015c). 
  
In this view, the current immigration system is one of the most ‘primitive’ in the world 
(interview no. 17). In sharp contrast to other countries with ageing populations, decision-makers 
in northern Cyprus have been creating numerous barriers for entry and unjust obstacles on the 
path for citizenship.  
A large population is needed for economic growth and there is nothing more normal than a 
country seeking to grow its population through immigration. Germany after the Second World 
War is a good example here, seeking to grow its population through immigration and offering 
these migrants German citizenship later on. If the Europeans can think in this way, why should it 
then be a concern when we bring labour force from other countries and grant them citizenships 
in due process? This is all due to the fact that the Greek-Cypriot side has used demographic 
arguments to undermine the Turkish-Cypriot case on the negotiating table. Frequent calls for the 
‘settlers’ and the Turkish military to be sent back is also part of the same ploy to facilitate, in the 
long term, the assimilation of the Turkish-Cypriot community (interview no. 17). 
                                                          
167 The bill was created in 2015 and restricted the length of the work permits to a maximum of three years 
following which the permit holder would be required to stay abroad for a minimum period of 90 days before 
becoming eligible to reapply. But with a change in government before a vote could take place, it was never ratified.   
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A sharp Turkishness rhetoric, framing the settler issue in essentialist, ethno-nationalist 
terms can also be found in the columns of the Halkın Sesi newspaper. In this vein, the presence 
of Turkish immigrants and their naturalisation are viewed within an explicitly nationalist 
framework characterised by the much-cherished Turkish-Cypriot relationship with Turkey and on 
the basis of ethnic-kinship. Perhaps more remarkably and largely due to the editorial legacy of 
the newspaper promoting a nationalist stance on the Cyprus conflict (the paper’s logo features a 
picture of its founder Dr Kuchuk set against the Turkish flag), the views expressed in its columns 
on issues relating to citizenship and immigration also tend, more often than not, to frame the 
presence of ‘settlers’ more explicitly within the context of the ongoing negotiations. In this sense, 
‘boosting the numbers’ through new citizenships to ensure a numerically stronger Turkish-
Cypriot community is seen as a ‘crucial policy’ in order to secure better consociational returns on 
the negotiating table, but also to ‘undermine Greek-Cypriot negotiating position which claims 
sole ownership of the whole island based on their numerical superiority […] offering, in turn, 
mere minority rights for the Turkish-Cypriot community’ (Aydeniz, 2015). A number of economic 
arguments are also utilised in this vein to promote the argument for a ‘larger population which 
can facilitate economic growth but also to generate more tax revenue in order to ensure the 
sustainability of the ‘pensions fund’ and to stop the worrying demise of state-run industries’ 
(Çetinel, 2012). This hybrid nature of the nationalist rhetoric on Turkish settlers and its 






6.5. Identity (re)construction and the immigration-settlement debate in the Turkish-Cypriot 
newspapers (1995-2013) 
 
As discussed in detail in the previous chapters and outlined further above, the nationalist 
Turkishness discourse based on independent statehood and an overarching Turkish identity was 
further entrenched in the aftermath of the Turkish military intervention. Under this 
representation, Turkish-Cypriot identity was effectively subsumed as a form of ethnic/local 
variation whereas Turkishness took pride of place. The establishment newspapers such as the 
Halkın Sesi that had begun circulating in the pre-1974 period subscribed without much hesitation 
to these official narratives and promoted Turkish nationalism with reference to the ‘national 
cause’. The so-called ‘national cause’ (milli dava) conceived statehood as an ‘inseparable part of 
the motherland Turkey’ requiring perpetual protection from the Greek-Cypriots. In the same 
vein, the presence of Turkish immigrants and their naturalisation have been viewed on the basis 
of ethnic-kinship, characterised also by the ‘much-cherished’ and ‘existential’ Turkish-Cypriot 
relationship with Turkey. More recently, in an effort to regain political legitimacy, the nationalist 
rhetoric has been discursively expanded to appeal to popular anxieties in relation to the 
economy, emphasising the positive contribution of Turkish immigrants/settlers into the economy 
(and similarly, the negative economic repercussions of limiting migration) but also to include a 





Though this appeal to some notion of human rights combining economic and cultural 
arguments may at first seem a progressive transformation from a highly rigid essentialist 
discourse, the study has shown that such reference to human rights remain firmly couched in a 
distinctly ethno-nationalist framing which is aimed at legitimising the rather asymmetrical 
relationship between Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot community. In this sense, the citizenship 
status of the Turkish immigrants is justified on the basis of ethnic-kinship, level of contribution 
to the economy, but above all its importance in the context of bilateral relations with Turkey in 
which the latter is privileged in ethno-mythical terms as the ‘motherland’. Moreover, in the 
context of the Cyprus problem, the Turkishness discourse also tries to capitalise on the alleged 
benefit of immigration and citizenship in boosting the Turkish-Cypriot population numerically in 
order to maintain a stronger position in relation to the Greek-Cypriot community, construed as 
the ‘threatening other’. As such, it is devoid of any democratic concerns. This is an important 
finding since it highlights the deployment and articulation of a range of civic and ethnic elements 
within the Turkishness discourse in its attempt to contest for hegemony. From this perspective, 
and similar to the narrative of the nationalist civil-society discussed in the previous chapter 
(Chapter 5), the nationalist rhetoric found within the Turkish-Cypriot newspapers (most notably 
in the Halkın Sesi and to a lesser extent in the Kıbrıs) can be regarded as an extension of a 
hegemonic project in constructing and consolidating a form of collective-identity by articulating 
as many available elements (i.e. ‘floating signifiers’, see Chapter 2) as possible. This assertion is 
also in line with the hypothesis posited in Chapter 2 and elaborated within the historical context 




Hypothesis 1: Given the local history and in the context of the Cyprus conflict, Turkish-Cypriot 
identity was cultivated and subsumed within a hegemonic notion of Turkishness that did not 
distinguish between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish settlers.  
 
 As noted previously, identity is conceived here as a discourse which is predicated on the 
ultimate impossibility of a total ‘closure’ that in turn makes a range of subversive articulations 
and political agency possible. From this perspective moreover, the social field is criss-crossed by 
cleavages and the presence of elements (‘floating signifiers’) that can be articulated by opposed 
political projects in constituting collective, political identities. Indeed, it was precisely within this 
context that the Turkish-Cypriot left capitalised on the immigration cleavage from the 1980s 
onwards to challenge the hegemonic Turkishness discourse with an alternative notion of 
belonging which emphasised a distinct ‘Cypriot’ character. Such Cypriotness discourse was 
constructed against a ‘threat’ that conceived the presence of populations from Turkey as part of 
Ankara’s assimilationist project to ultimately undermine the distinct Turkish-Cypriot identity and 
the community’s autonomy. 
 
In this respect, leftist and oppositional newspapers such as the Yenidüzen, the Ortam and 
later on the Afrika, explicitly linked immigration from Turkey and granting of citizenship rights to 
Turkish settlers onto the issues of identity, societal security and political autonomy. In this vein, 
immigration from Turkey was criticised for instigating the outflow of Turkish-Cypriots to other 
countries but more importantly, that the lax immigration regime facilitated the ‘transfer of 
population’ from mainland Turkey which endangered the ‘authentic’ Turkish-Cypriot identity but 
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also undermined long-term prospects of Turkish-Cypriot autonomy through the large-scale 
granting of citizenships to the ‘newcomers’. This media rhetoric on immigration and citizenship 
stem from a securitised Cypriotness discourse in which the presence of populations from Turkey 
are treated as an existential threat to the presumed ‘authority’, ‘authenticity’ and ‘ways of living’ 
of the Turkish-Cypriot society. Within this discourse, moreover, Turkish settlers were seen as a 
homogenous constituency that invariably supported the nationalist status quo and the Turkish 
tutelage over Turkish-Cypriot affairs. These claims were also articulated with an appeal to 
autonomy and a political project that would safeguard it.  
 
Significantly, such demands were at the heart of the anti-systemic discourse and would 
keep immigration high in the domestic agenda ahead of the looming referendum on Cyprus’s 
reunification on the eve of its EU accession. In this connection, the position of the influential 
Kıbrıs newspaper is telling. The newspaper that had thus far supported official positions on the 
Cyprus Problem, displaying suspicion if not outright hostility towards the EU, undertook a radical 
change in its editorial policy to a clear support for the ‘yes’ vote in the run up to the referendum 
in 2004 that would allow a reunified, federal Cyprus to join the EU. In parallel, and in stark 
contrast to its previously muted position on the issue, the newspaper also became an outspoken 
critic of the new citizenships, charging those in favour of the status quo with ‘treachery’ and 
betraying the political will of the Turkish-Cypriot community through illegal naturalisations. In 




Hypothesis 2: In the context of Cyprus’s accession into the EU and the anticipated Turkish-Cypriot 
integration into the European mainstream, Turkish settlers came to be perceived as a threat to 
Turkish-Cypriot identity. 
 
Certainly, there were moments in this period, and in the immediate aftermath of the 
referendum which pointed out a rather different, more inclusive (and equally de-securitised) 
rhetoric toward the settlers and their citizenship status. The response of the newspapers in this 
sense to the exclusion of settlers from new freedoms in movement following the opening of the 
crossing-points in 2003 is a case in point. So is the fact that the ‘settler issue’ was dropped from 
the political discussions on the eve of the crucial 2003 elections. Yet, these changes in rhetoric 
can also be explained by the fact that virtually all parties, including those critical of new 
citizenship claims, tried to appeal to the ‘settler vote’ for the elections and also for the 
referendum. To that end, even the Yenidüzen (bearing in mind its close ties to the CTP) toned 
down its reporting on the issue though only to now victimize the settlers that had been ‘targeted’ 
and ‘manipulated’ during this time by the right-wing parties against the ‘Annan Plan’ and the 
reunification of Cyprus. In other words, there is scarce evidence from the findings above to 
suggest a strong normative impact of ‘Europe’ and the ‘EU’ to suggest a transformative effect on 
the identity narratives articulated by the newspapers (this is further elaborated in the following 
chapter). 
  
In any case, the impact of the EU in seemingly transforming oppositional identity 
narratives began to lessen, once Cyprus was admitted to the EU as a divided island. As suggested 
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earlier, the peculiar and rather ‘marginal’ positioning of the Turkish-Cypriot community within 
the post-accession context (see section 3.4 in Chapter 3) has meant that the ‘EU project’ was 
unable to consolidate itself into a viable, more inclusive imaginary vis-à-vis the settlers. Instead, 
the pro-EU Cypriotness discourse that brought together large segments of the Turkish-Cypriot 
society and simultaneously led to a political sea-change in the run up to Cyprus’s EU accession 
became disorientated. This ‘dislocation’ can be explained by the lack of any systemic change in 
relation to integrating the Turkish-Cypriot community into the European mainstream which, at 
the discursive level, obstructed the continuity of the common ‘social imaginary’ or the markedly 
pro-EU (and more inclusionary) Cypriotness discourse. Moreover, the dislocatory experience of 
the aborted EU-membership has led to a new reconfiguration of the pre-existing elements 
articulated within this discourse for the leftist and oppositional newspapers in which settler 
antagonisms took centre stage. This argument was hypothesised in Chapter 2:  
 
Hypothesis 3: With the failure of the ‘Annan Plan’, the pro-EU Cypriotness discourse is 
disorientated and settler antagonisms take centre-stage. 
 
 While the Yenidüzen and Afrika remained committed towards reunification and EU-
membership, the post-referendum period has seen a vocal anti-Turkish rhetoric that surpassed 
the all-empowering pro-EU trend. To this end, these newspapers instrumentalised on the 
austerity policies which were gradually introduced from 2009 onwards, by adopting a more 
assertive rhetoric on Turkish-Cypriot identity in general and the bilateral relations with mainland 
Turkey in particular. During this time, Turkish-Cypriot identity was conceived once again within 
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an explicitly securitised framework and in relation to immigration from mainland Turkey. In this 
vein, the unions argued that the Turkish-Cypriot identity was put at risk not only through its 
positioning in relation to Turkey which excluded ‘mutual respect’ but also through the large-scale 
naturalisation of Turkish nationals that altered the domestic political balance, further 
consolidating Turkish domination and tutelage over Turkish-Cypriot affairs. The Afrika has 
remained consistent in its rhetoric which considers immigration an illegal population transfer 
hence describing everyone from Turkey as ‘settlers’. The Yenidüzen, on the other hand, has 
gradually sharpened its rhetoric on immigration and vis-à-vis Turkey, calling for greater 
autonomy in the face of increased interference from Turkey under the AKP government. 
  
In this sense, the most striking feature of the identity discourses on both sides, has been 
their remarkable modification in relation to the changing context, reflected in the articulation of 
more recent anxieties in their appeal to popular sentiments. As indicated above, this has been 
the case also with the introduction of a ‘human rights’ element within the Turkishness discourse 
together with a neoliberal argument to further frame immigration as much-needed ‘cheap 
labour’ mainly as a reaction to the oppositional rhetoric of the Cypriotness discourse which seems 
to have dominated the discussions in the second half of the time-period under study. For the 
Cypriotness discourse, on the other hand, the most notable change since 2004 has been in 
relation to the framing of Turkey. While the Afrika’s views on Turkey as an ‘occupier’ or 
immigration as an illegal population transfer did not change, what is striking is that once seen as 
marginal, similar views are now being taken by the more moderate Yenidüzen. Though the paper 
has continued to refrain from using an explicit ‘occupation’ rhetoric, certain elements of this 
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discourse has nonetheless spilled into its narrative. In this vein, the newspaper has taken a more 
explicit stance against Turkey and the increasingly authoritarian AKP government there, tying a 
number of elements including austerity and religiosity onto immigration in its articulation of the 
Cypriotness discourse. Within this discourse, the Turkish-Cypriot relations with Turkey are framed 
as one of subjugation, with immigration as part of the systematic efforts to sustain Ankara’s 
overwhelming influence over the Turkish-Cypriot affairs. In this vein, the AKP government is 
further criticised for implementing its Islamic agenda in northern Cyprus through policies to boost 
the public visibility of religious symbols in the building of new mosques but also through the 
religious indoctrination of the immigrant/settler population by swaying the right-wing UBP 
government to reintroduce mandatory religious education in schools, turning a blind eye on 
privately organised Koran lessons (illegal under the ‘TRNC’ constitution) and lately with the 
opening up of a ‘vocational Islamic college’.168  For the oppositional and leftist newspapers such 
as the Yenidüzen and the Afrika, and to a lesser extent the Kıbrıs, this is a worrying trend which 




This chapter examined the media narratives, in this case the newspapers, on immigration 
from Turkey and the citizenship rights of Turkish immigrants/settlers in relation to the wider 
framing of Turkish-Cypriot identity. As the chapter confirmed, the rhetoric utilised by newspapers 
and their columnists on these issues not only influence the nationalistic imagination in society 
                                                          
168 These are elaborated further in the following, concluding, chapter. 
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but were also shaped by the prevailing, rival discourses of Turkishness and Cypriotness that seek 
to capture the social imaginary. In their construction of national/cultural identity, the 
newspapers benefited from various strategies but mainly those of perpetuation and 
transformation. Reflecting on the changing political context, distinguished here with Cyprus’s 
entry into the European Union in 2004, the political continuity between past and present times 
was emphasized on the one hand, mainly within the essentialist Turkishness discourse while, on 
the other, a necessary and desired political change between now and the future was predicted 
by its rival Cypriotness version. Constructive strategies were also employed to forge an imagined 
community with reference to rival visions of Cypriotness and Turkishness.  
  
The introduction of the ‘EU factor’ into the political agendas of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community from the mid-1990s onwards had an important effect in this respect and in the 
representation of the ‘settler issue’ particularly within the Cypriotness discourse as the issue was 
largely downplayed in relation to a new ‘imaginary’ in which EU membership came to signify. As 
the EU became the focal aspect of identity narratives, immigration related anxieties became 
somewhat muted. This was only a partial, and perhaps an instrumental shift however, largely 
undertaken by the opposition in fear of losing votes from the settler constituency ahead of the 
referendum, and the ‘settler issue’ continued to lurk in the background as evidenced by the 





As asserted also in the previous chapter (Chapter 5) moreover, the partial nature of this 
discursive shift and the absence of a complete paradigmatic change in terms of how the settler 
issue was presented in the Turkish-Cypriot newspapers, can be explained by the structural and 
historical features of the settler issue (particularly its linkage to the bilateral relations with 
Turkey) as well as the contingent nature of the ‘window of opportunity’ represented by EU 
membership that was made available. Indeed, the impact of the EU in seemingly transforming 
oppositional identity narratives began to diminish once Cyprus was admitted to the EU as a 
divided island. The peculiar and rather ‘marginal’ positioning of the Turkish-Cypriot community 
within the post-accession context meant that the ‘EU project’ was unable to consolidate itself 
into a viable social, and perhaps a more inclusive imaginary in relation to the ‘settler question’. 
In this case, this was evidenced by the re-introduction of the immigration-related anxieties into 
oppositional rhetoric particularly in the ‘austerity period’ from 2008 onwards to, in effect, take 
centre stage in organising Cypriotness centred identity discourses in the post-referendum period. 
  
Such discursive structuring of immigration and the citizenship rights of Turkish settlers 
within prevalent perceptions toward Turkey point out to the pervasiveness of the unresolved 
‘Cyprus Problem’ in all spheres of life and with important implications for the construction of 
inclusive identities, domestic balance of power and above all, the framing of the conflict. These 
issues are elaborated further in the following, concluding chapter which reviews the research 
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This thesis has investigated the politics and discourses of Turkish migration into northern 
Cyprus in relation to conceptions of identity in the Turkish-Cypriot community. The first chapter 
briefly introduced the historical context for the study of Turkish migration, the focus and 
timeframe of this research, its scope and the discursive methodology utilised for the analysis. 
The following chapter (Chapter 2) then reviewed the literature on nationalism, identity and 
immigration paying specific attention to the discursive construction of national identities and 
their securitization in relation to immigration. In Chapter 2, the Turkish-Cypriot case was 
positioned within the discussion on identity and differentiation on which the conceptual 
framework of the thesis is premised and a set of working hypotheses were introduced for 
studying the impact of Turkish migration on three empirical domains, namely the political parties, 
civil society and the print media. Chapter 3 further elaborated on the historical evolution of the 
notion of Turkishness in the Turkish-Cypriot community, which provided the context for the 
empirical chapters that followed. Chapter 4 looked at the articulation of identity and immigration 
in the political discourse by the mainstream parties. Chapter 5 discussed the civil society 
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responses to immigration from Turkey and Chapter 6 examined the discursive construction of 
identity and the ‘immigration-settlement debate’ in the Turkish-Cypriot newspapers.    
 
This concluding chapter aims at revisiting the conceptual framework, returning to the 
hypotheses which guided the empirical analysis and outlining avenues for future research.  The 
following section (7.2) provides a conceptual review of the investigated impact of migration on 
conceptions of identity in the Turkish-Cypriot community. The third section (7.3) revisits the 
working hypotheses and the overall research question. Here, the change and continuity in 
conceptions of identity and their interplay with immigration all three empirical domains (political 
parties, civil society and the print media) is discussed in comparative perspective. This is aimed 
at providing a rounded presentation of the ‘settler debate’ in northern Cyprus. The contribution 
of the thesis, in both empirical and conceptual terms, is presented in section 7.4, before some 
concluding remarks on the future of the identity debate in the Turkish-Cypriot community and 
the related research on immigration and identity change in other comparable settings (7.5). 
 
7.2. Nation, identity and differentiation: Dynamics of Change     
 
In the empirical chapters above, the impact of Turkish migration on conceptions of 
identity was structured along three distinct empirical domains: political parties (Chapter 4), civil 
society (Chapter 5) and the print media (Chapter 6). In each of those domains, the conceptual 
framework of identity change was applied, with particular reference to two dynamics, as 
presented in the literature review: a) discursive construction involving the articulation of ‘floating 
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signifiers’ and b) securitization. In each of those empirical domains, the analysis also outlined a 
number of context-specific factors (unique to northern Cyprus) which further mediate the 
conceptualisation of Turkish migration. In order to provide a complete account of the identity 
debate in the Turkish-Cypriot community, this section aims at recapping the impact of migration 
on identity at the conceptual level before reflection on the empirical findings of the study based 
on its articulation by various actors and in distinct empirical domains. In other words, this section 
aims to discuss how some of the key premises of immigration and identity change (outlined in 
Chapter 2) have applied to the case-study. This will also enable further elaboration on cross-
sectoral themes and provide a wider reflection on the empirical findings, before the thesis is 
concluded.  
*** 
One of the key assumptions of this research is that identity in general and national identity 
in particular, is produced and renegotiated in discourse. As highlighted in the literature review 
(Chapter 2) dealing with nationalism, the idea of the nation and the notion of national identity 
became salient only in the modern period as a result of economic and social changes. The earlier 
modernist perspective considered nations and the national identities attached to them as 
constructs, forged by elites to achieve various socio-political and economic objectives. Gellner 
(1997: 7), for example, famously suggested that nationalism was not an ‘awakening of nations to 
self-consciousness’ but that it invented nations where they did not exist. Hobsbawm (2012: 1) 
too claimed that nationalist leaders went so far as to invent ‘national traditions’ in order to 
reproduce nationalist sentiment which implied continuity with the past in order to invoke 
legitimacy for the present (Hobsbawm, 2012: 1-2). Benedict Anderson (1991) elaborated on 
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these arguments further with more systematic attention to the role of the ‘print capitalism’ which 
has not only engaged in history-making but has constituted the nation as a community albeit an 
imagined one (Anderson, 1991: 1).  
 
The historical evolution of Turkishness in the Turkish-Cypriot community (see above, 
sections 3.2 and 3.3 in Chapter 3) as a hegemonic identity largely mirrors this process of identity 
construction described above, yet with an important distinction. As the analysis has further 
revealed, the mechanism through which the nation and national identity have been construed in 
this case is not one of an entirely novel creation but a rather derivative process, mirroring the 
developments in its near abroad, especially Turkey. More specifically, the notion of Turkishness, 
or the idea of belonging to the greater Turkish nation, as the study has tried to highlight, wasn’t 
a natural given or an ideal that was fostered in a vacuum but emerged gradually through 
interaction and borrowing from earlier Turkish nationalist currents within the Ottoman Empire 
and later with the Turkish Republic. Indeed, it was a complex set of domestic but also external 
dynamics ranging from inter-ethnic relations (the perceived threat of rising Greek nationalism, in 
particular) and the colonial politics to developments in Turkey which would lead to the 
development of an ethno-nationalist Turkishness discourse to further foster nationalism and 
prompt its expression in political action.  
 
Nonetheless, nationalism in the Turkish-Cypriot community (as in other cases) too was 
initially an elite-driven project rather than a popular movement. Building upon the earlier 
modernist/constructivist approaches, a number of scholars have widely argued that it is 
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nationalism that creates and defines nations and our attention should return to more fruitful 
concepts of power, discourse and ideology. Wodak et al. (2009: 153) have argued that the idea 
of a national community becomes reality ‘through reification and rhetoric orchestrated by the 
political elite, intellectuals and the media and circulated through education, mass 
communication, and other policy regimes’. Indeed, as Calhoun (1997: 30) has pointed out, the 
construction of national identity is ‘a self-conscious and manipulative project carried out by elites 
who seek to secure their power by mobilizing followers on the basis of nationalist ideology’. This 
was also manifest in the Turkish-Cypriot case. A number of nationalist organisations, 
personalities but also newspapers thus played a significant role in the dissemination of nationalist 
ideology to the Turkish Cypriot population at large and promoted the ethnic kinship of the Turkish 
and Turkish-Cypriot populations during the period when nationalist fervour in Turkey was at its 
peak during the Turkish War of Independence led by the Kemalists and later with the founding 
of the new Turkish Republic in 1923 (see Chapter 1). 
 
While particular note is made of the impact of external stimuli from Turkey and its 
interaction with the domestic context in spurring the notion of Turkishness, the study also 
acknowledged and sought to elucidate the contestation and differentiation that is inherent to 
nation-building and in the construction of a national identity. In other words, rather than arguing 
that national identity requires those who share it to have ‘something in common’ and exploring 
the ‘cultural content’ of Turkishness, the study sought to unpack the contextual and contested 
processes hidden behind its conception. That identities are constructed but also contested and 
modified has thus been a key assumption of this research from the outset. Premised on the 
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discourse of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and construed through the articulation of signifying elements from 
pre-existing discourses, competing definitions of national/collective identity are employed to 
construct distinct ‘imagined communities’ to seek legitimacy, consolidate control or rally support 
for alternative/subversive agendas. Contrary to the assertions that national identity is a natural 
phenomenon, the study confirmed that it is a product of the dialectical relationship between 
discursive acts and social practices. The conception of Turkishness in this case shifted and 
transformed with changes in the social, political and economic dynamics that were also 
instrumental in opening the discursive space for its contestation. Indeed, the study also 
confirmed that other, subversive visions of collective identity based on the notion of Cypriotness 
in particular also co-existed throughout the period studied. 
 
This finding also complements the discourse theoretical assumptions of Laclau and 
Mouffe (2001) on hegemony and social change. In their discourse theory, Laclau and Mouffe 
define floating signifiers as concepts or political demands that do not have any intrinsic meanings, 
only non-deterministic traces of past articulations; their actual value depends on their precise 
definition in a specific historical context. From this perspective, dominant discourses such as 
Turkishness prevail by marginalising radically different discourses and by naturalising their 
hierarchies and exclusions. Yet, despite this, no hegemony can remain stable. This is because a) 
a hegemonic discourse cannot fix a meaning onto a ‘floating signifier’ but also because there is 
always an ‘outside’ in the field of discursivity that threatens the stability of the ‘inside’ and reveals 
the traces of its contingency. In the Turkish-Cypriot case, the contingency of the Turkishness 
discourse which succeeded to hegemonise the notion of belonging was gradually revealed with 
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the de facto portioning of the island in 1974 and with the introduction of an ‘other’ — the 
migrants/settlers from Turkey — that proved difficult to capture adequately in ethno-nationalist 
terms. While other important identity signifiers were acknowledged (see the ‘introductory 
chapter’), immigration from mainland Turkey and the presence of Turkish settlers in northern 
Cyprus was thus chosen as the key signifier which constituted rival accounts of the Turkish-
Cypriot identity in the period under study.   
 
More specifically, the study identified and examined the articulations of collective 
(national) identity and immigration-settlement along two antagonistic discourses: a historical 
version emphasizing irredentist ‘motherland nationalism’ and the newer, subversive version of 
Cypriotness discourse. Although each presented itself as the real and natural identity, the analysis 
tried to capture their contingency and modification within different contexts. In general, the 
nationalist discourse — fervently advocated by the late Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and 
to a large extent by the right-wing parties that have historically dominated the Turkish-Cypriot 
administration – did not differentiate a Turkish national from a Turkish-Cypriot, categorizing the 
mainland Turks and native Turkish-Cypriots under the same group. Turkish immigrant-settlers 
were described as co-ethnics or ethnic-kins from the historical homeland. In contrast, the 
Cypriotness discourse asserted a divergence in relation to Turkish migrants/settlers to emphasize 
its distinction on the basis of ‘authenticity’ but also autonomy.   
 
The ways in which immigration and the ‘immigrant other(s)’ become privileged signs, or 
a key signifier in organizing discourses on identity have been elaborated in a number of works 
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from the immigration literature and the literature on securitization in particular. Buzan and 
Wæver’s conceptualisation of ‘societal security’ in particular has suggested that societies, 
defined in terms of identity, could be seen as the referent-object for some cases of securitization 
in which what could be lost is not only sovereignty in the hard sense, but also identity. As the 
authors have argued, the two concepts can share the same label of ‘existential threat’ since: ‘for 
a state, sovereignty defines when a threat is existential, because if a state is no longer sovereign, 
it is no longer a state; and similarly identity is the defining point regarding existential threats for 
a society […]’ (1997: 242). Indeed, identity could be a possible object of securitization since it can 
hold a symbolic power which makes it efficient to invoke and it can take a form which makes 
securitarian discourse possible, that is making a claim to survival as well as articulating what non-
survival would mean (Buzan and Wæver, 1997: 243). 
 
The study has confirmed that such speech-acts to securitize identity were discernible in 
both versions of national identity. The Turkishness discourse that had been dominant prior to 
2003 as the official state ideology used speech-acts to demonise the Greek-Cypriot community 
as the enemy and a threat to the Turkish-Cypriot population with their intention described as 
perpetually aiming to deprive Turkish-Cypriots of their state and sovereignty – the twin notions 
which embodied national identity. Demonization of the other, while aimed at forging a ‘national 
community’ also marginalised different discourses and silenced internal dissent. The discourses 
that challenged official narratives on Turkishness and groups which promoted the alternative 
notion of Cypriotness were thus cast aside as the adversaries of the Turkish-Cypriot people, or 
indeed accused of national sacrilege.  
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The Cypriotness discourse, too, utilised similar securitizing acts in its narrative on identity 
and in the framing of Turkish immigrants/settlers. This is an important finding which confirmed 
another key assumption of this study that within a securitarian discourse on national identity, 
the former can be linked to immigration by framing the latter as an existential threat to the 
presumed ‘authority, ‘authenticity’ and ‘ways of living’ of the host society. The bourgeoning 
literature on immigration briefly outlined in Chapter 2 also suggests that political discourse and 
public opinion toward the former is largely influenced by anxieties and fears about physical 
security, ‘well-being’ and national identity. In addition to physical insecurity, threat perceptions 
to presumed authenticity of the ‘national culture’ and national identity have been shown to 
promote ingroup solidarity and ethnocentrism. The notion of border is a particularly relevant 
signifier which articulates immigration within a securitised context and in relation to collective 
(national) identity. The notion of border links immigration and national identity to one another 
by articulating the ‘immigrant’ as a cultural ‘other’ who, by crossing the border, disturbs the 
identity and the presumed authenticity of the host society. Immigrants who cross the border or 
who are already inside the national territory are then associated with ‘incivilities’, and ‘alien 
forms of violence’ (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002); they are also often attributed different cultural 
identities that are not compatible with the ways of life, culture and the identity of the society. 
Immigrants from Turkey and settlers (Turkish-origin TRNC citizens) were also treated as the 
‘other’ and as a homogenous group within the Cypriotness discourse such negative attributes. 
While this finding is in line with the conclusion of previous socio-psychological inquiries into 
identity formation in general and in the Turkish-Cypriot community in particular, describing the 
othering process with reference to Freud’s notion on the ‘narcissism of small differences’ (Aksoy, 
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2005: 3). The study has further revealed the fact that Turkish migrants/settlers were not only 
seen as a threat to the perceived ‘authenticity’ in socio-cultural terms but also signified the 
precarious nature of the Turkish-Cypriot autonomy with regards to its relationship with Turkey 
(this is elaborated further below).  
 
As stressed previously moreover, the two competing discourses Turkishness and 
Cypriotness, each embodying certain power relations and ideological assumptions, had been 
battling for dominance. The migration of populations from Turkey from 1974 was a particularly 
important cleavage which drove the contestation and was chosen as the primary unit of analysis 
here. More remarkably, as the study has attested, the discursive contestation between the two 
meta-narratives on Turkish-Cypriot identity also brought about their modification, a finding in 
line with the conceptual framework elaborated in Chapter 2 and recapped above. The conception 
of Turkishness and its framing of immigration shifted and transformed with changes in the social, 
political and economic dynamics that were also instrumental in opening the discursive space for 
its contestation by the rival Cypriotness discourse, which showed variation in content and 
intensity. In other words, the ongoing rivalry between the two discourses for domination has 
meant a certain fluctuation in trying to fix a meaning onto Turkish-Cypriot identity in relation to 
migration in a changing context which undermined their stability.  
 
The change and continuity in relation to each discourse type is further captured in the 
notion of dislocation referring to the ‘displacing’ process which reveals the contingency of the 
discursive structures. Such processes disorientate the already existing identities (or discourses) 
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and induce an identity crisis which, in turn, opens up a discursive space for the constitution of 
new identities. The contingency but also the dislocation and displacement of dominant 
discourses was operationalised in the study with reference to a critical juncture (that is, times 
when social identities are in a crisis and structures need to be recreated) that subjects are 
compelled to identify with discourses which seem capable of suturing the rift in the symbolic 
order. It is also at these critical junctures that what Laclau (1990) calls myths emerge to construct 
new spaces of representation by articulating dislocated elements and social demands. When a 
myth or a political project has proved to be successful, it is transformed into a social imaginary 
that is defined by Laclau as a ‘horizon’ or ‘absolute limit which structures a field of intelligibility’ 
(Howarth et al., 2000: 16). From this perspective, Cyprus’s accession into the EU presented a 
critical juncture which led to a disorientation of the hegemonic Turkishness discourse and 
presented a strategic opportunity for the Cypriotness discourse to ascend. It is further argued 
that the inability of the ‘EU Project’ to integrate northern Cyprus into the European mainstream 
has resulted in a dislocatory experience which led to a crucial discursive shift in oppositional, pro-
EU discourse to transform and reorganise, once again, around the issue of Turkish settlers and 
opposition against the ‘assimilationist immigration-settlement policies’ purportedly engineered 
by the AKP government in Turkey.  
 
It is nonetheless important to note that such shifts and dislocatory moments, while 
emphasising contingency, do not preclude the relative endurance of the meta-narratives on 
Turkish Cypriot identity. In fact, while the discursive rivalry brought about their modification with 
important changes in the way they attempted to capture the key issues discussed here 
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(immigration and the settler issue, in particular) such contestation also showcases how both 
narratives have co-opted a range of justifications as the extension of a hegemonic struggle and 
to maintain their own power relations. The findings of the study elaborated further below also 
show that there was no paradigmatic change during the period of study and the ‘core’, structural 
frames (relating to the symptomatic extension of the ‘Cyprus Problem’, see below) remained 
relatively durable. 
 
In sum, identity was conceptualised here in an operationalised and embedded way, 
pegged onto a theory of discourse which is produced through competing articulations of ‘Turkish 
settlers’. To suggest that collective identity be understood as a discourse does not assume a priori 
definition of the former or the pre-given attributes attached to it. Instead these definitions are 
allowed to emerge from specific empirical analyses. Articulation, securitization but also 
dislocation have been identified as the key dynamics which construct and reconstruct identities 
that are in constant flux due to their inherent indeterminacy (at least in principle, see section 
2.2.b in Chapter 2). In addition, and in line with much of the literature on nationalism and national 
identity, the study has also acknowledged the ‘agency’ of various social actors in the 
orchestration, reconstruction and dispersal of various discursive frames. From this perspective, 
the study has examined the articulation of settlers by the Turkish-Cypriot political parties, civil 
society and the print media which were considered key empirical domains in the discursive 
construction of Turkish-Cypriot identity. The following section discusses in a comparative manner 
how each discursive mechanism of identity change outlined above has applied to the case-study 
by looking at its impact in the three empirical domains. This will also enable further elaboration 
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on cross-sectoral themes and provide a wider reflection on the empirical findings, before the 
research is concluded.  
 
7.3. Looking back: Research Question and Hypotheses Revisited 
 
This section revisits all three hypotheses and the overall research question of this thesis, and 
concludes the investigation of the impact of immigration on identity in the Turkish-Cypriot 
community, before proceeding to the concluding remarks with regards to the thesis contribution 
and future prospects for the ‘settler debate’ in Cyprus and beyond. As set out in the introductory 
chapter, the thesis sought to investigate the impact of migration on conceptions of collective 
identity in northern Cyprus formulated in the following, overarching research question:  
 
• What has been the impact of immigration from mainland Turkey on conceptions 
of collective identity in northern Cyprus? 
 
In Chapter 2, three working hypotheses, which correspond to the discursive change in identity 
conceptions were set to track the impact of immigration across three distinct empirical domains: 
political parties (Chapter 4), civil society (Chapter 5) and the print media (Chapter 6). Each of 
those hypotheses were tested in each of the separate empirical domains.  




Hypothesis 1: Given the local history and in the context of the Cyprus conflict, Turkish-Cypriot 
identity was cultivated and subsumed within a hegemonic notion of Turkishness that did not 
distinguish between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish settlers. 
  
This hypothesis is concerned with the impact of Turkish migration on the notion of 
Turkishness. A thorough investigation of Turkish nationalism was first provided in section 3.2 
which discussed the specific historical juncture at the beginning of the twentieth century by 
providing a brief chronological analysis of the spread of Turkish nationalism which rendered 
Turkishness the primary locus of collective-identity. Key elements of the nationalist discourse 
which came to constitute and entrench Turkishness were also highlighted throughout.  As the 
investigation attested, a national identity based on Turkishness was cultivated from the late 
nineteenth century onwards in conjunction with several domestic and international 
developments (in the Turkish mainland) to replace the ethno-religious form of Ottomanism (on 
Ottomanism, see Ergul, 2012). While Turkish nationalism in Cyprus was to an important extent 
characterised by kin-state nationalism, that is a response to the nationalist developments in the 
Turkish mainland, the study has also highlighted the specific characteristics and conditions of the 
domestic context which bore out, sustained and at times, magnified Turkish nationalist 
sentiment. Of these domestic factors, the long-term economic prospects of the Muslim/Turkish 
community, rapid and large-scale emigration but also the perturbing prospects of ‘communism’ 
— all perceived to be threatening the very survival of the Muslim/Turkish community in the face 




Encapsulating the idea of Cyprus’s union with Greece, the goal of enosis indeed laid at the 
heart of Cypriot Muslims’ fears over their autonomy as a distinct community. The argument 
advanced here was that economic prosperity was not only a goal in-itself but would provide the 
Muslim community with the means they desperately needed in order to maintain their 
‘authentic’ identity and reassert their ‘autonomy’ against the economically superior Greek 
community. It was also widely argued that unemployment had been forcing many ‘Muslims’ to 
emigrate (mainly to Turkey) for better economic prospects. This was particularly worrying for a 
small minority who feared that the better-educated and economically more advanced Orthodox 
population would ultimately use their economic muscle to assimilate the numerically weakened 
Muslim/Turkish community. In the following decades, the nationalist movement succeeded in 
galvanising these ‘existential anxieties’ into stronger national identification with Turkishness. Also 
discerned in this context was that the version of Turkishness that began taking root in Cyprus 
from the early 1920s onwards was conceived not as a sui generis identity but rather an 
overarching notion of belonging to the greater Turkish nation which had replaced the ethno-
religious Ottoman identity. 
 
By the 1950s, Turkish nationalism became a reckonable movement and fought under the 
banner of the TMT against Greek-Cypriot enosis and ultimately for the partition of the island in 
order to unify with Turkey (taksim). The establishment of an independent, bi-communal Republic 
in 1960 failed to provide a remedy for the violent nationalist conflict which ultimately led to de-
facto partition of the island when large numbers of Turkish-Cypriots retreated into ethnic 
enclaves (1963-64). Turkish-Cypriot enclavement contributed significantly to the further 
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deterioration of relations between the two communities but most importantly, it consolidated 
the hegemony of Turkish nationalism. Territorial separation was also fortified with the ideological 
exclusion of Cypriotness from official discourses dominated by the monolithic conception of 
Turkishness. The hegemonic Turkishness discourse remained prevalent after 1974 when the 
island was partitioned as a result of Turkish military intervention and dominated official 
conceptions of identity for much of the Turkish-Cypriot administration’s history. 
 
In this context, the hypothesis concerning the hegemonic construction of Turkishness was 
confirmed in all three case studies. As discussed in Chapter 4, the right-wing parties DP and the 
UBP have both acted as staunch advocates of ‘ever-closer’ links with Turkey, conceived not only 
in geo-strategic terms that denotes the latter clear political/military rights in relation to Cyprus, 
but also in nationalist-mythological terms as the ‘motherland’ that the ‘TRNC’ (as the so-called 
‘infant-land’ or yavruvatan in Turkish) and the ‘Turkish population of Cyprus’ depends for its 
security and well-being. As the hypothesis purported, Turkish-Cypriot identity, within this 
‘motherland/infant-land’ narrative, is conceived not as a sui generis identity but as a form of 
ethnic/local variation in which Turkishness takes pride of place and signifies belonging to the 
larger Turkish nation. This was evident in the parties’ programmes, describing the Turkish-Cypriot 
community as an indivisible part of the Turkish nation based on history, culture, language and 
religion but also in their efforts to utilise ethno-national myths (in combination with other civic 
references to sovereign statehood169) in relation to immigration to advance the argument that 
                                                          
169 This is elaborated further below. 
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Turkish migrants/settlers and native Turkish-Cypriots belonged in the same ethnic group with 
‘common roots’ in Anatolia. 
 
 The nationalist rhetoric of the ‘fighters’ associations’ examined in Chapter 5 also did not 
deviate from the official discourse of the nationalist leadership and the political elite which 
dominated the Turkish-Cypriot political scene until the early 2000s (see sections 3.3 and 3.4 in 
Chapter 3). Similar to the situation in the south (Papadakis, 2003) but also in other cases of post-
conflict as Croatia (Fisher, 2002) various ‘fighters’ associations’ which represent those who 
fought against Greek-Cypriots present perhaps the strongest nationalist and extreme nationalist 
factions in Cyprus. As it was highlighted in that discussion, these actors can be categorised as 
‘nationalist’ in a dual sense, in articulating an ethno-nationalist conception of collective identity 
whilst maintaining a discourse of victimhood in relation to the ‘Cyprus Problem’ in order to 
securitise that particular conception in a nationally-insular perspective. Within it, the ‘Cyprus 
Problem’ is framed as the Turkish-Cypriot ‘oppression’ at the hands of the Greek-Cypriot 
majority; the Turkish military intervention that ensued following a coup attempt against 
President Makarios in 1974 is seen in this context as the ‘liberation’ of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community which put an end to ‘Greek atrocities’ and settled the Cyprus Problem by bringing 
about ‘bizonality’ in which Turkish-Cypriots could now lead ‘peaceful’ lives in the safety of their 
own state under the effective guarantee of ‘motherland’ Turkey. In this vein, these organisations 
also favour pursuing closer relations with Turkey and promote a positive view of immigration 
from the mainland. The twin issues of immigration and citizenship rights of Turkish settlers are 
considered within an explicitly nationalist framework characterised by the much-cherished 
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Turkish-Cypriot relationship with Turkey and on the basis of ethnic-kinship. Moreover, recent 
attempts to introduce stricter requirements for the acquisition of citizenship for Turkish 
immigrants are criticized by these groups as breaching of immigrants’ human rights and with 
negative repercussions for the economy.  
 
The investigation of media rhetoric in Chapter 6 has also shown that exactly the same 
appeal is taken up by the establishment newspapers such as the Halkın Sesi and by nationalist 
columnists in other outlets. In other words, the presence of Turkish immigrants and their 
naturalisation were viewed on the basis of ethnic-kinship, the ‘existential’ Turkish-Cypriot 
relationship with Turkey but also framed as an ‘economic necessity’ and branded a ‘human rights 
issue’. The similarity, however, is not accidental. The suggestion that Turkish immigrants/settlers 
are good for the economy and that their entry and settlement should be treated as a human-
rights issue has broader political appeal. It is, in fact, used as part of an effort to regain political 
legitimacy. Though such references to human rights and positive economic contribution in the 
articulation of immigration may at first seem a progressive position, the study has shown that 
they are couched in a distinctly ethno-nationalist framing of the Turkish-Cypriot relationship with 
Turkey, thus devoid of any democratic concern. In other words, there is a hierarchical relationship 
between the propositions of the Turkishness discourse which are ultimately aimed at preserving 
the power constellation that exists between Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot community. In 
discursive terms, statements based on economic arguments and with reference to human rights 
are uttered here in a particular configuration, combined in ways to privilege but also marginalise; 
the Turkish migrant/settler is privileged on the basis of ethnic kinship and from a specific context 
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of ‘kinship’ which does not apply to other immigrant groups. The specific context of ‘kinship’ is 
also characterised by a certain dependency of the Turkish-Cypriot community to Turkey. The 
asymmetrical context characterised by the ‘special relationship with Turkey’ in which Turkish-
Cypriots depend on Turkey for their ‘well-being’ and ‘security’ is thus emphasized to counteract 
or override other immigration-related concerns. Last but not least, it is an exclusionary discourse 
in relation to the Greek-Cypriot community by justifying a nationalist Turkish-Cypriot position on 
the negotiating table in which the latter’s demands are bolstered through 
demographic/numerical strength. More importantly perhaps, the deployment and articulation of 
a range of civic and ethnic elements within the Turkishness discourse can be regarded as the 
extension of a hegemonic struggle in constructing and stabilising a form of collective identity by 
articulating as many available elements (i.e. ‘floating signifiers’, such as the economy, ‘security’ 
and ‘human rights’, see Chapter 2) as possible.  
This assertion is also in line with the hypothesis posited in Chapter 2 and elaborated within the 
historical context in Chapter 3:  
 
Hypothesis 2: In the context of Cyprus’s accession into the EU and the anticipated Turkish-Cypriot 
integration into the European mainstream, Turkish settlers came to be perceived as a threat to 
Turkish-Cypriot identity.  
 
As noted earlier in Chapter 2, the theory of discourse that is utilised in this study, based 
loosely on the post-structuralist Discourse Theory (DT), is predicated on the ultimate impossibility 
of closure, a condition that makes articulatory practices and political agency possible. Thus, 
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hegemonic practices presuppose a social field traversed with antagonisms but also elements 
(‘floating signifiers’) that can be articulated by various political projects. Indeed, it was precisely 
this context which created the condition of possibility for empowering the discourse of 
Cypriotness and initiated its rivalry with the hegemonic Turkish nationalism. The migration and 
presence of populations from Turkey developed into a major cleavage between the two rival 
interpretations of national identity and provided the anti-establishment left with an opportunity 
to challenge the hegemony of the Turkishness discourse with an alternative notion of belonging 
which emphasised a distinct ‘Cypriot’ character. Such a commitment, moreover, to the 
indigenous character of the Turkish-Cypriot identity was constructed against a ‘threat’ that 
conceived immigration-settlement from mainland Turkey as part of Ankara’s assimilationist 
project to ultimately undermine the distinct Turkish-Cypriot identity and its long-term autonomy. 
 
This hypothesis was tested in all three case studies which traced the securitization of the 
settler issue within the Cypriotness discourse in the specific time period marked by anticipated 
EU membership. Though not immediate in its impact and certainly not an outcome wholly of this 
specific context, the study has shown that the EU was instrumentalised heavily during this time 
within the Cypriotness narrative, offering a new political reality. Indeed, from the early 1990s 
onwards, Cyprus’s EU accession process gradually came to be viewed by the Turkish-Cypriot left 
as a political project that could enhance their community’s security and consolidate its ‘distinct’ 
identity. They sought to attain this goal by creating a social imaginary (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) 
through discourse whereby the Turkish-Cypriot community was conceived as a member of the 
international community but also a stronger collectivity (the European Union) beyond the control 
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of Turkey. The economic lure of EU membership was important to the extent that it would end 
the crippling isolations over the Turkish-Cypriot economy, foster growth and stem the worrisome 
decline of the Turkish-Cypriot community numerically through emigration. But above all, such 
integration meant an endorsement of the Turkish-Cypriot community internationally and a 
recognition of its well-defined identity. In this political vein, the EU was framed within a popular 
struggle against the Denktash-UBP establishment and came to signify such political notions of 
‘democracy’, ‘peace’ and ‘freedom’ and ultimately the upholding of ‘Turkish-Cypriotness’ that 
had been undermined by the nationalist policies of the Turkish-Cypriot regime not least through 
the large-scale naturalisation of Turkish immigrants/settlers. As such, the EU soon became a 
central element of the collective identity discourses invoked by political actors on the left of the 
political spectrum and played a critical role in galvanising support against the Turkish nationalist 
hegemony by legitimising the alternative conceptions of belonging, namely Cypriotness. The 
rhetoric surrounding the ongoing naturalisations on the eve of Cyprus accession into the EU 
further indicated the securitised nature of the issue in propagating fear that the fresh citizens 
would oppose the ‘Annan Plan’ and torpedo Turkish-Cypriot prospects of joining the EU. 
 
In this connection, the study has found that Turkish migration was construed by the leftist 
parties CTP and the TKP (later BDH-TDP) within a securitised discourse of collective identity in 
which the presence of populations from Turkey was treated as an existential threat to the 
‘autonomy’ of the Turkish-Cypriot community. The notion of autonomy was visible in the appeal 
to the securitised Cypriotness discourse which regarded Turkish settlers as a homogenous 
constituency that invariably supported the nationalist status quo and the Turkish tutelage over 
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Turkish-Cypriot affairs – a reference to the inability of the Turkish-Cypriot community to take 
hold of their own destiny. The political call for reunification of the island and EU membership was 
therefore based on a dissociation from Turkish interference and voiced as an invocation for 
greater autonomy in a federal future, that is ‘finding an own place under the sun’ for Turkish 
Cypriots. Yet, the study has also shown that despite the framing of EU membership as ‘crafting 
its fate in own land’ — and in longing for emancipation and autonomy from Turkey —  the leftist 
parties were acutely aware of the unacceptability of such an exclusionary social imaginary 
(crafted along ethnic lines) for large numbers of naturalised Turkish-Cypriots (Turkish settlers 
with ‘TRNC’ citizenship).  Faced with suspicion and a potential rebuke at the polls that could 
jeopardise plans to conclude the peace negotiations and submit a finalized plan to the 
referendum ahead of the island’s EU accession, the left, and the CTP in particular, thus toned-
down on its anti-immigration rhetoric within a newly formulated, more inclusive ‘imaginary’ 
making the EU the focal aspect of identity narrative. The party’s rhetoric was modified to 
represent a more-inclusive notion of ‘Turkish-Cypriotness’ in which identity was articulated 
together with citizenship ties and with reference to human rights. This was only a partial 
discursive shift however, that came about at the eleventh-hour in order to appeal for votes; the 
‘settler issue’ continued to lurk in the background, evidenced in the citizenship-stripping court 
battles on the eve of EU accession.  
 
Similar dynamics were also discerned among various civil society groups (section 5.3 in 
Chapter 5) and in the narratives of the leftist newspapers (section 6.3 in Chapter 6). The trade 
union movement in particular, now organised under the ‘This Country is Ours’ platform, linked 
270 
 
its rhetoric on autonomy to embracing EU membership. In this connection, the Platform 
overwhelmingly supported EU membership for Turkish-Cypriots in the run up to the referendum 
in 2004 that would allow a reunified, federal Cyprus to join the EU (see section 4.2 in Chapter 4). 
An identical link was also shown between the immigration rhetoric of the leftist trade unions 
such as the KTAMS and the Teachers’ Union and the issues of identity, societal security and 
political autonomy. In this vein, immigration from Turkey was criticized for instigating the outflow 
of Turkish-Cypriots onto other countries and that the lax immigration regime facilitated the 
‘transfer of population’ from mainland Turkey would, in the long-term, undermine Turkish-
Cypriot autonomy but also endanger the ‘authentic’ Turkish-Cypriot identity through large-scale 
naturalisations. EU membership was once again depicted as a political project which signified a 
new political opportunity that would enable the desired emancipation of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community and offer a safeguard for its long-term autonomy within a federative statehood with 
the Greek-Cypriot community.    
 
The leftist newspapers such as the Yenidüzen, the Ortam and the Afrika, also explicitly 
linked immigration from Turkey and granting of citizenship rights to Turkish settlers onto the 
issues of identity, societal security and political autonomy. This media rhetoric on immigration 
and citizenship stem from a securitised Cypriotness discourse in which the presence of 
populations from Turkey are treated as an existential threat to the presumed ‘authority’, 
‘authenticity’ and ‘ways of living’ of the Turkish-Cypriot society. Within this discourse, moreover, 
Turkish settlers were seen as a homogenous constituency that consistently supported the 
nationalist status quo and the Turkish meddling in Turkish-Cypriot affairs. These claims were also 
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articulated with an appeal to Turkish-Cypriot autonomy and a political project that would 
safeguard it. Significantly, such demands would keep immigration high in the domestic agenda 
ahead of the looming referendum on Cyprus’s reunification on the eve of its EU accession. 
 
 In this context, the position of the influential Kıbrıs newspaper is telling. The newspaper 
that had thus far supported official positions on the Cyprus Problem, displaying suspicion if not 
outright hostility towards the EU, undertook a radical change in its editorial policy to a clear 
support for the ‘yes’ vote in the run up to the referendum in 2004 that would allow a reunified, 
federal Cyprus to join the EU. In parallel, and in stark contrast to its previously muted position on 
the issue, the newspaper also became an outspoken critic of the new citizenships, charging those 
in favour of the status quo with treachery and betraying the political will of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community through illegal naturalisations. On the other hand, the positive, transformative effect 
of the EU rhetoric on newspaper and trade union narratives was much limited. The response of 
the newspapers in this sense to the exclusion of settlers from new freedoms in movement 
following the opening of the crossing-points in 2003 is a case in point. So is the fact that the 
‘settler issue’ sometimes appeared muted within the civil society narrative during and in the 
immediate aftermath of the referendum. Yet, these changes in rhetoric can also be explained by 
the fact that virtually all parties, including those critical of new citizenships, tried to appeal to the 
‘settler vote’ for the elections and also for the referendum. To that end, even the Yenidüzen 
(bearing in mind its close ties to the CTP) toned down its reporting on the issue though only to 
now victimize the settlers that had been ‘targeted’ and ‘manipulated’ during this time by the 
right-wing parties against the Annan Plan and the reunification of Cyprus. In other words, there 
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is scarce evidence from the findings above to suggest a strong normative impact of ‘Europe’ and 
the ‘EU’ to suggest a transformative effect on the identity narratives. Prospects of EU 
membership did reduce to some extent the salience of immigration and citizenship temporarily 
but did not amount to less antagonistic framing of the settler issue or a restructuring of the 
discursive context of identity articulation. 
 
As asserted throughout the empirical chapters (4,5 and 6), the partial nature of the 
discursive modification within the Cypriotness discourse and the absence of a complete 
paradigmatic change, can be explained by the contingent nature of the ‘window of opportunity’ 
represented by EU membership as well as the structural and historical features of the settler 
issue (particularly its linkage to the bilateral relations with Turkey). As the study has further 
asserted, what compromised the potentially transformative effect of the EU on collective identity 
and in effect perpetuated settler antagonisms was the peculiar and rather ‘marginal’ positioning 
of the Turkish-Cypriot community within the post-accession context (see section 3.4 in Chapter 
3) which meant that the ‘EU project’ was unable to consolidate itself into a viable social, and 
perhaps a more inclusive imaginary. Instead, the pro-EU Cypriotness discourse that brought 
together large segments of the Turkish-Cypriot society and led simultaneously a political sea-
change in the run up to Cyprus’s EU accession became disorientated. In other words, the abortion 
of the plan to integrate the Turkish-Cypriot community into the European mainstream obstructed 
the continuity of the common ‘social imaginary’ and thwarted the emergence of a stable 




Moreover, the dislocatory experience of the aborted EU-membership has led to a new 
reconfiguration of the pre-existing elements articulated within the oppositional Cypriotness 
discourse in which settler antagonisms took centre stage. This argument was hypothesized in 
Chapter 2:  
 
Hypothesis 3: With the failure of the ‘Annan Plan’, the pro-EU Cypriotness discourse is 
disorientated and settler antagonisms take centre-stage. 
 
 In this case, this was evidenced by the reintroduction of the immigration-related 
anxieties into oppositional rhetoric which soon took centre stage in organising Cypriotness based 
identity discourses in the post-referendum period. This period was also characterised by a more 
vocal anti-Turkish rhetoric on the part of this camp that surpassed its distinct pro-EU stance. To 
this end, the leftist parties instrumentalised on the anti-austerity sentiment from 2009 onwards 
by adopting a more assertive rhetoric on Turkish-Cypriot identity in general and the bilateral 
relations with mainland Turkey in particular. Inevitably, the renewed context of insecurity which 
put emphasis on Turkish-Cypriot identity further perpetuated the securitised narratives in 
relation to immigration from mainland Turkey.  
  
In a similar vein, the trade unions too argued that the Turkish-Cypriot identity was put at 
risk not only through its positioning in relation to Turkey which excluded ‘mutual respect’ but 
also through the large-scale naturalisation of Turkish nationals that altered the domestic political 
balance, further consolidating Turkish hegemony and tutelage over Turkish-Cypriot affairs. To 
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this end, a series of ‘Communal Survival’ rallies were organised by the KTÖS, KTAMS and others 
in 2011 and 2012 which saw thousands of Turkish-Cypriots taking to the streets to reassert their 
Turkish-Cypriot identity, protest against Turkish-imposed austerity measures and tell Ankara to 
keep its ‘hands-off the Turkish-Cypriot community’. The unions in this context also asserted that 
the ongoing naturalisation of Turkish immigrants (especially during election times) was a form of 
gerrymandering to manipulate results in favour of those parties who aligned themselves with 
Turkey. The analysis of leftist newspaper narratives also confirms these findings. Both the 
Yenidüzen and the Afrika (perhaps more so) have taken a more explicit stance against Turkey and 
the increasingly authoritarian AKP government there, tying a number of elements including 
austerity but also religiosity onto immigration in its articulation of the ‘Turkish-Cypriotness’ 
discourse. In the narratives of their editorials and their columnists, the Turkish-Cypriot relations 
with Turkey are framed as one of subjugation, with immigration as part of the systematic efforts 
to sustain Ankara’s overwhelming influence over the Turkish-Cypriot affairs. From this 
perspective, the AKP government was further criticized for implementing its ‘Islamic agenda’ in 
northern Cyprus through policies to boost the public visibility of religious symbols in the building 
of new mosques but also through the religious indoctrination of the immigrant/settler 
population. 
 
In this sense, the most striking feature of the identity discourses on both sides, has been 
their remarkable modification in relation to the changing context, reflected in the articulation of 
more recent anxieties in their appeal to popular sentiments. As indicated above, this has been 
the case also with the introduction of a ‘human rights’ element within the Turkishness discourse 
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together with a neoliberal argument to further frame immigration as much-needed ‘cheap 
labour’ mainly as a reaction to the oppositional rhetoric of the Cypriotness discourse which seems 
to have dominated the discussions in the second half of the time-period under study. For the 
Cypriotness discourse, on the other hand, the most notable change since 2004 has been in 
relation to the framing of Turkey. While the Afrika’s views on Turkey as an ‘occupier’ or 
immigration as an illegal population transfer did not change, what is striking is that once seen as 
marginal, similar views are now being taken by the more moderate Yenidüzen. Though the paper 
has continued to refrain from using an explicit ‘occupation’ rhetoric, certain elements of this 
discourse has nonetheless spilled into its narrative. Concerns over the religiosity of Turkish 
immigrants/settlers, though not entirely new, were also frequently aired in this period in parallel 
to developments in Turkey, with particular reference to the increasingly Islamist and 
authoritarian AKP under Recep Tayyip Erdogan.  
 
Finally, the study also considered different interpretations of immigration and citizenship 
articulated within critical and marginal discourses. As noted in the conceptual discussion on 
discourse, several interpretations compete for the contents of the same identity signifiers, in 
upholding their own narratives. Their salience, moreover, is determined by the outcome of 
political struggles which eventually brings about the stabilisation (albeit temporary) of one 
interpretation over another. Some of these discourses may be termed ‘marginal’ in the sense 
that they are non-dominant and promote critical narratives and practices, focusing on 
oppression, how powerless groups are oppressed within power relations and the possibilities of 
resistance. In line with much of the conceptual insights provided by the literature, the analysis of 
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these discourses articulated by various civil society actors including the feminists, communists 
but also the immigrant associations (ICSOs) has shown that these actors are often instrumental 
in widening the discursive space by challenging existing public discourses of gender, economy 
and politics (see section 2.5 in Chapter 2). One major finding here, however, points out to the 
difficulty of articulating alternative discourses on immigration from mainland Turkey which may 
contradict meta-narratives in relation to the ‘Cyprus Problem’. Indeed, when marginalised 
discourses come under scrutiny by more powerful discourses, the possibility exists that they may 
be co-opted into the dominant discourse or may undergo extensive modification that renders 
them ‘completely sterile’ (Powers, 2001: 62). The discussion has shown that some of these actors 
in northern Cyprus too have therefore focused on bilateral relations with Turkey as a 
symptomatic extension of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ and as a problem of assimilation (and to a lesser 
extent, occupation) thus perpetuating securitised discourses on immigration and citizenship. 
This, in turn, points out to the pervasiveness of the Cyprus conflict in the organisation of identity 
discourses including those that aim to challenge the existing symbolic order. The following 
section further reflects on these findings. 
 
7.4. Identity politics and kin-state relations in unrecognised states: The Contribution of the 
Thesis 
 
As stated in the introductory chapter and elaborated further in the literature review 
provided in Chapter 2, the focal aim of this research has been to contribute to the conceptual 
discussions on immigration and identity change, by applying it to the Turkish-Cypriot case, a 
particularly intriguing example of an unrecognised polity that hosts immigrants/settlers from a 
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kin-state. In this sense, the research sought to provide rich empirical findings with regards to the 
framing of ‘Turkish settlers’ in northern Cyprus, Turkish-Cypriot relations with Turkey in the 
context of domestic identity politics but also on the Turkish-Cypriot society and politics in 
general. It was also posited that the research, although restricted to observations on northern 
Cyprus, provides useful conceptual insights that are of potential comparative value to other case-
studies similar to northern Cyprus, that is in unrecognised states or in fact cases in which the 
context of identity politics resembles that of the identity politics in northern Cyprus involving a 
kin-state (Romania-Moldova relations or Crimea’s relations with Russia for example).  What 
follows is a summary of the thesis’s contribution. 
 
7.4.a. Turkish ‘settlers’ in northern Cyprus   
 
The specific focus of the thesis on Turkish settlers in northern Cyprus is an original, much-
needed contribution to existing academic knowledge on the modern history and politics of the 
island. Whilst the inter-communal conflict and the ‘Cyprus Problem’ has drawn significant 
academic attention over the years, there is scant information on Turkish settlers which is an 
important aspect of that conflict. The immigration-settlement dispute as it features in the 
identity politics of the Turkish-Cypriot community and in the context of its relations with Turkey 
is even more understudied. When they have been studied at all, it has often been through an 
anthropological and socio-psychological approach, insufficiently embedded in the political 
context, or in a language not accessible to the English-speaking world (for exceptions, see 
Chapter 3). This thesis addresses all three omissions by providing extensive empirical findings 
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with regard to Turkish settlers, Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey during a particularly captivating and 
important period (1995-2013).  
 
In the first place, the thesis thoroughly investigated the effect of migration from Turkey 
on conceptions of identity, during two very important periods distinguished by the ‘Annan Plan’ 
referendum on reunification and EU membership, held in 2004. The investigation of the first 
period (1995-2004) provided important knowledge for the gradual securitization of the 
‘immigration issue’ and the citizenship rights of the Turkish settlers which, during that era, was 
framed by the Cypriotness discourse as an existential threat for the distinct identity and long-
term autonomy of the Turkish-Cypriot community, in a similar fashion to the ‘othering’ of the 
Greek-Cypriot community by the nationalist Turkishness discourse. Chapter 3 also discussed how 
the Turkishness discourse promoted the migration from Turkey and the citizenship status of 
Turkish nationals based on kinship and the ethno-mythological ties with the latter but also its 
failure in discursive terms to remain hegemonic. The empirical sections of the thesis (4, 5, 6) also 
discussed how the EU as a framework instigated a temporal change on the framing of the Turkish 
settlers in a more inclusive way by the left but ultimately failing to surpass identity-related 
anxieties during the post referendum period (2004-2013). A focussed literature review, official 
document and news report analysis combined with extensive fieldwork and interviews with 
central actors of this process in each empirical domain (the press, civil society and the political 
parties), provided original and fascinating insights into the framing of immigration and the 




The second contribution of this thesis concerns the modern history and politics of Cyprus. 
The ‘Cyprus Problem’ which has marred much of the recent past of the island has been discussed 
extensively in the chapter reviewing modern Cypriot history from a Turkish-Cypriot perspective, 
by means of tracing the evolution and spread of the Turkishness narrative that came to dominate 
that community, its relations with the Greek-Cypriot part and ultimately the trajectory of the self-
proclaimed ‘TRNC’. In this sense, the investigation uncovered complex layers of identity discourse 
which complement accounts on competing nationalisms in the context of the ‘Cyprus Problem’. 
Even more so, the empirical chapters presented extensive evidence on the socio-political 
development of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Focusing on the remits of the press, political 
parties and civil society, the thesis offered a useful contemporary account of Turkish-Cypriot 
affairs together with detailed profiles of the main societal actors in northern Cyprus. This is a 
particularly important contribution to the existing literature, which is short of scholarly works 
exclusively focused on northern Cyprus as a political and social space. Again, the extensive 
research fieldwork and material that this research was based on, such as the literature review, 
news report analysis and interviews, offered a well-informed insight into the Turkish-Cypriot 
polity.     
 
7.4.b. Identity, non-recognition and kin-state relations   
 
As stated above, the thesis has further sought to provide useful conceptual insights that 
are of comparative value to other case-studies similar to northern Cyprus, such as in relation to 
the presence of settlers in unrecognised states or in fact cases in which the context of identity 
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politics resembles that of the identity politics in northern Cyprus involving a kin-state. The study 
offers an original conceptual framework, combining discourse theory with reflectivist strands 
from two academic (sub-)disciplines: nationalism and immigration studies. Looking at 
collective/national identity from the cross-section of these academic fields permits a much 
broader and fuller understanding. It allows for the incorporation of various theoretical 
approaches (securitization theory and critical approaches to studying nationalism), various levels 
of analysis (distinguished by various domestic remits or empirical domains) and various 
qualitative methods (through discourse analysis of official publicly produced texts, news reports 
and elite interviews). Placing this investigation within the wider discourse-analytical framework 
can complement existing understanding of many aspects of the political relevance of identity in 
particularly intriguing migration settings or contexts involving similar conflict dynamics and/or 
the presence of a kin-state. The current thesis thus offers a particular fragment of the infamous 
‘Cyprus Problem’ but one that points to many ‘bigger’ stories in Europe and beyond. 
 
Indeed, the nature of northern Cyprus as an internationally unrecognised state provided 
important insights for the literatures on nationalism and immigration, beyond what has been 
researched until now. The distinct features of the Turkish-Cypriot case, namely the non-
recognition of northern Cyprus as a sovereign entity and its dependence on Turkey because of its 
international isolation have been the two major factors that have shaped identity politics of the 
Turkish-Cypriot community, rendering Turkish migration a key reference-point for multiple 
conceptions of identity. Lack of recognition means that migration of Turkish nationals into the 
disputed territory controlled by Turkish-Cypriots is deemed illegal (and thus stigmatised) from an 
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international law perspective. But more importantly perhaps, their hosting is seen domestically 
by the opposition groups as the consolidation of the status quo under indirect control of Turkey. 
Turkey in this case acts both as a ‘patron state’ and ‘kin’, and perceptions regarding Turkey are a 
crucial part of the identity politics which acts as a mediating factor in the framing of immigration 
and the citizenship claims of Turkish nationals. As the study has shown, the long standing 
isolation of the community but equally important dependence this has created on Turkey have 
also made the prospects of EU integration all the more important with significant implications on 
the framing of ‘settlers’.   
 
The role of the kin or ‘patron’ is indeed important in other cases of contested states, such 
as Transnistria or in South Ossetia and Abkhazia which enjoy significant Russian support.  
Abkhazia is also interesting as far as the ethnic identification and relationship with the patron 
state is concerned: though mostly Russian citizens and reliant heavily on Russian help, the Abkhaz 
remain very sensitive to any possibility of becoming a minority or their homeland becoming a 
province of Russia (The Guardian, 2016). By extension, other examples of kin-states whereby 
migratory flows but also the dual-citizenship status of co-ethnics have been contributing to 
increased anxieties over identity are increasingly scrutinized within a bourgeoning literature. The 
relations between Romania and Moldova and the changing nature of identification is a 
particularly revealing example from the post-Soviet space (Ticu, 2016). The thesis thus has 
increased relevance to a number of other cases, where research can benefit from the discussion 
of kin-state migration and identity change in northern Cyprus. For future inquiries into the 
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framing strategies, differentiation and contestation in similar cases, the present study can indeed 
offer an important blueprint. 
    
7.5. Conclusion: Looking Ahead 
 
This thesis has sought to shed light onto identity politics in northern Cyprus during an 
exceptional time marked by the prospects of EU accession (1994-2014). A series of identity 
markers have mediated the construction of Turkish-Cypriot identity but the migration of Turkish 
nationals and the citizenship rights of Turkish ‘settlers’ were chosen as the key reference-point 
for the organisation of two dominant narratives which have competed with one another to 
uphold their stories of identity and belonging. The framing of ‘settlers’ within the two rival 
discourses has also revealed the pervasive effect of the bilateral relations with Turkey and the 
non-recognition of the Turkish-Cypriot community, both symptomatic of the ‘Cyprus conflict’ 
that has structured the specific discursive context. The years to come will thus be important to 
test the salience of identity politics and the ‘settler issue’ in a fluid political/diplomatic scene in 
relation to the ongoing negotiations. The aborted plan to reunify the island in 2004, but also the 
slow-moving reunification talks since then has led to a surpassing of the positive ‘EU effect’ by 
insecurity and widespread anxieties in relation to the ongoing migration of Turkish nationals. In 
this sense, it would not be far to suggest that such anxieties are only set to intensify with 
significant and potentially polarising implications for the inter-ethnic relations in northern 
Cyprus, but also the Turkish-Cypriot relations with Ankara. Here, it will be interesting to see to 
what extent the discussions on ‘Political Islam’ (in line with recent developments in Turkey 
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following the coup attempt in July 2016) will gain salience within identity debates in northern 
Cyprus. The impact of Ankara’s attitudes toward northern Cyprus will also be important in this 
context: will Ankara continue in its effort to pull Turkish-Cypriots closer to its orbit? Will it take a 
more pro-active role toward the Turkish citizens in northern Cyprus as it has done recently with 
Turks living in Germany?  In the case of reunification too, there will be a number of new dynamics 
the new context will bore out. Will EU membership lead to a change in attitudes toward the 
migration of Turkish nationals? In what ways, will reunification and EU membership affect 
notions of belonging among the Turkish-Cypriots but also the Turkish settlers? It will be revealing 
to see if a ‘European reading’ of identity will emerge in either case. Indeed, another important 
item on the research agenda opened by this thesis represents the discursive effect of 
‘Europeanization’ over the re-conceptualisation of identity.  
 
The investigation offered here was able to establish a rather temporal and instrumental 
effect and only from a Turkish-Cypriot perspective which began to decrease following the 
abortion of reunification. This does not mean, however, a reduced potential of Europeanization 
in modifying national identity narratives in a less conflictual, or more inclusive way following an 
eventual reunification. Indeed, all these questions testify to the increasing relevance of identity 
politics in northern Cyprus which this thesis has sought to track. In this context, the study offers 
the starting-point for further and in-depth research on each of these themes. The remarkable 
influence of bilateral relations with Turkey as ‘patron’/kin in the context of northern Cyprus’s 
non-recognition on conceptions of identity and the framing thus of Turkish migrants/settlers and 
their citizenship rights, indicates that the topic of Turkish-Cypriot relations with Ankara also has 
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increased research potential.  With or without reunification, moreover, studying the way conflict 
evolves along the relations between an EU member state (Republic of Cyprus) and a non-member 
state (Turkey) would add important insights to further developing the argument presented here. 
This is significant because antagonistic politics is not limited to states outside the EU. The RoC 
position on Turkey in that same context of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ is an illustration (see for example, 
Diez and Tocci, 2010). Thus, future inquiries into the effect of Europeanization over national 
identity narratives in Greek-Cypriot relations with Turkey, and perhaps its own ‘kin-state’ 
relationship with Greece, is among the items in the future research agenda proposed by this 
thesis.   
*** 
 
Paving the way for these exciting avenues for future research, this thesis aims to be a 
significant contribution to existing, albeit limited knowledge and understanding of the much-
contested notion of identity in the original and particularly intriguing research context presented 
in northern Cyprus. With the Cyprus peace talks set to enter a crucial phase in early 2017 
moreover, the issue of Turkish migration and the citizenship status of settlers continues to be 
important. During the most recent round of negotiations that took place since 2014, the leaders 
of the two communities were keen to present the eventual resolution of the conflict as a turning 
point in the island’s affairs and more remarkably a clear path toward a more inclusive entity, 
protecting the citizenship status of all inhabitants including ‘settlers’ (Cyprus Mail, 2016b). 
Nevertheless, the reality is still rather different. Almost 40 years after their first arrival following 
the de facto partition of the island, the presence of populations from Turkey (and their 
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descendants) continues to underpin identity narratives on both sides of the island, and in the 
northern part more notably so. The need to promote multiculturalism and inclusiveness was 
largely ignored as the issue became intimately linked with securitised notions of belonging and 
purpose and framed in the context of the ‘Cyprus Problem’ and through the relationship of the 
Turkish-Cypriot community with Turkey. Against this background, the viability of any solution to 
the conflict will also depend on its ability to address these issues effectively (and quickly) within 
the new institutional-political formulation of governance. In this respect, there is no doubt that 
debates around the issues of immigration, identity and citizenship will continue to shape the 
















APPENDIX 1. ‘COMMUNAL SURIVIVAL MOVEMENT’ LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
1. CTP (‘Republican Turkish Party’) 
2. TDP (‘Communal Democracy Party’) 
3. YKP (‘New Cyprus Party’) 
4. BKP (‘United Cyprus Party’) 
5. KTMMOB (‘Union of the Chamber of Cyprus Turkish Architects and Engineers’) 
6. KTEZO (‘Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Shopkeepers and Artisans’) 
7. KTGB (‘Cyprus Turkish Journalists’ Union’) 
8. Zeytin Üreticileri Birligi (‘Olive Producers’ Union’) 
9. Kıbrıs Türk Taşeronlar Birliği (‘Turkish Cyprus Sub-Contractors’ Union’) 
10. Kıbrıs Türk Taksiciler Birligi (‘Turkish Cyprus Taxi-Drivers’ Union’) 
11. Güzelyurt Lefke Narenciye Üreticileri Birliği (‘Güzelyurt Lefke Citrus Producers’ Union’) 
12. KTAMS (‘Cyprus Turkish Public Servants’ Union’) 
13. KTÖS (‘Cyprus Turkish Teachers’ Union’) 
14. KTOEOS (‘Cyprus Turkish Secondary School Teachers’ Union’) 
15. TURK-SEN (‘Turkish Union’) 
16. DEV-IS (‘Revolutionary Workers’ Union’) 
17. BES (‘Municipal Workers’ Union’) 
18. GUC-SEN (‘Port Workers’ Union’) 
19. TIP-IS (‘Healthcare Workers’ Union’) 
20. CAG-SEN (‘Cyprus Turkish Union of the Public Sector Workers’) 
21. BASIN-SEN (‘Communication Workers’ Union’) 
22. DAU-SEN (‘Union of the Eastern Mediterranean University’) 
23. DAU-BIR-SEN (‘United Union of the Eastern Mediterranean University’) 
24. KOOP-SEN (‘Cooperative Workers’ Union’) 
25. HAVA-SEN (‘Airways Union’) 
26. EL-SEN (‘Cyprus Turkish Electricity Authority Workers’ Union’) 
27. TEL-SEN (‘Cyprus Turkish Telecommunications Authority Workers’ Union’) 
28. DEVRIMCI GENEL-IS (‘Revolutionary Labour Union’) 
29. EMEK-IS  
30. PETROL-IS (‘Cyprus Turkish Petroleum Workers’ Union’) 
31. MAGUSA TURK GENEL-IS (‘Famagusta Labour Union’) 
32. BANK-SEN (‘Bank Workers’ Union’) 
33. GIDA-SEN (‘Food Producers’ Union’) 
34. SAGLIK-SEN (‘Health Workers’ Union’) 












- Despotism of the conspiratorial UBP government has been driving the Turkish-Cypriot 
community to the brink of extinction. 
 
The Communal Survival Movement has decided to wage a struggle until such time that: 
 
- The privatisation plans and other systematic attempts of the AKP government in political, 
economic, social, cultural and demographic spheres, designed to exterminate the Turkish-
Cypriot community are thwarted; 
 
- Conditions for self-rule restored; 
 
- Turkish-Cypriot community takes its rightful place as a member of the international 
community following the resolution of the Cyprus Problem on a federal basis guided by 
the relevant UN resolutions. 
 
Within this framework, the Movement will distribute flyers across the island and in all districts 
on 17 January 2013. On 18 January 2013, the Movement will also hold a sit-in at the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs to protest the arbitrary granting of citizenship status to Turkish nationals aimed 
at undermining our country’s demographic structure. 
 
We hereby invite every conscientious person to take part in the ‘sit-in’. 
 
On behalf of the Communal Survival Movement, 
Ahmet Kaptan (KTAMS Chairman) 
                                                          
170 15 January 2013 
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Sir Münir (on the right) together with 
Herbert Richmond Palmer, Governor 
of Cyprus (1933-1939) at a school 
play performed at the Victoria High 
School for Girls (1937, author’s 
personal archive) 
Public gathering in Atatürk Square ın Nicosia, organised by the 
Turkish-Cypriot community to greet the Turkish Foreign Minister 
Şükrü Saraçoğlu and his British counterpart Anthony Eden. 13 
March 1941, from the author’s personal archive. 
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Freedoms will be prioritized in the new 
administration]’, 13 December 2003 
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anlattı [Rauf Denktas recalls TMT]’, 22 
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Kıbrıslı tutuklandı [2 Greeks, 1 Turk and 1 
true Cypriot gets arrested]’, 23 
September 2003 
Yenidüzen (2009). ‘Postallardan sonra 
takunyalılar [First the ‘Combat Boots’, 










Yenidüzen (2008). ‘Talat: Yetkiyi 
yalnızca Kıbrıslı Türklerden alırım 
[Talat: I take my mandate only from 
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2008 
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turnout would increase the influence 
of illegal voters]’, 20 June 2013 
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APPENDIX 5. INDICATIVE STRUCTURE OF INTERVIEWS  
 







• What are your thoughts on the recent debates about identity? Do you agree with 
those who are concerned about the loss of cultural identity? 
 










• Would you say that there is a demographic erosion in northern Cyprus? 
 
• What are your thoughts on immigration from Turkey? What kind of an impact, if 
any, has this had on the conceptions of identity in your community? 
 









• Northern Cyprus is a non-recognised state. Has this had any impact on conceptions 
of identity? 
 
• In this context, what are your thoughts on the Turkish-Cypriot community’s 
relations with Turkey? 
 
• What were your reaction to (former Turkish EU Minister) Mr Egemen Bagis’ 
statement that northern Cyprus should be annexed to Turkey, if necessary? What 




 ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EU/EUROPEANNESS 
 
 
• Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 but the international isolations over the Turkish-
Cypriot community remain. What are your thoughts on this? 
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